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Has the construction of a European level playing field in terms of policy solutions in 
the merger control field led to a de facto standardisation of European corporate modes 
of representation? This study challenges scholars who have predicted the development 
of a European mode of representation that would accompany the shift of competences 
from the national to the European level of governance.  
 
 Following the establishment of a generic framework of design of corporate 
political strategies – based on the management literature – and adapted to the 
European merger control regime context, French and British firms’ corporate political 
strategies are thoroughly analysed. The comparison refines the original analytical 
framework. Moreover the conclusions of the comparative study show differences in 
corporate political strategies along national lines, although a certain degree of 
convergence can be identified. There are traditional tendencies in choosing strategies 
– although the efficiency of strategies can be assessed case-by-case.  
  
These conclusions are, in turn, analysed in terms of Europeanization. The latter 
concept is defined as a horizontal and vertical process related to the existence of the 
European level of governance. Unlike current conclusions of the Europeanization 
literature this research project highlights five main themes of differences between 
French and British corporate political strategies. In light of these themes the extent to 
which the Europeanization process affects interest intermediation needs to be 
qualified. Both the horizontal and vertical flows have an impact on corporate political 
activity. However, this impact should not be over stated. National constructs and 







By comparing the design of corporate political strategies of large French and British 
firms in the financial services sector, this research investigates the role of interest 
intermediation in European policy-making, notably in the development of the 
European merger control regime. Conclusions will be drawn as to the impact of the 
EU level of governance on corporate political behaviours.  
 
Although many scholars interested in corporate political activities have claimed to 
explain the strategic behaviours of firms, most have described specific tools that tend 
to draw narrow, piecemeal conceptions of strategy. The broader view of the design of 
corporate political strategies is comprised of different elements: message, staging, 
arenas and vehicles, and their articulation. Literature in the field of European interest 
representation has defined 'messages' as information or expertise. However my own 
analysis also focuses on the format in which 'messages' are conveyed. The SAV 
structure (staging, arenas and vehicles) composes the core of my framework of 
analysis, as defined in Chapter 1. Each element of which has been studied 
independently by the literature as reviewed in Chapter 1.  
 
In this project the behaviours of French and British firms in each element of 
corporate political strategy design will be compared. What type of relationship do 
French and British firms establish with the European Commission? At which 
hierarchical level of the European body do firms interact? Do national governments 
interfere in the European merger control regime and when? Preliminary answers to 
these questions in Chapter 4 will be further examined in Chapter 5. This will assess 
the extent to which national modes of interest representation are converging to a 
European mode of representation.   
 
Indeed a central and common theme of investigation, in the field of EU corporate 
interest representation, has recently been the impact of a European level of 
 2 
governance on political strategies of interest representatives. Coen (2007) explained 
that ‘the gradual transfer of regulatory functions from Member States to the EU 
institutions in areas such as […] competition law has contributed to the 
Europeanization of interest groups’. This has yet to be assessed in the context of 
European competition law. 
 
Whereas much interest intermediation literature has focused on collective 
action issues, my own research looks at the whole concept of the design of corporate 
political strategies. Association membership, for instance, represents one possible 
type of actions among different choices available to firms. Secondly I have used 
qualitative research tools – namely semi-structured interviews, participant 
observation, and a comparative case study – when the literature on European 
corporate political activity is largely based upon surveys and quantitative data 
gathering, sometimes combined with interviews (Coen 1998, 2007, Markussen et al. 
2005, Bouwen 2002, 2004a, 2004b, Eising 2004, Broscheid et al. 2003).  
 
This introduction follows the development of the five chapters of my thesis. Firstly I 
will consider the background to my study: the design of corporate political strategies 
in the case of the European merger control regime, in Chapters 1 and 2 of my thesis. 
These two chapters will help to set the décor, establishing a framework of corporate 
political strategy – in Chapter 1 –, adapted to the contextual elements of the European 
merger control regime – in Chapter 2. The specific framework will be used in the 
analysis of my data. The second section, Chapter 3 of my thesis, consists of a 
comprehensive discussion of qualitative research methods used throughout this 
project. The two main methods used in the construction of my research are 
ethnographic and case study, the latter of which is supplemented by semi-structured 
interviews. Chapter 4 of my study is the analysis of data collected according to my 
framework and a comparison of French and British firms in the financial services 
sector. The comparison will provide elements to assess the degree of Europeanization 





1. Background of this project 
 
The European merger control regulation is embedded in a multi-level 
governance structure. European and national levels of governance constantly interact 
to formulate the European merger control regime. The competences of the two levels 
of governance are primarily defined by the turnover thresholds of the merged entity.  
 
Mergers and acquisitions are critical to corporate strategies. Indeed resource 
limitations do not seem to apply in merger cases. Firms have, for instance, sued the 
Commission at high fees1, even though they were legally advised that their chance of 
winning such a case would be slim2
Individual firms and the analysis of their political behaviours, in the European 
context, have been looked at infrequently by scholars, although there has recently 
. Moreover, similar legal requirements of merger 
regimes affect all sectors of the European economy. Conclusions regarding corporate 
political strategies may be drawn on a cross-sectoral basis; a clear gap in the interest 
intermediation literature.   
  
1.1. Designing corporate political strategies and the establishment of an analytical 
framework.  
 
I will be using the term corporate political strategy rather than corporate 
lobbying in this project due to it being a more encompassing concept. Indeed 
lobbying, as defined by Van Schedelen (1993) as ‘the informal exchange of 
information between private actors and the public authorities which [the former] try 
to influence’, is understood as one part of the corporate political activity. This project 
is looking at the whole process from issue identification to representation of interests 
by firms. Referring to corporate political strategy as a term, suggests the integration of 
this element in the overall corporate strategy – understood in more economic and 
business terms.    
 
                                                 
1 My Travel has filed a GBP 518m damages claim against the European Commission for blocking its 
deal to acquire rival First Choice – the amount also takes into account the damages resulting from the 
failure to merge (T-403/05, My Travel Group plc. v Commission). Schneider sued for EUR 1.66bn and 
won the appeal – albeit not for the full amount (T-351/03, Schneider Electric SA v Commission, 11 
July 2007).   
2 Interview with London-based lawyer regarding the Airtours case 
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been a noticeable surge in academic literature in this field. This bias towards 
collective interest intermediation is understandable. European institutions, notably the 
Commission, have favoured the emergence of collective actors that would provide an 
overview of an industry position, instead of a patchwork of conflicting individual 
positions – ‘and perform one of the traditional functions of interest groups, the 
aggregation of demands’ (Mazey et al. 1996). Indeed the European Commission has 
been interested in aggregated knowledge at the European level and has, as a result, 
promoted the establishment of European federations.  
 
European interest representation literature on corporate political behaviours 
has focused on different elements of their political strategies. The management 
literature, on the other hand, suggests different conceptualisations of strategy. By 
considering both academic and practitioners’ literatures in the field of interest 
representation, three elements emerged as the core of the development of political 
strategies; staging, arenas, and vehicles (SAV). These elements are preceded by the 
identification of the message which the company is seeking to convey. Therefore the 
SAV core inserts itself in a wider corporate political strategy design. This framework 
and its establishment constitute the first Chapter of my thesis, and will be further 
developed in the context of the European merger control regime in my second and 
fourth Chapters.  
 
I will also introduce the concept of Europeanization. Indeed the ultimate research 
questions posed by this study are focused on the comparison of national and European 
corporate political strategies, and whether these are affected by the existence of an EU 
level of governance – the assessment of the degree of Europeanization in the 
European merger control regime.  
 
1.2. The European merger control regime 
 
The economic and legal literatures have always been fully engaged in the 
debate of regulating mergers – employing theories of perfect competition or 
maximization of social welfare, for instance. This debate is key for firms and the 
design of their corporate political strategies. Legal and economic theories are at the 
heart of the Commission's merger control decision-making system with a more recent 
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emphasis on economic reasoning – as shown by the appointment in 2003 of a Chief 
Economist3
A classic example of political interference is recognised in the 
Mannesmann/Vallourec/Ilva case
. Political scientists, on the other hand, have only recently considered 
analysing competition policy, and more specifically merger control regimes (Bulmer 
1994, McGowan and Wilks 1995, McGowan and Cini 1999). Are merger transactions 
purely the preserve of an analytical legal and economic framework or are there also 
political considerations to be taken into account? These considerations relate to the 
problematic relations that exist between industrial policy and competition policy. Far 
from being straight forward, positions regarding both policies have evolved in the 
European Union.   
 
4. This was considered a controversial decision for 
the collegiate Commission. Indeed the decision went against the recommendation of 
the Advisory Committee – made up of representatives of Member States – and 
Competition Commissioner Karel Van Miert was outvoted at the College meeting. 
Mannesmann/Vallourec/Ilva5 shows that non-competition factors, in the form of 
industrial goals for instance, can affect the background of decisions. The joint venture 
intended to strengthen the competitiveness of the European steel industry against 
Japanese and East European producers. As a result of this transaction many 
commentators called for an independent competition authority (Schmidt 2001). More 
recently, the Commission threatened to sue both Italy6 and Spain7
                                                 
3 The role of the Chief Economist and its Cabinet is explained by the first Chief Economist in Roeller, 
L-H., Buigues, P.A. (2005), The office of the Chief Competition Economist at the European 
Commission, available at 
 for interfering in 
merger proceedings in the financial services and the energy sectors respectively. 
France struggled to push through the GDF/Suez merger at the European level and 
completed it domestically. This merger was perceived as a governmental effort to 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/officechiefecon_ec.pdf    
4 Case IV/M.315. 
5 ‘The Commissioner for competition, Karel van Miert, was outvoted by 8:8:1 result (…). The case 
shows impressively, that European merger control procedure needs an improvement in its institutional 
conditions. This is demonstrated by the result of the voting procedure by the commissioners. Primary 
non-competition factors in the form of industrial goals were in the background of this decision. The 
joint venture was meant to strengthen the competitiveness of the European steel industry against 
Japanese and East-European producers. Under aspects of an effective competition this decision was 
doubtful’, in Schmidt, A. (2001), ‘Non-competition factors in the European competition policy: the 
necessity of institutional reforms’, CeGE Discussion Paper no.13 
6 The Bank of Italy had delayed the ABN Amro bid for an Italian bank, Antoveneta, in March 2005.  
7 The Spanish government placed conditions on the acquisition of energy company Endesa SA by rival 
companies E.ON. The Commission considered that the Spanish government violated European law 
(November 2006). 
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create a national champion preventing Enel gaining a foothold in the French energy 
market.  
 
Many cases scrutinised at the European level have therefore caused political 
discomfort at the domestic level. The 2006 merger boom has been particularly 
eventful. Nationally sensitive sectors, such as financial services and energy, are 
currently consolidating, and as a result governments are calling for ‘economic 
nationalism’. Over the last decade the European energy markets have experienced 
deregulation and privatisation leading to the break-up of monopolies and vertically 
integrated companies. In many cases these companies controlled the entire supply 
chain, i.e. from gas production to consumer electricity bills. More competition has 
been difficult to introduce at the national level. Even the UK, reputed for its 
liberalism, has been tempted to change its policy approach towards mergers in order 
to protect its energy sector8
The Commission has prohibited 20 cases out of around 4000 cases
.  
 
The consequences of the existence of a European merger control regime are crucial to 
firms and the future business landscape. It is worth noting, however, that the 
European merger regime only applies to certain transactions as defined by the 
thresholds set in the first Articles of the Regulation (Chapter 2). The Regulation is 
attached in Annex 1. Transactions outside the scope are under the responsibility of 
national competition authorities that have their own merger regimes. The European 
merger control regime is firmly built as a multi-level governance structure. 
 
9, and the majority 
of mergers (85%) are actually approved unconditionally in phase I of the merger 
proceedings10
                                                 
8 In April 2006, the UK government considered changing its domestic merger control regime to block a 
potential takeover of Centrica, the UK’s biggest gas supplier, by Gazprom – a Russian state-controlled 
company. Alan Johnson, the then trade and industry Secretary, had been a vocal critic of protectionism 
in the U.S. and Europe. The Financial Times (in April 2006) reported that he was briefed on the legal 
changes required to allow them to block the rumoured bid by Gazprom. 
9 A distribution of the different decisions taken by the Commission can be found in Annex 3, ending 
May 2008.  
. At the European level, notification of mergers under scrutiny of the 
10 Figures are available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/statistics.pdf.  
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European Commission is compulsory11
Stone Sweet and Sandholtz (1997) explained that cross-border activities are of 
increasing importance, ‘[cross-border corporations] expect to find the creation and 
growth of supranational governance (…), rising levels of cross-border transactions 
generate demand for EC rules and dispute resolution’. The need for a European 
merger control regime has rapidly been identified by the European Commission, but 
has failed to generate enough political momentum on its own. Following European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) judgements such as Continental Can
. So how and when do firms interact with the 
Brussels competition authority? What elements matter when interacting with the 
European body? Who will, within the firm, interact with the European merger case 
team? And, why do some firms and not others succeed in pushing through 
problematic mergers?  
 
1.3. The role of firms in the development of the European merger control regime. 
 
12 and Philip Morris13, 
which created a de facto European merger control regime, firms pushed for a 
European level-playing field. Undoubtedly, as will be explained in more detail in the 
second chapter of my thesis, the role of firms has been critical to the 
institutionalisation14 of a European merger control regime by the Council in 1989 in 
the form of a Regulation15
Questions regarding the interactions between firms and the European Commission in 
the context of the European merger control regulation are therefore legitimate. 
However such questions cannot be answered by relying solely on economics or 
legalistic views. Indeed, the economic and legal literatures fail to account for the 
whole of the European merger control regime – its emergence and evolution. The 
.  
 
                                                 
11 See Recital 4 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 802/2004 of 7 April 2004 implementing Council 
Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, ‘Regulation (EC) 
No 139/2004 is based on the principle of compulsory notification of concentrations before they are put 
into effect. On the one hand, a notification has important legal consequences which are favourable to 
the parties to the proposed concentration, while on the other hand, failure to comply with the 
obligation to notify renders the parties liable to fines and may also entail civil law disadvantages for 
them. It is therefore necessary in the interests of legal certainty to define precisely the subject matter 
and content of the information to be provided in the notification’. 
12 Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Co. Inc. v EC Commission (Case 6/72), OJ C68, 
ECR 215, 21.09.73. 
13 1987 Cases 142 and 156/84 1987 ECR 4487. 
14 A weaker regime existed on the basis of Articles 81 and 82.  
15 Council Regulation (EEC) No 4084/89 on the control of concentrations between undertakings.  
 8 
latter literatures are not interested in analysing the intricacies of the relations between 
firms and the competition authority, and their impact on decision-making processes. 
For instance, Newscorp successfully secured a quasi-monopoly – Sky Italia – in Italy 
following the merger between Stream, NewsCorp’s pay-TV firm, with Telepiù16. 
From an economic point of view this may seem to be difficult to defend, and yet the 
European Commission cleared the merger17
However the literature related to interest intermediation explains only partially the 
polymorphic nature of the relationship between the Commission and firms. Although 
some aspects of European Merger Control Regulation, such as the insertion of 
‘legitimate interests’ and Article 9 allowing for the possibility of referrals to national 
competition competent authorities, are remarkable they do not account for the whole 
of corporate interactions with the Commission, and may actually present a distorted 
vision. Indeed micro-analyses of both organisations – the Commission as a 
bureaucracy headed by a political College and firms as multi-layered entities – will 
provide deeper understanding of the interactions. Other scholars have highlighted the 
importance to consider the Commission from an anthropological viewpoint (Abélès 
1993, Bellier 1995, 1997) – as in ‘in terms of the character of the individuals and not 





. Historical institutionalism, one of the strands of new 
institutionalism, has placed the role of institutions in a prominent position in 
European studies. Indeed new institutionalism is usually introduced by the affirmation 
that ‘institutions matter’ (Thelen 1999). Accordingly, institutions have an impact on 
the design of corporate political strategies and represent an independent or intervening 
variable that influence political outcomes (Steinmo et al. 1992). Institutions are 
viewed as the critical variable in any analysis of policy making in that they structure 
the input of social, economic and political forces, and thus influence policy results 
(Bulmer 1998). The impact of the approach will be clearly perceived in the design of 
a framework for studying corporate political strategies as explained in my first 
chapter. 
                                                 
16 Merger Decision IV/M.2876 
17 The clearance – subject to undertakings – allows a merger that created a monopoly and therefore 
provides a permanent example of traditional antitrust policy. This was justified by a weak environment 
in the Italian market for satellite pay-TV that has pushed competitors out of the market and increased 
concentration.  
18 Bellier 1997, p.91 
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As a result my study considers the European merger control regulation as a 
much broader subject of analysis and indeed as a European regime rather than merely 
a Regulation. Chapter 2 reviews these different viewpoints with regards to the 
development of European merger control regime. Some companies interact with the 
Commission at the drafting stages of the regulation or notices, some companies sue 
the Commission following a merger decision, and some prefer staying away from DG 
Comp – the Directorate General in charge of competition policy. All these elements 
will need inserting into the analysis of corporate political strategy, as explained in 
Chapter 2.  
 
2. The Research Methodology 
 
Scholarly work has become increasingly advanced in defining units of analysis 
and choosing methods of research. The management literature, for instance, has 
proved helpful in providing frameworks to analyse political activities (in the 
European literature, Fairbrass (2003) based her paper on the strategic decision-making 
analysis – SDM – a management studies tool, and Dahan (2003) for management 
literature applications). Indeed ‘strategies’ have been a key theme in the management 
literature – a term that political scientists have attempted to adapt to interest 
representation. This project belongs to this stream of work, and is thus partly 
influenced by the management literature to establish a framework for corporate 
political strategies.   
 
Although a framework has been built prior to the data collection phase – as 
explained in Chapter 1 – this research project follows inductive reasoning. The 
ethnographic approach and the use of a geographical comparative case study 
explained in Chapter 3 are natural choices for such an inductive project. Throughout 
the data collection phase of the project, I was thus able to collect first-hand data and 
get involved in the corporate political strategies’ community. Indeed the ethnographic 
approach is based upon the process of describing a culture or way of life as found in 
their settings (Van Maanen 1983). This research method requires close field 
observation, and therefore participant observation as a tool for collecting data that is 
difficult to access. I worked in the European public affairs department of a French 
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bank (BNP Paribas) from February 2006 to July 2006, in Paris. This placement was 
followed by one in the ‘wholesale’ department19
In fact two transactions occurred during my placements. As I joined BNP Paribas, the 
bank was in the process of notifying
 of a British association well-
positioned in the financial services sphere (the British Bankers’ Association) – from 
July 2006 to December 2006. Although these two placements were organised with my 
PhD study in mind, I was also able to join the government affairs department of a 
Dutch bank (ABN Amro) on a part-time basis – from March 2007 to June 2007. This 
string of placements has culminated in my current position within a trade association, 
ICMA – the International Capital Market Association, based in London. This level of 
access to the community has enhanced my process of data collection, notably in a 
context as secretive as that of merger control.  
 
20 the BNL (Banca Nazionale del Lavoro) in Italy 
to European Commission. Whilst at ABN Amro, two suitors were battling for control 
over the Dutch bank: a consortium of banks – Royal Bank of Scotland, Fortis and 
Santander – and Barclays21
My data has primarily been collected in the field of financial services, using 
both ethnographic and case study research strategies. The financial industry is under 
close scrutiny from both the European competition authority
.  
 
22 and national 
authorities23
                                                 
19 The department is more focused on issues affecting major investment banks. It is generally separated 
from the retail banking side.  
20 The transaction M.4155 was formally notified to the European Commission on February 27, 2006. I 
started my placement in the beginning of February.  
21 The consortium finally acquired the Dutch bank on October 2007.  
22 The European Commission has launched some sectoral inquiries in the banking industry on retail 
banking on payment cards and current accounts (the final report was published in January 2007).  
23 The OFT launched in March 2007 an inquiry on bank charges for instance.  
. The role of competition policy has become crucial to the financial 
services industry as it allows firms to compete on a European level-playing field. The 
economic literature has been keen to try and assess the impact of merger regulation on 
the aggregate value of mergers. However, the political science literature has 
comparatively remained quiet about the dynamics of the interactions between 
competition authorities and financial institutions (Grossman 2004 does provide some 
insights in state aid and the financial services). Some authors have nevertheless been 
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writing about interest representation in financial services (Josselin 1996, Bouwen 
2002, Grossman 2004, Quaglia 2005).  
 
The comparative study of French and British corporate political activities in 
the context of the European merger control regime will, through semi-structured 
interviews, allow the collection of fresh new data. This will be explored in Chapter 4. 
Comparative studies are essential to highlight differences and similarities and also 
identify variables that may influence observed discrepancies. Chapter 5 of my thesis 
will attempt to identify either national patterns or European patterns of corporate 
political behaviours in the context of merger control. The extent of influence of 
European policy processes on corporate political activities will be analysed in this 
Chapter. Comparative analysis is essential to analyse the degree of Europeanization of 
corporate political strategies.  
 
3. The Europeanization of corporate political strategies 
 
The Europeanization literature, in the field of interest intermediation, is 
concerned with the extent to which interest representation modes are detaching 
themselves from the developing relationship between firms and the national state. 
This project contributes to the interest representation literature by accounting for the 
role and importance of national policy processes in the design of European corporate 
political strategies. 
 
Based on my definition of Europeanization established in Chapter 1, and building 
upon the research methods explained in Chapter 3, two analytical stages will follow. 
Firstly, analysis of French and British firms, in the context of the European merger 
control regime, will identify the main distinctive features of corporate political 
strategies. Three main elements are identified in the comparative analysis. They touch 
upon all the different elements of the analytical framework established in Chapter 1. 
This analysis looks at the impact of another level of governance in the case of the 
European Merger Control regime. The second stage, Chapter 5 of this project, is the 
explanation of the degree of convergence and divergence of corporate political 
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activities as outlined in Chapter 4. This final chapter will also present rationales for 
questioning the degree of Europeanization of corporate political strategies.  
 
 
 In summary, this project focuses on the current debate of Europeanization in 
European interest intermediation literature. This is a central issue. Much of the 
literature assumes the presence of external forces to explain the Europeanization 
concept. My research methods, and specifically the level of access permitted by my 
ethnographic approach, has generated fresh, interesting data in this field. The analysis 
of the collected data will allow the establishment of a model qualifying corporate 
political strategies. My study compares these strategies of British and French financial 
service firms. The EU merger control regime provides a context to examine whether 







Corporate Political Strategies  




A range of scholars from a wide range of fields have been interested in the study of 
the European merger control regime. Some authors – especially political scientists 
(Bulmer 1994, Cini and McGowan 1998, McGowan 2000) – noted the underlying 
corporate political influence, but no project has analysed systematically, the 
interaction between firms and European institutions in this context. This project 
examines the design of French and British firms’ corporate political strategies 
along four elements (described in the Introduction), henceforth highlighting the 
position of interest intermediation in the European merger control regime. 
Preliminary analysis of the comparison will be further examined in terms of 
Europeanization, in order to assess the degree to which national modes of interest 
representation are in fact converging to a European mode of representation.  
 
Clearly, other pieces of academic work have been concerned with European firms’ 
corporate political activities (Bouwen 2004, Coen 1997, Dahan 2003, Fairbrass 
2003, Saurruger 2003, Van Schendelen 2005, Woll 2006). Scholars seem to be in 
agreement over the fact that corporate interests are, in general, much better 
represented in comparison to other societal interests in the European arena (Mazey 
et al. 1999, Bouwen 2003). Greenwood (2007) suggests that a relative decline in 
the proportion of business associations among the total population of groups, and a 
corresponding increase in the proportion of citizen groups should also be taken into 
account. Yet it remains that numerically the majority of the national and European 
interest representatives in Brussels are business groups. Europe’s evolving 
governance architecture and competencies raises important questions about the 
development of interest representation in a multi-tiered environment, presenting 
sub-national, national and supranational access points.   
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The latter governance structure characterises the European Union as ‘a system of 
continuous negotiation among nested governments at several territorial tiers’24 and 
explains that ‘supranational, national, regional, and local governments are enmeshed 
in territorially overarching policy networks’25
The European system indeed displays many access points which different corporate 
political strategies can use. Firms, from this point of view, have a clear advantage as 
they can follow a variety of strategies to represent their interests to the institutions, 
without necessarily resorting to collective action - whose shortcomings have been 
widely discussed in the literature. At a basic level Bennett (1999) identified three 
main channels available. Firstly, he discusses: 1) the direct route, i.e. developing an 
individual 'Brussels Strategy'. The 2) national association route can be used to lobby 
either European institutions directly as a 'Brussels strategy' or their national 
governments in order to interact with the different European technical committees, 
national officials, and ministers. Thirdly, 3) the European association route remains 
open to businesses. They can either join European business associations directly 
 . The multi-level governance 
theoretical approach takes into consideration the intricacies between the different 
levels of national and European governance and their respective importance in the 
governance of the European Union. As a result, although multi-level governance was 
first developed from a study of EU policy the theory is now being applied to EU 
decision-making processes. Indeed the multi-level governance approach stems from a 
reflection on the existence of overlapping responsibilities between the different levels 
of the European polity. Decision-making processes and policy-making competencies 
are distributed amongst the different levels of the European governance system, rather 
than resting in the hands of one institution. The number of access points is multiplied 
in such a system. Competition policy, and the European merger control regime, as 
will be explained notably in Chapter 2, represent a prime example of multi-level 
architecture.  
 
                                                 
24 Marks, G. (1993), 'Structural policy and Multi-level governance in the EC', in Cafurny, A. et al.(eds.) 
The State of the European Community: The Maastricht Debate and Beyond, pp.391-411 
25 Bache, I. (2005), Europeanization and Britain: Towards Multi-level governance?, Paper prepared for 
the EUSA 9th Biennal Conference in Austin, Texas, March 31 - 2 April. 
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(ERT26 or EFR27 for instance) and/or work collectively with national business 
associations, merging to form 'Euro-groups' or join European federations of 
associations (EBF28
Analysing the interface between European merger control regime’s institutions and 
the interest representation agents meant coming across many books and articles 
looking at this policy based on other specific analytical considerations such as legal or 
economic ones, rather than political ones. Although one article seemed promising in 
its title ‘Discretion and Politicization in EU Competition Policy: the case of merger 
control’
 for example) - by far the most common phenomenon. Another 
form of ‘associational’ route is that of coalitions. Although recognising the difficulties 
to define coalitions, Pijnenburg (98) explained that ‘every form of collective action, 
including business associations, is some sort of coalition’. 
 
29
The emergence of a European merger control regime, as will be analysed in the 
following chapter of this thesis, reflects these academic conclusions – a system 
generated, partly, by ‘social demands’ in order to establish a European level playing 
, it failed to propose a thorough study of the interactions of firms and 
European institutions. My thesis contributes to both the literature on corporate 
political strategies and that on the development of a European merger control regime, 
from a political science perspective, but drawing upon insights from other disciplines.  
 
Sandholtz and Stone Sweet (1997, 1998), in an effort to reconceptualise the “spill-
over” concept central to neo-functionalism highlight that cross-border activities and 
communications generate a social demand for further integration at the European 
level. Mazey and Richardson (1996) explained,  
 
‘There is increasing evidence that economic interests (the multinational 
companies are probably the best example) are increasingly active in pressing for 
standardisation, harmonisation, and for a level playing field within Europe’ 
(p.249). 
 
                                                 
26 European Roundtable 
27 European Financial Roundtable 
28 European Banking Federation 
29 McGowan, L., Cini, M. (1999) 
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field, as will be explained in Chapter 2. However, can one conclude that calls for, and 
the subsequent construction of, a European level playing field from firms in terms of 
policy solutions in the merger control field have led to a de facto standardisation of 
European corporate modes of representation? This is a question that will be addressed 
in Chapter 5.  
 
 Still, as a first step, the study of corporate political behaviours remains key to 
this project. This chapter is primarily concerned with the strategies endorsed by firms 
to interact with the European level of governance, and it also calls for a holistic view 
of the European merger control regime. This research project will attempt to explain 
corporate political strategies in a holistic manner, based upon insights both from 
available literature and from practice. After a review of the corporate political 
strategies – and their integration to corporate activities, I will be explaining basic 
components essential to the design of a corporate political strategy according to a 
model of strategy, inspired by both the political science and management literature, 
ahead of the presentation of differences and similarities of corporate political 
behaviours based on my data collection.  
 
1. Integrating political strategies within corporate activities 
 
The integration of corporate political strategies into corporate activities is a recurrent 
theme in American literature, although is less prominent in the literature published in 
Europe. Although the literature, based on accounts of Commission officials (Mazey et 
al. 2003, Van Schendelen 2005, Coen 2007), points to the sophistication of corporate 
political activities, the hierarchical position of internal departments dedicated to 
European affairs is inconsistent, and therefore limits the systematic analysis of such 
integration. Some departments belong to the Marketing department, others in the 
Communications one, and some are directly attached to the Chairman’s office. In 
addition the relative importance of the department in an organisation seems to be 
directly related to the personalities and ‘European’ experiences of top managers. The 
study of corporate political strategies as an activity of the firm needs to take into 
account American literature conclusions.  
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Porter’s (1980) seminal work introduced the argument that differences 
between firms open opportunities for them to exert competitive advantage over rivals. 
Although governmental influence was acknowledged, active corporate political 
involvement failed to appear in the model (Vining et al. 2005). Applying Porter’s 
model to the political arena, Leone (1986) argued that differential effects of 
government policies, both within and across industries, also provide opportunities for 
the development of competitive advantage – ‘the indirect and unintended competitive 
consequences of [governments] are an important and poorly understood part of the 
[public policy] process’30
After exploring definitions and concepts of strategy proposed by leading 
authors in the field, Hofer and Schendel
.  Authors have, as a result, proceeded to integrate and 
position a ‘political’ dimension to corporate activities. Tullock (1967) and Krueger 
(1974) conceptualised an additional dimension to corporate activity as ‘corporate rent-
seeking’ – the pursuit of competitive advantage through political advantage. The rent-
seeking concept emanates from Adam Smith’s original typology of income: profits, 
wages, and rents. Rent-seeking behaviour, the capture of wealth, contrasts from 
profit-seeking behaviour, the creation of wealth. 
 
Baron’s work favoured a dual corporate activity encompassing a corporate 
political strategy (what he terms ‘non-market’ strategy) and economic ‘market’ 
strategies (1995, 1997, 1999). Aggarwal (2001) builds upon Baron’s ideas when 
proposing an integration of the ‘market position’ of the firm referring to external 
opportunities and threats, and the ‘firm position’ referring to a firm’s internal 
strengths, weaknesses and distinctive competencies and the firm’s ‘non-market 
position’. A merger or acquisition transaction echoes this dichotomy. Indeed the 
choice of the target and the financial structure behind the transaction resemble the 
market strategy of the firm, whereas seeking the approval from authorities constitutes 
the ‘non-market’ element of the corporate strategy.  
 
31
                                                 
30 Leone, R.A. (1981), p. 117 
31 Hofer, C.W. & Schendel, D.E. (1978), Strategy Formulation: Analytical Concepts, St Paul, 
Minnesota: West Publishing Co. 
 developed a corporate strategy definition on 
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three levels - corporate32, business33 and functional34. A fourth level - enterprise 
strategy – was later35
Unsurprisingly many political scientists have attempted to investigate how corporate 
political strategies have ‘developed’ in line with the evolving relationship with 
politics. The insider/outsider differentiation (Grant 1989, 1990) is one of the first 
attempts at modelling corporate behaviours in political environments – characterising 
systems of interest representation. Grant’s typology of groups is based upon the 
degree of intimacy pressure groups enjoys within the policy-making process. Grant 
identifies three kinds of insider groups, all of which are constrained to some extent by 
the ‘rules of the game’: prisoner groups dependent upon government support and low-
profile and high-profile groups. Outsider groups are less constrained. There are three 
 added in order to account for certain environmental aspects, not 
explicitly covered within the other levels. The addition of this level illustrated the 
increasing importance which the firm was having to place on issues generally falling 
in the public policy arena. The issues raised by questions of governance, legitimacy, 
and corporate public policy activities tended to force a re-examination of strategy in 
terms of integrating the firm with its broader uncontrollable environment. Even 
though an organisation may not be able to control its environment, this does not mean 
it cannot influence it. Many of the questions and issues described in the context of 
enterprise level strategic considerations have long been part of the strategy 
formulation process. However, the increasing concern with these broadly based, hard-
to-define issues has forced firms to respond by increasing their importance in the 
planning process (Ryan et al. 1987). 
 
Corporate political strategy will be understood, in this project, as a sequence of 
corporate decisions that represent an integrated set. This concept will be further 
detailed later in this chapter. Its primary aim is to attempt to produce public policy 
outcomes favourable to the firm's economic survival and continued success (Schuler 
1996). Epstein (1969) argued, moreover, that corporate political activity was not an 
end in itself but a means to contribute to the overall strategy of the firm.  
 
                                                 
32 is concerned primarily with answering the question of what business the organisation should be in. 
33 is principally focused on how to compete in a particular industry or product/market segment. 
34 is generally concerned with the maximisation of resource productivity. 
35 Hofer, C.W. & Schendel, D.E. (1979), op.cit. 
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types: potential insider groups will strive to establish credibility through media 
campaigns, meetings with ministers and civil servants. Outsider groups represent 
those lacking the political skills to become insiders. Ideological outsider groups 
deliberately place themselves beyond institutions because they wish to challenge their 
values and authorities. Beyers (2004) distinguished between ‘voice’ and ‘access’ 
strategies – this distinction focused on the representation of interests  and the 
transmission of information to institutions, making it a more advanced versions of this 
insider/outside dichotomy. Bouwen and McCown (2007) added legal strategies to 
these two main political strategies. Legal strategies ‘seek to have a court rule on the 
unconstitutionality or otherwise improper nature of legislative provisions in order to 
change policies’. 
 
Looking at the interaction between the public sphere and firms, some authors have 
argued that business can constitute a rival system of public policy making, one in 
partial competition with the governmental system (Lindblom & Woodhouse 1983). 
Although the influence may not have been perceived as political per se, the position 
of business in economic matters means that corporate executives should be accounted 
for in policy making processes – even though the business sector may not always be 
satisfied. Governmental bodies pay business executives special attention, attention 
reserved for no other group in society, via privileged communication channels. Large 
companies exploit strategically this economic competitive advantage in the political 
marketplace. By their very size, the largest companies enjoy a privileged position in 
the economy, compared with smaller companies for instance. Their performance has 
the most impact on the economy (Lindblom 1977). 
 
The privileged position of business in policy-making is in fact a recurrent theme in the 
literature. Many scholars before this project have argued for business not to be 
described as a traditional interest group. Greenwood (2007) explained that business 
interests had a naturally privileged position in policy-making considered as generators 
of resources – such as market information – which governments need to survive. Very 
large companies can make leverage on the importance of their negotiating position to 
some extent from their size alone, because they possess a structural power and 
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visibility that leads to a routine consideration by policy-makers (Cawson 1997, 
Meznar & Nigh 1995). On the other hand government activity is also pervasive 
throughout economic life. Indeed, as Jackson and Van Schendelen explained, the 
relationship between business and government is to be understood as one of 
interdependency and interpenetration (Van Schendelen et al. 1987). Scholars have 
indeed argued for separating business interest representation from other interest 
intermediation, and such a distinction does seem adequate. In market-oriented 
economies, the business sector plays a key role in order to attain fundamental 
economic goals, such as employment and the growth of national income. At the firm-
level, governmental activities are a key factor to current and future profit generation. 
As a consequence, business firms and trade associations play a justifiable role in the 
development of government policies (Lindblom 1977). The rationale behind firms’ 
involvement, as well the attention they excite in public spheres once they get 
involved, the false dilemma regarding their participation, their economic and financial 
competitive advantage and the expertise they can provide, are convincing arguments 
to distinguish them from other interest groups.  
 
This section argued that political strategies should be an integrated part of the overall 
corporate political strategies. The literature also provides information regarding the 
rationale behind firms’ involvement in the political scene, and the limits to this 
involvement. The next section will give a review of the scholarly work studying the 
field.    
  
2. Explaining the involvement of firms in public policy. 
 
2.1. Why firms get involved at the European level? 
 
As aforementioned there is a substantial interdependence between a firm’s 
economic or competitive environment and government policy (Lenway & Murtha 
1994). Many firms are therefore expanding their efforts to affect public policy 
decisions (Hillman & Hitt 1999) typified by the efforts of integrating corporate 
political activities into corporate activities. Indeed the effects of government policy on 
the competitive position of business represent important determinants of a firm’s 
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performance (Shaffer 1995). The government – and government policies – can prove 
to be a source of uncertainty for firms. The legal uncertainty linked to the fact that 
there was no European merger control regime before 1990 had been a concern raised 
by trade associations such as UNICE36 or ERT37. In June 1988 the ERT, representing 
‘the leading European industrialists, […] expressed [its] strong concern about the 
need to clarify and simplify the control of mergers within the Community’38
Government decisions can potentially impact upon market size through 
government purchases and regulations affecting substitute and/or complementary 
products. Governmental decisions can alter the structure of markets through entry and 
exit barriers by enacting antitrust legislation or alter the cost structure of firms 
through various types of legislation affecting various factors, such as employment 
practices and pollution (Hillman & Hitt 1999). As early as 1969, Epstein argued that 
‘political competition [had] followed in the wake of economic competition’ and that 
the government may be viewed as a competitive tool to create the environment most 
favourable to a firm’s competitive efforts
 and based 
its proposals on three main points: a one-stop-shop, a clear substantive test, and 
appropriate procedural thresholds.  
 
39
 Since national legislation increasingly originates at the European level, 
European institutions have become more important as a target of political activities 
(see Grant 1991, Coen 1997). The chronological description around three main phases 
of the establishment of the European lobby given by Coen (1997) has some merit in 
showing the growing consideration given to the European governance level in the 
view of firms. Coen (1997) identified the first phase as the establishment of the 
European lobby – constructed on a traditional corporatist model. The first phase 
ended with the Single European Act, when a boom in interest group activity, leading 
to an overload of the European political arena, occurred. The final phase introduced 
by the 1992 Commission communication on ‘an open and structured dialogue 
. Therefore it seems logical that firms 
develop an interest in influencing the way markets are regulated.  
 
                                                 
36 Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe (since 23.1.2007 Business Europe) 
37 European Roundtable of Industrialists 
38 European Roundtable (1988), Merger Regulation, Press Statement, 15 June 1988, emphasis added.   
39 Epstein, E. (1969), The corporation in American politics, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, p. 
142 as quoted in  Hillman, A.J. and Hitt, M.A. (1999) p. 826 
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between the Commission and special interests’40
            2.1.1. Too much attention 
 has been coined as the ‘forum 
politics’ phase – with a more focused and elitist structure. Firms regard Brussels today 
as an unavoidable point of access to influencing policy-making. 
 
The literature has identified a variety of rationale explaining firms’ 
involvement in spheres outside their business activities. I have identified three main 
factors that drive large firms to engage in corporate political activities. Firstly, large 
firms attract too much attention from other stakeholders to remain out of such 
activities. As a result, secondly, participating in the ‘political’ arena may not be an 
actual choice for economic agents. Finally firms provide expertise and legitimacy to 
institutions, and consequently represent key contributors to the public policy process.   
 
 
All corporate activities are subject to public scrutiny from one group or 
another. This has brought an increasing number of public policy issues to the attention 
of management. This constant strain places corporations in the position of having to 
design an extensive strategic programme towards the public policy process. The sheer 
diversity of concerns directed at most businesses make determining how, when, and 
whether to deal with specific issues a difficult question to answer (Ryan et al. 1987). 
 
Compared with their smaller counterparts, or other interest groups, large firms 
have a higher degree of visibility vis-à-vis public opinion. Their activities in the 
public policy process are more likely to be related in the press and to rapidly become 
public property.  In the context of merger transactions going through European 
proceedings, Heim (2003) explained, 
 
 ‘Unlike many other jurisdictions, there is an unprecedented level of media 
scrutiny of EU competition cases, which rarely focus on the commercial merits 
of the transaction alone. Press coverage is often more subtle and much more 
deeply informed, going beyond company statements to scrutinising the 
truthfulness of companies’ submission and speculating about the outcome, 
possible remedies and policy considerations influencing the EU regulatory 
decisions. The press has successfully drawn in the active involvement of the 
parties and regulator’.   
                                                 
40 European Commission (1993).  
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Large firms are as a result more vulnerable to adverse media exposure. This degree of 
exposure could lead to political inactivity, thereby depriving corporate critics and 
other interest groups of further opportunities to accuse large corporations of 
dominating society and the public policy process. Regardless is there really such a 
strategy available to firms? The next section will look at this question.  
 
2.1.2. Participation or non-participation, a real choice? 
 
Participation versus non-participation represents the original dilemma for large 
firms as far as political activity is concerned. The section above provides elements to 
explain why firms may not have a choice regarding their participation in political 
arenas. Meznar & Nigh (1995) and Blumentritt (2003) conceptualised this dilemma 
according to two fundamental corporate political behaviours: buffering and bridging. 
Political 'buffering' behaviours are understood as acting proactively by, for instance, 
informing government officials on implementation issues, directly or through trade 
associations. Earlier versions of buffering activities were 'public policy shaping' à la 
Weidenbaum (1980) and 'bargaining behaviour' à la Boddewyn and Brewer (1994). 
'Bridging' on the other hand, corresponds to a more reactive form of behaviour, for 
instance monitoring the development of legislation/regulation in order to implement 
adequate compliance devices when passed. This strategy clearly echoes 
Weidenbaum's (1980) 'passive reaction' and 'positive anticipation' categories, and 
Boddewyn and Brewer's (1994) 'non-bargaining' behaviour. Ultimately, either 
proactively or reactively, firms are necessarily participating in the public policy 
process.  
 
Larger firms also appear to be more convinced of the interrelationship between their 
corporate economic activities and the external public policy environment when 
assessing risk of participation. This has been illustrated by the establishment and 
operation in Europe of the European Round Table (ERT), which is a general business 
association reported to have fundamentally shaped the debate leading to the 1992 
Programme and its implementation (Green Cowles 1995). The recent establishment of 
a European Financial Services Roundtable (EFR) springs from similar concerns. The 
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Roundtables' success is attributed to the direct involvement of CEOs in chairing task 
forces and sitting on policy committees. It is not surprising that these same CEOs 
would insist that their companies should also be actively involved in the public policy 
process, if for no other reason than to be supportive of Roundtable’s activities. This 




In efforts to address public policy problems, corporations have been confronted not 
only by a greater number of issues but also by questions as to the legitimacy of their 
participation in the process. The Corporate European Observatory, ‘a European-based 
research and campaign group targeting the threats to democracy, equity, social 
justice and the environment posed by the economic and political power of 
corporations and their lobby groups’ based in Amsterdam, is systematically 
investigating the role of firms in different European regulatory initiatives. As an 
example, BMW, Daimler, and Porsche won the 2007 ‘worst EU lobby award’. Erik 
Wesselius explained at the award ceremony:42
 
 ‘When the Commission proposed 
compulsory CO2 targets, the car companies reacted immediately with a lobby 
campaign full of misinformation and scaremongering. Decision-makers were 
manipulated with grossly exaggerated threats of factory closures and job losses’. 
Seemingly, corporations are not entitled in the minds of some to have the same rights 
and privileges as other groups and organisations to present and champion their views 
on issues with which they are concerned (Ryan et al. 1987). Yet the economic power 
of large corporations can in some cases be transferred into political power, as 
abovementioned. In turn, this affects their decision-making processes. Moreover, 
above the public scrutiny and because of the potential effect public policy has on their 




                                                 
41 Accordingly, the goal of the political entrepreneur is like the goal of all politically active companies 
in national politics: to secure access to key decision makers, influence policy, and enhance the 
profitability of business operations.   
42 See http://www.worstlobby.eu/2007/winners_en 
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2.1.3. The needed expertise and legitimacy  
 
Arguments in favour of corporate political participation contend that such 
participation is inevitable given the highly diverse and complex nature of issues that 
require collective extensive consultation for them to be successfully resolved. The 
involvement of governments has indeed changed43. There are clear signs of a move 
towards a regulatory form of governance, similar to the ‘American-style regulation’ 
(Majone 1996). Indeed after 1945 the concept of industrial policy was prevalent in 
Europe – the notions of ‘intervention’ and ‘regulation’ were almost interchangeable 
then (Majone 1994), when the United States was already using the concept of 
‘regulation’. The concept of regulatory state has been clearly defined44
                                                 
43 see Coen & Thatcher 2005 
44 The regulatory state has been defined as a rule-making state, attached to the rule of law and, 
normally, preferring judicial or quasi-judicial solutions. Still one cannot conclude that a regulatory state 
is a minimal or a mere 'night-watchman' state. Indeed the breadth of its involvement can be quite large. 
Moreover regulation and intervention are not mutually exclusive. All states intervene in their economy; 
what is of interest is rather the modus operandi of governments and for the purposes for intervention. 
Still the regulatory state favours a support role rather than being a substitute to markets.   
 (Jordana & 
Levi-Faur 2004) and so have its aims – the correction of market failures; and the 
provision of rights. Regarding the former purpose, governments are concerned with 
market power, information asymmetries, and externalities. The latter objective is 
directed at correcting past discrimination and geared to questions of equity 
(McGowan & Wallace, 1996). The European polity has been defined as a regulator 
(Majone 1996). Yet knowledge, rather than resources, is central to regulators’ policy-
making processes. As a result expertise plays a prime role, and the Commission, the 
fundamental regulatory body, is in need of this resource. In its 2002 communication 
on the collection and use of expertise, the European Commission explained, 
 
‘Expertise forms an integral part of a dynamic knowledge-based society. 
Specialist know-how and skills help create new opportunities that can boost 
competitiveness and enhance our quality of life. 
 
It is the task of policy-makers to set up a regulatory environment in which 
these opportunities can be exploited in a sustainable manner for the common 
good. As a condition for success it is crucial that policy choices are based and 
updated on the best available knowledge. This requires access to the right 
expertise at the right time. 
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The European Commission, with its pivotal role in proposing and overseeing 
the execution of European policies, maintains a high level of in-house 
expertise, but also frequently calls on external experts’.45
                                                 
45 European Commission (2002), Communication from the Commission on the collection and use of 
expertise by the Commission: principles and guideline : ‘improving the knowledge base for better 
policies’, COM (2002) 713 final.  
  
 
Therefore the European institutions in general, the Commission in particular, are 
constantly seeking expertise. In contrast to the legislative and executive bodies, 
regulators’ appointment rather than election shapes their behaviours. Bonardi et al. 
(2006) identified different regulators’ objectives: the maximisation of offices’ budget, 
increase in the number of staff, and enhancement of career prospects or political 
reputation. Ensuring institutional legitimacy is perceived to enable regulators to 
achieve these objectives. As a result regulators aim to increase or preserve their 
legitimacy (Majone, 1996) – and therefore design and implement policies 
accordingly. McCubbins et al. (1987, 1989) explained that as a result, regulatory 
decisions should be relying on an informational base in order to be justified. The 
interest representatives, the affected parties in this process, have at their disposal such 
informational competencies, and are therefore in a favourable position to establish a 
fruitful dialogue with European institutions.  
 
Corporations have a legitimate role to play, as they are as much affected as any 
other actor by such issues and can provide valuable expertise in ‘issues’ resolution. 
Indeed there are many public issues either on the current public policy agenda or that 
will make their way onto that agenda which will affect business one way or another. 
The resolution of these issues needs business participation. Business input is crucial 
because of the technical and managerial expertise that business possesses. Theoretical 
approaches to EU ‘lobbying’ have as a result increasingly conceptualised ‘lobbying’ 
as a political exchange (Bouwen 2002, 2003, Michalowitz 2004). Accordingly 
‘lobbying’ activities, referring to the relationship between private and public actors, 
are envisaged as an exchange relation between two groups of interdependent 
organizations – de facto acknowledging the bi-directional attribute of the activity. 
Indeed private actors seek access – and in fine influence – over public organisations, 
and the latter expect information essential to their functioning.   
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The Commission’s position is well known to be that of a long-standing understaffed 
bureaucracy in need of outside input. The Commission is considered as an open and 
accessible body, and this directly relates to its working capacities (From 2002). A 
Commission’s policy document (1993) corroborates, 
 
 ‘The Commission has always been an institution open to outside input. The 
Commission believes this process to be fundamental to the development of its 
policies. This dialogue has proved valuable to both the Commission and to 
interested outside parties. Commission officials acknowledge the need for such 
outside input and welcome it’.  
 
Firstly, the comparatively small bureaucratic Commission staff (Nugent et al. 2002) is 
not able to inform itself sufficiently without external sources. The expertise of trade 
associations, for instance, is seen as a necessary help to reaching decisions that are 
closely oriented at market practice and can be therefore practically implemented. 
Secondly, external input enables the Commission to bypass national governments and 
reach a consensus among those that are affected (Héritier 1999). The Commission has 
institutionalised this practice through its White Paper on European Governance 
(Commission 2001) and the proposed minimum standards for the consultation with 
interest groups (Commission 2002). External input permits the Commission to 
legitimate its role – the participation of external groups in decision-making processes 
allows for a certain degree of consent to be reached. In its White Paper on governance 
(2001) the Commission explains in its ‘participation’ section, 
 
 ‘The quality, relevance and effectiveness of EU policies depend on ensuring 
wide participation throughout the policy chain – from conception to 
implementation. Improved participation is likely to create more confidence in 
the end result and in the institutions which deliver policies’46
Scholars interested in the questions regarding the accountability of the European 
polity have conceptualised inter alia as the enhancement of legitimacy in terms of 
input and output legitimacy. A solution debated currently by the academic literature to 
the perceived legitimacy deficit of the supranational level of governance is the 
.  
 
                                                 
46 European Commission (2001), p.10.  
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enhancement of input legitimacy47
‘It is a tactical choice how much you want to contribute to the case as a third 
party. [Your company] may be in a similar position some time soon. It is a 
case of gauging how much information you are willing to disclose’
. The concept of input legitimacy – or the 
participatory rhetoric (Scharpf 1999) – explains that a democratic governmental 
system achieves its legitimacy by the way decisions are made. In contrast output 
legitimacy relies on the results of the European Union that mirrors the reference of 
‘end result’ in the previous quote; the concept has been notably developed and 
favoured by Scharpf (1999). The basis for legitimacy from input or output-oriented 
governance is different. As Thomassen and Schmitt (2004) explained, 
 
‘In terms of Lincoln’s famous description of the main elements of democracy 
input-oriented legitimisation refers to government by the people, whereas 
output-oriented legitimisation refers to government for the people’ (p.3). 
 
In addition Coen (1997, 1998) further explains that European institutions establish a 
dialogue with firms in order to reinforce another form of legitimacy. The latter form is 
based on using these firms to establish a preferential contact with national 
governments, and this is what he called ‘improved input into national policy 
processes’ and ‘could be used as a Commission intermediary in intergovernmental 
negotiations’. The relationship between the European Commission and large firms is 
clearly interdependent.  
 
Firms are often solicited to provide information in relation to merger cases, 
outside the information provided in the notification dossier. In addition to providing 
information in the context of sectoral investigations conducted by DG Comp, one of 
my interviewees also had to decide whether or not to contribute to the Commission’s 
gathering of information process regarding a merger case. As she explained, 
  
48
The first section has looked at the rationale behind firms’ involvement in the public 
policy sphere. This review answers the question of why firms choose to interact – and 
.  
 
                                                 
47 See Rihackova, V. (2007) for further discussion on solutions discussed by the literature regarding the 
legitimacy issue of the European level of governance. 
48 Interview with author, 08.03.2006, ‘Là tout est question de tactique dans le sens où nous pouvons 
nous retrouver dans une situation similaire à la leur dans un futur proche. Il convient de doser les 
informations données’. 
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therefore, I will be looking at a general level, the degree of rationality with which 
firms enter the public policy sphere – and with which financial means.  
 
2.2. Business, a rational actor? 
 
The literature has taken a clear stance towards rationality of corporate actors. 
Moe (1980) identifies three distinctive assumptions that are central to the notion of 
rational choice: the assumption that each individual is rational; the assumption that his 
decisions are premised on specified types of information; and the assumption that he 
evaluates his alternatives on the basis of specified kinds of values. These assumptions 
are mutually reinforcing, constructing a meaning for an individual to make a rational 
choice in any situation.  
 
Rational choice behaviours are, in their basic forms, choices the benefits of which will 
outweigh the cost. In general, corporate political behaviour is described as an attempt 
to use the power of the government to advance private ends (Mitnick 1993). The 
overall objective is therefore to produce public policy outcomes favourable to the 
firm's economic survival and success (Baysinger 1984, Keim & Baysinger 1988). The 
decision of a company's management to direct corporate resources toward political 
activities represents an important one, firstly, as such activity is expensive, but also 
because corporate political strategies are becoming more complex and controversial 
than previously. Thirdly, the public nature of political activities still poses a degree of 
risk to a company. A firm market position or reputation can be affected when 
advocating certain ideas in the policy arena (Schuler 1996).  
 
Empirical observations indicate that lobbying could also be irrational, reactive 
and ad hoc and not necessarily well-planned, and at least strongly dependent on the 
individual issue or situation. Interestingly, in merger regulation, some companies have 
contested a Commission prohibition – willing to invest time and money 
notwithstanding the fact that the deal could not be revived, as a ‘matter of 
principle’49
                                                 
49 ‘[Airtours] considered that the processes undertaken by the Commission and the conclusions reached 
by the Commission were so bad that almost as a matter of principle they should seek to have this 
decision reversed’, Barrister, London, interviewed on 2nd June 2005.  
. However what can be perceived as ‘emotional’ behaviour may be a long-
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term rational strategy. Following the prohibition of its merger with a competitor, one 
firm explained,  
 
‘The problem [with the prohibition] is that we were very disappointed… but it 
was also a very dangerous precedent for the market. The Board took a very 
long time to decide whether or not appealing against the prohibition decision 
was a good or a bad thing, and we decided that although the chances for 
success may be slim – it was unchartered territory – it was worth doing, 
spending the money and launching the appeal because of  the sort of dead end 
that would be left for future consolidation.  
 
As I said the Board got that right because we were excluded from the process 
of further consolidation, the different purchases etc. […] 
 
So it was not sort of vindictive. We had to do this to get some clarity for the 
industry. And this decision was likely to impair our future strategic 
progresses’.  
 
A vast number of associations, interest representatives and their clients or 
employers seem to do the same work simultaneously and thereby contradict each 
other, standing in each other's way, not creating solutions or complementing each 
other (Michalowitz 2004). Is this behaviour in fact rational? Moe (1980) explains that 
all too often in social science there is confusion about what the concept of rationality 
implies. For him, the problem arises from a tendency on the part of some writers to 
overlook the distinctive contributions with separate assumptions and to lump them 
together indiscriminately under the title ‘rationality’. It is not uncommon, for instance, 
to find the concept of a rational man equated with the classical notion of a ‘rational 
economic man’ – an omniscient decision maker motivated purely by economic gain. 
Moe puts a special emphasis on the influence of the value system in choice processes. 
 
However, evaluations of corporate political strategies and inherent strategic 
elements have been recently explicitly conceptualised in terms of rational choice 
(Bouwen 2002). Corporate political strategies follow rational strategies and can 
therefore be easily pictured in formal models (Broscheid et al. 2003).  
 
Yet this section questions the degree of rationality of firms. Corporations can be 
perceived as rational actors, to a certain extent. Because of the nature of their 
activities, firms can be expected to reach corporate decisions following a rather 
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rational pattern not unlike that put in place for other economic decisions. Already 
talking about strategy ascribes to large firms, acting as political actors, a certain 
degree of rationality. However in political decisions other factors, such as legitimacy 
issues, affect the strategy followed and the business decisions taken with regards to 
political activities. Political matters remain fundamentally different from economic 
matters, and are not the primary activity of large firms’. This distinction refers to the 
typology of income used by Adam Smith between profit, wage, and rent. Entering the 
political arena is primarily a rent-seeking behaviour that does not create value as 
would a profit-making behaviour. Many corporate lobbyists talk of misunderstanding 
from the mother company regarding European affairs, and the fact that they do not 
generate money – in Moe’s terminology a ‘specific kind of value’ that will affect the 
rationality of the economic agent. 
 
           2.2.1. A financial investment issue 
 
Larger companies are more politically active than smaller ones because of their 
capacity of capitalising on more resources, both human and financial, and directing 
them to public policy issues. Larger firms can easily appoint individuals within the 
corporations to public affairs duties or use external consultancies, doing so without 
major disruptions of its core activities. In fact, larger firms are more likely to have a 
top-level executive in charge of the company's public affairs who has direct access to 
the CEO and other high management decision makers. Costs incurred in political 
participation may be easier to account for when reporting to a broader corporate 
shareholder constituency. 
 
Yet, investment in public policy differs from other types of strategic investments, 
such as investment in a new plant and new equipments, in that the benefits are seldom 
fully appropriated by the investing firm, but spill over to other firms. These benefits 
are thus 'collective goods'. Politics is a 'non-proprietary setting where individual 
agents do not always see the full benefit and cost of their decisions'50
                                                 
50 Tollison, R..D.(1982), ‘Rent Seeking : A Survey’, in Kyklos, 35 p. 589 as quoted in Schuler, D.A. 
(1996), ‘Corporate Political Strategy and Foreign Competition: the case of the steel industry’, in 
Academy of Management Journal, 39(3), p.721.  
. Many 
conflicting factors intervene in the corporate political decision-making process. It can 
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be seen as rational to be a proactive participant as it is to be a reactive participant.  
This issue is complex and probably analysed by each firm when considering public 
policy issues.  
 
My first section explained the position corporate political activity may have in 
different firms, encouraging firms to include political strategies in their overall 
corporate strategies. The second part of this chapter demonstrated the rationale behind 
corporate political involvement and the different parameters against which firms’ 
political activity rational and political are constrained. Both the external environment 
and the institutions impact upon corporate political involvement to a certain extent. 
The next section of this chapter will describe the model around the corporate political 
strategy I will be using for the rest of my research.  
 
3. Review of the EU interest representation literature, a strategic view. 
 
In 1995, Andersen and Eliassen highlight in their research agenda of EU lobbying, 
‘the heterogeneity of studies concerning interest articulation’ at the EU level. Some 
papers have tried to comprehensively review the EU literature (Andersen and Eliassen 
1995, Getz, 2002, Greenwood 2003, Woll 2006), yet, they fail to truly account for the 
strategic element that many authors mention. The American academic literature is 
more advanced with international business literature clearly contributing to the 
corporate political activity corpus. Strategies are key to European interest 
representation, as the latter field becomes more professionalised. The academic work 
on EU corporate lobbying is now rich of both qualitative (Greenwood 2007) and 
quantitative (Coen 1997, 1998, 2007) analyses and provides invaluable insights, but 
generally focuses on one element of a strategy (commercial consultancies, Lahusen 
2003; ad hoc coalitions, Pijnenburg 1998, Sabatier 1988; European interest 
associations, Beyers 2004; European Parliament, Bouwen 2004; Council of Ministers, 
Fouilleux et al. 2005; AmCham, Green Cowles 1996).  
 
In order to palliate this gap in the European literature, my review will take root in 
the work of management scholars, building upon a framework for strategy design 
originally devised by Hambrick and Frederickson (2005). According to the authors, a 
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strategy encompasses five elements, namely arenas, vehicles, differentiators, staging, 
and economic logic. My study focuses on strategic behaviours of firms and therefore 
each element needs careful consideration. The academic literature has analysed each 
element in detail– as will be explained in this section – and is useful to either develop 
hypotheses or give a description of the EU interest representation landscape – a 
description that may be more detailed than mine in some instances. My own research 
is thus more holistic. 
 
 Moreover, once again referring to Andersen and Eliassen’s research agenda, 
my thesis contributes to an area less covered by empirical studies - that of the role of 
interest groups in policy-making. Andersen and Eliassen regret in their paper a lack of 
studies that specifically deal with policy-making rather than decision-making. My 
research, and in particular this chapter, develops a framework of analysis adapting 
strategies to the development of a policy, the European merger control regulation. 
This will provide a basis to analyse corporate political strategies in this context. This 
study attempts to fill these gaps in the literature by primarily building upon the 
political science and the management literature.  
 
3.1. A definition of strategy 
 
In almost any commercial environment the term ‘strategy’ is sure to be heard 
on a regular basis. Unfortunately, the term is frequently ill-defined. The term 'strategy' 
has a range of related meanings and authors have generally felt quite free to use it 
idiosyncratically. One of the first business management definitions was that of 
Chandler (1962): ‘the determination of the basic, long-term goals and objectives of an 
enterprise, and the adoption of courses of action and the allocation of resources 
necessary for those goals’ (p.13). The many definitions of strategy found in the 
literature fall into one of four categories: plan, pattern, position, and perspective51
                                                 
51 Nicklos, F. (2000), ‘Three forms of strategy’, available at  
. 
According to these views, strategy is: 1) a plan, a ‘how’, a means of getting from A to 
B; 2) a pattern in actions over time – for example a company that regularly markets 
very expensive goods is using a ‘high end’ strategy; 3) a position, it reflects decisions 
to offer particular products or services in particular markets; 4) a perspective, a vision 
http://home.att.net/~nickols/strategy_forms.htm 
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and direction, a view of what the company or organisation is to become.  In his 
‘Strategy as a political process section’, White (2004) explained, 
 
‘Here the emphasis is on the exercise of power, whether within the enterprise 
or outside it, specifically as it relates to the making of strategy. (…) Strategy 
results from bargaining, compromise and the exercise of power by relevant 
groups. This school is unashamedly processual’ (p.18).  
 
Corporate political strategies are understood in this section of the chapter as a 
‘plan’ – a means of getting from A to B. As a result the framework that will be used is 
one of the set of decisions. Corporate political strategy implies the integration of this 
element in the overall corporate strategy – understood in more economic and business 
terms.    
 
3.2. A five-element management model 
 
Hambrick and Frederickson’s framework for strategy design tries to give a 
detailed answer to questions related to the process firms undertake to engage with 
their environment. This question can easily be adapted to interest representation 
research. Their framework, based around arenas, vehicles, differentiators, staging, and 
economic logic, will constitute the basis of my own model. The context of my study is 
the development of merger control regulation. Within this context and its 
characteristics – institutionally for instance – I questioned at a basic level how large 
firms interact with European institutions, notably the Commission, and what can one 
therefore infer with regards to corporate political strategies? Although many scholars 
focusing on corporate political activities (Tenbuecken, 2002) have claimed to explain 
strategic behaviours of firms, as with the management literature, most writers have 
described specific tools that tend to draw narrow, piecemeal conceptions of strategy. 
As a first step I will match the different elements of Hambrick et al.’s model with the 
European literature on corporate political strategies.  
  
 3.2.1. The ‘arenas’ element 
 
 The first element mentioned by Hambrick and Frederickson are the ‘arenas’. 
A dichotomy has been established, for instance, between political and legal spheres 
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(Bouwen et al. 2007). Van Schendelen (2005) dedicated a chapter to arenas in 
‘Machiavelli in Brussels’. In his section, Van Schendelen advocates for a 
comprehensive analysis of ‘arenas’, ‘an arena is not a physical place, but the virtual 
collection of all stakeholders, including the officials, together with their issues 
regarding a specific dossier at a specific moment. Taken as a whole, it means ‘the 
situation’ on which the answer to the question ‘what is best thing to do?’ depends’. In 
my own analysis ‘arenas’ focuses on the institutional context – the choice of the 
institution as well as the choices related to the internal dynamics and hierarchy of that 
institution. This definition relates to the fact that the object of study is firms and by 
association their relationships with institutions.  
 
Much of the academic work has focused on the interaction of interest representation 
organisations with the different political institutions. The role of the Commission – as 
a target of interest organisations - has attracted the most attention (Broscheid and 
Coen 2003, Staniland 1997 for the study of air transport regulation). According to 
Coen’s data (1997), the Commission is indeed regarded as the best means of 
influencing the European policy process. More importantly to corporate political 
strategies, Bouwen’s (2002) work shows that large individual firms have a higher 
degree of access to the Commission than do EU level associations.  
 
Although the Commission’s role is important, following the introduction of firstly 
consultation and co-operation, and then the co-decision procedure (Corbett 1989), the 
European Parliament has become an integral part of policy-making decisions. 
Unsurprisingly it has been more heavily lobbied, and academics have started to be 
interested in the interest represented at the ‘co-legislative’ body’s level (Kohler-Koch, 
et al.1999, Kohler-Koch 1994, Crombez 2002, Bouwen 2004). The role of the 
rapporteur has especially been scrutinised (Kaeding 2004).  However, as Chapter 2 of 
my thesis will show, in the European merger control regime the European Parliament 
plays a minor role, and will not be thoroughly studied in this thesis.  
 
Intergovernmentalism has repositioned the role of the Council in policy-making 
processes – especially during Treaty negotiations (Moravcisk 1993). However 
interactions with national governments are not confined to ‘grand bargains’ and ‘high 
politics’. The role of COREPER has already been highlighted by scholars (Hayes-
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Renshaw and Wallace 1997). The papers of Council working parties, unavailable in 
the public domain, are circulated by national representations to some interest 
representation organisations. In the case of merger control some interviewees also 
identify their national merger control authorities as helpful hands in some cases. 
Moreover the ‘secondment system’ whereby a national official is delegated to the 
European authority allows for the diffusion of information cross-border and ultimately 
the creation of an epistemic community.  
 
Although the interaction between European political institutions and interest 
representation organisations has been well-documented, only a handful of academics 
have been interested in the relationship between firms and the European Courts of 
Justice – in the context of political strategy (Bouwen et al. 2007). Although the Court 
is neutral and even isolated in the Duchy of Luxembourg – away from political 
influences – it plays a critical role. Some groups have not failed to acknowledge that 
role (see Greenwood 2003 and the case of the Women’s Legal Defence Fund). 
Concerning merger regulation I have elsewhere showed the importance of the Courts 
to the development of the policy (Aubry 2005). Legal strategies are much more 
related to outsider strategies, as the Court’s judges, rapporteurs and Advocates-
General are not lobbied as such. They receive information from the media and the 
legal literature discussing cases (Schepel et al. 1997). Some authors have noted the 
importance of the press (Meznar et al. 2006), notably in merger cases (Heim 2003). 
 
 3.2.2. The ‘vehicles’ element 
 
Hambrick and Frederikson’s second element is ‘vehicles’. Back in 1994, 
Greenwood and Ronit discussed the different channels firms could use to exert 
influence on EU policy making. More importantly they suggested reasons why some 
channels may be used by firms. Interestingly most of the reasons given still ring true 
and the vehicles that firms can choose to interact at EU policy-making level still 
remain. Multi-level governance and corporate interest intermediation literatures 
indicate that many options are open to firms when entering political activity at the 
European level. As mentioned earlier Bennett (1999) identifies three main channels 
available.   
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Focusing on the large firms’ perspective this study favours a two-dimensional 
analysis of routes, based on the direct and associational split. This distinction prime to 
the design of a corporate political strategy mirrors that between core interests and 
secondary issues which Coen (1997) briefly touched upon. As the object of study is 
large firms, one can assume that both direct and associational routes are available for 
their interest representation.  
 
Comparatively, direct representation has emerged late in the history of European 
integration (see Cowles 1996); prior to the single market, firms played a rather 
moderate role at the European level – national perspectives, because of the extensive 
use of unanimity voting were prevailing. Coen (1997) explains changes in corporate 
political representation according to a chronological description around three periods: 
the ‘formative period’ where a ‘lowest common denominator’ style of policy-making 
was customary. The Single European Act and its legislative boom with the removal of 
the need for unanimity on single market measures opened up the Commission to 
lobbyists, making it the second period. The last identified era is the early 90s, the 
post-Maastricht era. The Commission fostered the building of loose groupings – such 
as the Ravenstein group52
A firms’ corporate political strategy may also entail the hiring of consultants (Jordan 
1991, Lahusen 2003, Michalowitz 2004). The literature on the subject remains mainly 
empirical and descriptive. In merger proceedings legal – i.e. law firms – and 
occasionally economic and political consultants are hired. Scholars are divided 
regarding the influence ascribed to consultancies. Their work generally is either seen 
as a mere complement to lobbying strategies (Greenwood 1997, Coen 1997), while 
others argue that more attention should be paid to them (Kohler-Koch 1997, 
 – due to an 'access overload', as Coen describes it. Those 
forums generally provide a better focus than Euro groups. This has led to an 
asymmetry of representation between large and small enterprises in favour of 
groupings of multinational enterprises. A new period might have commenced with the 
Commission White Paper on European Governance that seeks to strengthen the 
relationship between EU institutions and civil society.  
 
                                                 
52 The Ravenstein group is a cross-section of Brussels-based political affairs directors. It is an informal 
industrial club which discusses broad issues; however, it is more a networking group than a policy 
forum. 
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Michalowitz 2004). The larger role is given to viewing them as experts of European 
policy making and institutions. This difference of views probably relates to the policy 
studied. The merger control regime has always required the hiring of lawyers, and, as 
DG Comp moves towards a more economic-based approach, the use of economic 
consultants is increasingly common. ‘Political’ consultants do play a role, yet my 
interviews show that there is clear split regarding their function. Some interviewees 
discard their role totally while others see benefit in listing them. Indeed consultants – 
mainly political – may on the one hand be used as a support platform,  able to perform 
an adequate lobbying function whenever direct lobbying tasks are required in a cost-
effective way; but on the other hand, their expertise make them useful lobbying agents 
for certain tasks. Michalowitz (2004) identified, for instance, five main functions 
performed by political consultants at the European level – an advisory/support 
function at each stage of public affairs, contact provision, the provision of specific 
non-lobbying tasks such as guidance on fund raising activities, a cost-sparing role, 
and a function of crisis management.  
 
As far as the associational route is concerned, the management literature has 
dealt extensively with collective approaches, such as the use of trade associations. 
Accordingly, collective approaches may be appropriate under certain conditions, 
when firms in an industry are unified by external threats such as new technologies 
(Russo 1993), or competing industrial sectors (Staber 1985), or when the expertise or 
resources of any one firm are limited due to small size (Lehne 1993). In general, 
attention to collective strategies (including collective political strategies) seems fairly 
limited among students of strategic management, due at least in part to the emphasis 
on the firm as the unit of analysis (Astley & Fombrun, 1983, Russo 1993). The 
European literature has studied associations extensively, either by countries 
(Denmark, Sidenius 1998, USA, Jacek 1995, the Netherlands, Van Schendelen 1987, 
France, Van den Hoven 2002), sectors (Agriculture - Saurruger 2003; Banking and 
Insurance - Vipond 1995) or policy specific (competition policy, Reid 2003; 
environment policy, Webster 1998) – to name only a few studies from the 
overwhelming number of scholarly work available.     
 
The collective action problem (Olson 1965) has also been much discussed. The 
problem is linked to industry-wide legislative and regulatory decisions. A firm has 
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little economic incentive to incur any of the costs of political action when it knows 
that it will not be excluded from the ‘collective good’ (Olson 1965) that a favourable 
decision will bring. Free riders may thus acquire part of the collective benefits at no 
cost; however, if too many firms in an industry decide to pursue a free-rider strategy, 
the government may decide not to provide the collective benefits (Olson 1965). Those 
firms that choose a follower strategy express their political commitment by paying 
trade association fees and participating in trade association debates. This strategy 
gives a firm some input into the political process while minimising costs. On the other 
hand, followers may have to compromise their individual positions in order to achieve 
the trade association’s objectives. A leader underwrites all costs, even though a trade 
association may exist. Thus, a leader can shape political outcomes and receive a 
disproportionate share of the collective benefits, if the outcome is favourable. 
Interestingly, previous findings have not found any statistically important differences 
between leaders and followers. Therefore followers have the resources available to 
pursue a leadership strategy but have chosen not to53
Strategically collective action is problematic. Yoffie and Bergenstein’s
 (Lenway & Rehbein 1991). 
 
54
                                                 
53 Some researchers (e.g. Baldwin 1985, Olson 1983) have suggested that firms are more likely to 
become organised for political action when their competitive positions have been threatened. Lenway 
& Rehbein’s results, however, indicate that firms may use political processes to complement their 
competitive advantages. 
54 Yoffie, D. B. & Bergenstein, S. (1985), ‘Creating Political Advantage: the Rise of the Corporate 
Political Entrepreneur’, in California Management Review, XXVIII(1), p. 128 
 model of 
political entrepreneurship clearly warns against the involvement of firms in 
established trade associations or interest groups. However resource-based studies 
(Barney 1991, Penrose 1959, Wernerfelt 1984) highlight that collective action may be 
the only available option for a resource-poor firm. Resources can be quantified in 
financial terms, expertise, or time. Indeed although large firms have financial means 
at their disposal, they usually lack the time to be active on all the issues enacting from 
Brussels, as these are only a portion of what an in-house public affairs person is 
supposed to work on. In the case of the European merger control regulation firms are 
wary of having DG Comp know their reaction regarding policy developments. They 
fear long-term negative implications should they interact with the European authority. 
Associations are, therefore, a platform to convey political inputs without being named 
– in the collective clock concept identified by Greenwood (2000). This will be 
analysed in more depth in Chapter 4.  
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 At a basic level the vehicles element, in designing corporate political 
strategies, are split between direct and associational routes. This section has explained 
both routes in considering the advantages and disadvantages of different options 
offered to firms. The next element of the Hambrick et al. framework relates to the 
choice of these options.  
 
 3.2.3. The ‘differentiators’ element 
 
The third element of the framework is ‘differentiators’. Hambrick et al. (2005) 
indicate that this element should answer, in a corporate environment: ‘How will we 
win in the marketplace?’ The literature has been rather quiet regarding differentiators 
– the topic is harder to define in comparison to the identification of arenas or vehicles 
(Moe 1980). And yet differentiators are a critical element of the design of a political 
strategy as it accounts for choosing one option over another one, or to follow two 
routes simultaneously. In Britain, for instance, the financial services sector is 
populated with numerous associations, with a usually overlapping constituency base. 
Therefore this element is underlying each decision made on each element of the 
framework and does not appear as a separate element in my framework for analysis. 
 
Translated into a public policy research agenda, differentiators are, for instance, what 
can guarantee access – the access goods described by Bouwen (2002). It can also 
reflect the quality of the relationship established with officials – a long term one, 
rather than an ad hoc one. It may also represent the possibility of combining a ‘high 
level’ and ‘technical’ style of interest representation, which is a concept that will 
become important in my analysis in Chapter 4. However another ‘internal’ dimension 
should be added to this external view, as previously mentioned firms, especially 
multi-nationals, can either opt for a direct representation of interest or choose the 
associational route. The options may be limited to only direct representation in the 
case of a merger. Moreover some associations will have an overlapping constituency 
base, as aforementioned, and can work on the same issues. Internal factors will 
determine what use to make of an association rather than another. One may be more 
aggressive when another one is seen as more consensual. One may be more expert 
than another one on some topics.  
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As aforementioned these issues are softer issues that may be difficult to 
integrate as a separate element in a framework for analysis of corporate political 
strategies but needs flagging up at this stage of the thesis, as they are considered in the 
overall design of corporate political strategies.  
 
 3.2.4. The ‘staging’ element 
 
The fourth element comes under the banner of ‘staging’. Many authors in 
political science have pointed out the importance of some stages of the public policy 
process – notably agenda-setting and implementation. Applying the principal-agent 
theory to European interest intermediation, Michalowitz (2004) hypothesises that due 
to the functional divisions between lobbying agents, which in her associations 
include: in-house lobbyists, political consultants and other agents; corporate actors 
will use different lobbyists strategically upon consideration of the public policy life 
cycle stage.   
 
The ‘stagist’ approach – a common approach dividing the policy process into 
phases and stages beginning with policy formation and ending with evaluation and 
termination – is often perceived by scholars as an over-simplification of public policy 
(see Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). The framework is based upon the postulate that 
policies emerge from the interrelationships between intentions and actions of political 
participants. Ergo the procedure allows the formulation of pertinent questions about 
the effectiveness of the policy process, but also about the differential influence of 
stakeholders according to their ability to set the political agenda. The approach has 
been widely criticised55
                                                 
55 Sabatier and Jenkins (1993, pp.1-4) offered a five-point critic of the PPLC. 
 for it creates an artificial view of policy making. Many 
interpretations to the public policy process have emerged as a result. John (1998) has 
distinguished five main streams, that will be also of use here – institutional, 
group/network, socio-economic, rational-choice, and idea-based. The ‘stagist’ 
approach can only offer a roadmap to research, identifying different stages of 
analysis. Often compared to the London underground map, this framework simplifies 
reality, distorts it even, but highlights the key element to one’s journey in a 
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manageable way. The idea is therefore to identify key milestones in the public policy 
process when corporate actors actively interact with the institutions to further develop 
the European merger control regulation (EMCR). More importantly, the very 
procedural mechanisms of the EMCR (as explained in Regulation 139/2004 in Annex 
1), and the amendments of the regulation (political crisis, Green Paper, reviews and 
final regulation), invite intuitively to view the regulation as a replicate of a public 
policy life cycle.   
 
Many cycles comprise of three or four of such stages. The life cycle often begins with 
changing expectations creating a gap between reality and expectations – the 
formulation of an issue. Only when the size of the ‘window of opportunity’ is wide 
enough, for instance affecting a significant number of people or impacting extensively 
upon corporations it can appear on the political agenda – the politicisation of an issue. 
As far as European institutions are concerned, the Commission’s role as initiator of 
legislation puts the institution in a strong position at this stage. The legislative phase 
refers to the time period surrounding the enactment of legislation dealing with the 
issue and its implementation. The rules of the game for business are being changed in 
this phase with the formal enactment of legislative and regulatory requirements. New 
legislation and regulations may require considerable debate and bargaining and even 
be the subject of court rulings. But at this stage, the issue has become institutionalised 
– the institutionalisation stage. The last stage, the litigation stage, is one of 
implementing the new rules of the game. During this period, there may be many 
negotiations between the government and businesses regarding enforcement 
provisions. If government agencies do not believe a business is successfully meeting 
the new rules and negotiating breaks down, they may file suit in court to force 
compliance. At this stage, the potential for conflicts between business and 
government is most acute.  
 
A four-element public policy cycle, as shown in Figure 1, will be adapted and further 
examined in the next chapter. At this stage, the importance of identifying different 




Fig 1: The stages of the Public Policy Life Cycle based on John (1998) 
 
 3.2.5. The ‘economic logic’ element 
 
Hambrick and Frederickson explain that the economic logic, the last element 
of their framework, answers the question of how a firm will obtain its returns. They 
present the examples of lowering of cost through scale advantages or through scope 
and replication advantages, the charging of premium prices due to unmatchable 
service or due to proprietary product features.  
 
The economic logic could be defined in general terms as obtaining a favourable 
outcome for the firm whose interests are represented. If strategy is understood as a 
plan, this element is the ‘B’ position firms want to reach, knowing that they are at 
situation ‘A’. This vague definition is adaptable to each stage of the policy 
development of merger regulation. At the policy making stage, for instance, firms 
hope for a regulatory framework that is useful – legal certainty, a one-stop shop, etc. 
Each stage will define the rest of the elements to be chosen. The management 
literature evaluates objectives according to the SMART criteria – accordingly 
objectives should be Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant and Time Bound. In 
turn the SMART framework will be helpful in conceptualising the position ‘B’ - a 
large business will want to achieve in the political environment and show how it 
integrates with its corporate activities.  
 
All these elements have been identified for commercial activities. However as 
mentioned throughout each section on the individual elements, Hambrick and 
Frederickson’s model can be adapted into a framework for the analysis of corporate 
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political strategies. This will be explained in further details below. This section also 
pointed to the interdependence of the different elements, but also establishing a 
certain degree of hierarchy. The staging element is to be considered in first position. 
All these components will be further studied in the next section of this chapter, in the 
context of the European merger control regime.  
 
4. A four-element structure to corporate political strategy  
  
 Based on the review of the European literature on interest representation and 
on the management framework discussed above, how can a model for corporate 
political strategy be developed?  
 
As defined in a previous section of this chapter, strategy can be defined as ‘a plan, a 
‘how’, a means of getting from A to B’. This definition begs, first and foremost, the 
inclusion of two elements in the model of strategy design – i.e. that of a start situation 
‘A’ and that of a final position ‘B’. The situation ‘A’ is defined externally and 
internally (see Figure 2). This basic understanding of strategy mirrors my own 
definition of corporate political strategies as an encompassing process from 









• Internal factors 
• External factors 
 ‘the outcome most favourable 
to the firm’ 
 
Fig 2: The ‘economic logic’ of design of corporate political strategies 
 
Situation ‘A’ and position ‘B’ will affect in turn the large firms’ message to the 
political environment that will be the basis for the corporate political strategy. The 
message refers to Hambrick et al.’s ‘economic logic’ – a critical element of a 
corporate political strategy.  However this element precedes the design of a political 
 45 
strategy. The main type of message identified by the literature is information or 
expertise. By ‘message’ in this context, I am not only interested in the substantial 
form of it but also the format in which the messages are conveyed to the interlocutors 















 MESSAGE  
 
 Fig. 3: From the economic logic to the message 
 
On the basis of Hambrick and Frederickson’s framework I have identified 
three other key elements to incorporate into corporate political strategies that 
represent the core of the strategy. The ‘economic logic’ was referred to in the 
‘message’ component and differentiators are omnipresent in the design of corporate 
political strategies as was mentioned in this chapter. These core elements are: staging, 
arenas, and vehicles – the SAV core of the model. The components will allow for the 
establishment of a generic approach to corporate political strategies. This will in turn 
serve as the basis for comparing French and British firms’ corporate political 
strategies.  
 
As aforementioned the staging element will be considered first in the design of 
corporate political strategies, as it directly impacts which institutions are involved – 
the ‘arenas’ element. In turn the latter element has, to a certain extent, an impact on 
the ‘vehicles’ element, as some ‘arenas’ may prefer some vehicles rather than others – 
as Bouwen (2002) showed in his conclusions.   
 
The staging and arenas elements were previously described. Chapter 2 will explain 
the contextual characteristics of these elements related to the European merger control 
 46 
regime. In the design of a corporate political strategy these two elements come first. 
They relate to the public policy development, and have an impact on the choice of 
vehicles by firms. 
 
One of the main tasks of a public affairs department is to monitor, identify, and 
prioritise issues of relevance for its business, i.e. assess the determinants of situation 
‘A’. However the scarcity of resources and the number of issues that may affect a 
company lead public affairs staff to focus on certain issues rather than all of them, as 
highlighted by the resource-dependency theory (Bretherton et al. 2005). Resource-
dependency theory suggests that agents lacking resources will seek to establish 
relationships with other agents to obtain these resources.  
 
Although this seems to be rather obvious, the process whereby issues are selected is 
difficult to pin down. One European public affairs specialist56
 ‘The only way you can [assess the lobbying strategies to adopt] is by 
understanding what the business wants out of it. So we have links within the 
business units at different levels. Within each of the business units, there are a 
number of people who are our first points of contact. On any particular issue, 
we will find the technical expert within the business, and they will build an 
internal team for themselves around this particular issue, which will go up 
and down within their particular business area’
, based in London, 
explains that his way to draw the corporate priority list is to assess how much value 
for the business each issue holds. This is usually done via the establishment of 
internal working groups in the different business units. Consultation paper responses 
for instance are built upon the feedback ‘the business’ sends back to the public affairs 
department. Accordingly the public affairs department acts as an interface between 
the business and political stakeholders.  
 
57
                                                 
56 Interview with author, London, 13th December 2005.  
57 Interview with author, London, 13th December 2005.  
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In the design of my strategy I have added the element ‘C’ which represents the 
political outcome of this effort. ‘C’ could be, but is not necessarily, the same as the 
position ‘B’. The diagram below reflects the different stages of the design of a 
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Fig.4: The design of a corporate political strategy 
 
 I have established in this section a basic framework for the design of a 
corporate political strategy. The different elements of this framework will be further 
detailed in the context of the European merger control regime in Chapter 2 and 
therefore understood in the context of this project, and then tested empirically – as 
will be explained in Chapter 3. Although the data collected will be helpful in 
understanding how French and British firms interact with the Commission and how 
the choice of the different elements is made, the data will also highlight at which point 
French and British firms differ in selecting the elements of corporate political 
strategies. These differences will form the basis of a wider discussion on whether 
 48 
corporate political strategies are national or European in the context studied. To 
introduce this discussion, the next section will define Europeanization. 
  
5. Defining Europeanization 
 
 The main current debate based around the concept of “Europeanization” in the 
literature is interested in, as far as the study of interest intermediation is concerned, 
the extent to which interest representation modes are detaching themselves from the 
structuring relationship with the national state. Yet, the scholarly community has no 
defined definition for the concept of Europeanization (Olsen 2001, Vink 2002).  
 
5.1. The different definitions of Europeanization 
 
In fact, Olsen (2001) identified five possible uses of the term Europeanization. 
According to his article on ‘The Many Faces of Europeanization’, the term can firstly 
refer to geographical changes. Secondly the literature on Europeanization used the 
concept to identify the development of institutions and governance structures at the 
European level. Thirdly, the term denotes the penetration of national and sub-national 
systems – a top-down process. Fourthly, Europeanization evokes the exportation of 
forms of political organisation and governance that are typical and distinct for Europe 
beyond the European territory. Finally, the concept explains the political project that 
is Europe aiming at a unified and politically stronger area.  
 
Saurugger (2003) presents three possible definitions of the concept – one related to 
the work of Ladrech (1994), the second one based on the work of Risse et al. (2001) 
and finally a definition given by Radaelli (2000). Based on the work of Ladrech 
(1994), the first definition defines Europeanization as an incremental process 
reorienting the direction and the form of politics to the extent that European political 
and economic dynamics have become an element of the organisational logic of 
politics and policy–making at national level, i.e. a top-down process defined by Olsen. 
In an edited volume Green Cowles and Caporaso and Risse (2001) proposed to define 
Europeanization as the emergence and development of distinct structures of 
governance at the European level, i.e. the emergence of institutions related to the 
management of European-based issues, a bottom-up process. Finally based on 
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Radaelli’s work (2000) – itself influenced by Ladrech (1994) - Saurruger identified a 
third definition. Europeanization is defined as a process of ‘(a) construction, (b) 
diffusion, and (c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy 
paradigms, styles, ways of doing things and shared beliefs and norms which are first 
defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated  in the 
logic of domestic discourses, identities, political structures and public policies’.  
 
The array of possible definitions shows the difficulties to grasp the concept. At a basic 
level I understand Europeanization as a process which affects the behaviours of 
agents, particularly at the national level. Questions derive from this definition, 
however further research is needed to answer them. What sort of process occurs? 
Many scholars have identified top-down or bottom-up sources of the process, but I 
will add a horizontal element. My data collection and Chapter 4 will analyse the 
corporate political strategies of French and British firms and which of these elements 
have been Europeanized. My Chapter 5 will attempt to explain the differences in 
corporate political strategies and analyse the extent to which national systems affect 
corporate political strategies. This project is solely interested in the European 
corporate political strategies. However further research is needed on the changes of 
national corporate political strategies in national systems.  
 
5.2. Europeanization as a vertical and horizontal concept 
 
Europeanization, as a concept, relies heavily on a vertical flow – bottom-up or 
top-down (Ladrech 1994, Radaelli 2000, Cole et al. 2000, Dyson 2002, Thatcher 
2004, Schmidt 2006). Yet such a view is limiting. Indeed global firms are usually 
affected not only by their home state and the European level of regulation. Their 
branches are usually subject to host state supervisory powers. Indeed the Commission 
is dependent upon the Member State to give effect to measures prepared at the 
European level, through implementation of provisions and the day-to-day 
enforcement of rules (Maher 1996). The most frequently designed form of the EC 
legislative measure is the directive, binding as far as policy outcomes are concerned, 
but provides for Member States room for manoeuvre as far as how they reach these 
results. The multi-layered nature of the governance structure within the European 
polity detaches the decision-making centres from the day-to-day enforcement in the 
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hands of national governmental bodies. As Schmidt (2006, p.672) explains, 
‘enforcement is the black hole of the EU’. This can result in discrepancies in the rules 
at Member States level.   
 
In an increasingly global world the largest firms – usually those affected by the 
European level of merger control – have interests in other Member States regulatory 
developments, and in a horizontal component that needs adding to the 
Europeanization process. The creation of pan-European forums where implementation 
is discussed (CESR58, CEBS59, CEIOPS60
 ‘Not all national authorities offer [pre-notification] possibilities. In one of my 
recent cases […], I have managed, for instance, to speed up the procedure 
thanks to the pre-notification possibility. There was no real competition issue 
because of the market structure – we were selling to a LBO [Leveraged 
Buyout]. Moreover this was only possible because the two countries 
concerned, Germany and Poland, accommodated a pre-notification phase’
 for instance in the case of the financial 
services sector) epitomises this regulatory aspect. The multi-level governance 
approach suggests that new and complex vertical and horizontal relationships are 
emerging (Hooghe et al. 2001). Private sector actors have responded to this change in 
their opportunity structure (Smith 2001) in taking advantage of the regulatory 
favourable corporate environment.  
 
In merger matters national developments should be known by firms in order to 
correctly comply with requirements. Anticipating national regulator’s expectations 
could prove useful to smooth out the process or even speed it up. Faced with a 
European-wide merger, one French commentator explained, 
 
61
It also means that public affairs or compliance departments and trade 
associations need to be aware of other Member States’ developments regarding 
implementation measures, and aggregate useful intelligence. This can be done through 
the European Federation platform, but also in less formal settings. European 
Federations provide an opportunity for members to benefit from brainstorming 
sessions between members, assess best practices in other Member States, and the 
.  
 
                                                 
58 Committee of European Securities Regulators 
59 Committee of European Banking Supervisors 
60 Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors  
61 Interview with author, translated by author, Paris, 1st February 2007.  
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positions of other European sectoral stakeholders. As a result, it is a means to develop 
functioning modes (Karpeles 2005).  
 
Recent debates regarding supervision of financial services firms exemplified 
this concept. Cooperation between national supervisors has developed organically 
both to strengthen capacity and to respond to cross-border problems, and to develop 
common supervisory approaches in tackling new forms of prudential risks in banking, 
insurance, and in the securities markets. The Committees which assist the 
Commission in implementation of single market legislation have emerged as a focal 
point for supervisory cooperation. Other activities by supervisors, such as the creation 
of CESR62 (the former FESCO) or the Committee of European Banking Supervisors 
(CEBS), can also help to promote cooperation in this area. Increased cooperation 
among supervisory authorities is key in the management of institutional/prudential 
risk63
The Commission tried to address this problem with the level 3 of the Lamfalussy 
process which fosters better cooperation between supervisors within institutions such 
as CESR, CEBS, and CEIOPS. The underlying conceptual idea is to have supervisors 
following the same way in supervising mergers. However, the approach needs to be 
.  
 
As financial institutions reorganise themselves on a cross-border basis, their 
nationality may become less clear and ascertaining which supervisor should assume 
responsibility in the event of a solvency crisis could become difficult. Here too 
intensive cooperation between supervisors in problem detection and early-response is 
critical. Progress with the adoption in Council of the winding-up and liquidation 
directives in banking and insurance is a vital component of legal clarity in this area. 
The trend towards financial conglomeration is also blurring the dividing-lines 
between financial activities and their related supervision. Cooperation between 
sectoral supervisors should be reinforced in line with progress in the Joint Forum. 
Similarly, the trend towards outsourcing of some financial activities to external bodies 
complicates the task of supervisors in detecting and assessing the behaviour of 
financial operators.  
 
                                                 
62 The Committee of European Securities Regulators.  
63 European Commission (1998), Financial Services: Building a Framework for Action, October 1998 
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practiced – it is a learning curve for all the supervisors. EU forums improve the daily 
operations of supervisors, but they do not mean that supervisors are ready to be less 
influential because they are part of such a forum. Furthermore, such forums or 
authorities are slower than the market: the start of the proposal can be traced back to 
2004, before cases were brought against the Member State. 
 
A sector fully harmonized is one where the same, amended rules apply if there is a 
problem. The directive and the amendments are aimed at these uncertainties and 
lifting the last obstacles for cross-border operations. The proposal offers considerable 
reduction of uncertainties. The issue remains around the achievement of an integrated 
market allowing cross-border mergers, and keeping supervisors. Supervisors are 
accustomed to being very powerful and they have a responsibility towards financial 
stability. The legislative proposal takes into account these expectations and leaves a 
certain degree of discretion to the supervisors. However, it is probable that the final 
outcome will be streamlined and watered down through the consultation process.  
 
Although finance ministers and central bankers should not interfere in the process of 
approving mergers, the Commission realises that supervisors had an important role to 
secure financial stability, and deliver. The proposal tries to tighten the framework so 
there is no abuse of the power, or when if there is abuse of power coercive actions can 
be put in place.  
 
However this type of function is usually endorsed by legal and compliance 
departments within firms, notably in merger cases. They can gather the necessary 
information through local legal and compliance teams. The legislative framework 
may be a European one, but gold-plating64 or silver-plating65
                                                 
64 National rules added to the original European directive 
65 National rules are already more stringent than the European directive. 
 during the transposition 
exercise can affect a firm. Its branches could be subject to other legal requirements 
compared to that of the headquarters. The Commission tries to reduce this possibility 




One main objective of the aforementioned forums is creating a sense of legal certainty 
for firms present in the European market. Because of the nature of the European 
regulatory work and the importance at the transposition stage of national influences, it 
also means that corporate departments and trade associations need to be aware of 
other Member States’ developments regarding implementation measures, and 
aggregate more encompassing intelligence. This can be done through their own 
branches, using their own resources and European associational platforms, but also 
less formal settings.  
 
 At a basic level, I understand Europeanization as a process whereby the 
existence of the European level of governance impacts national modes of 
representation. However I do not limit the process as a solely top-down one, but also 
consider horizontal flow of influence between Member States. Chapter 4 will make 
some suggestions that indeed French firms were looking at British firms as far as their 
corporate political strategies were concerned, for instance. The framework of 
corporate political strategy design explained in this chapter is used in Chapter 4 as a 




 Corporate political activities have been increasingly studied by academics, in 
light of a surge of the involvement of firms in the European arena. 
 
This chapter presents the object of my study - large firms and their corporate political 
strategies. I was firstly interested in explaining the reasons behind firms’ involvement 
in the political arena, as well the dynamics between corporate ‘economic’ activities 
and the political environment. This section led to understanding corporate political 
activities as an integrated part of corporate activities. However one may ask why large 
firms should be active in the political arena? Different rationale is identified in this 
chapter: the attention large firms attract, the expectations of the ‘public’ that affect the 
choice of participating, and finally the expertise and legitimacy needed by the 
institutions. However does it mean that businesses interact in political arenas in a 
rational manner? The ‘specific kind of value’ allocated to a rent-seeking activity 
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explains that businesses follow the pattern of rational actors. The financial allocation 
element to this activity is one that also needs reminding as it differs from commercial 
investments.  
 
Following the review of the reasons why firms should engage in corporate political 
strategies, the logical step was to explain how this could be done. An extensive review 
of the literature on corporate political strategies showed that the literature failed to 
address the design of corporate political strategies as a whole but provided essential 
contributions regarding different elements of the strategies. Using the management 
literature to identify the different elements that need taking into account in the design 
of such strategies, this chapter has established a generic framework for analysis of 
corporate political strategies (as shown by Fig. 4). Four main elements will be 
analysed in subsequent chapters – the message, and the SAV core of the framework, 
namely staging, arena and vehicle.  
 
Finally the ultimate question posed by this project relates to the ‘nationality’ of 
corporate political strategies. Early in this thesis it was useful to understand the 
concept of Europeanization, a concept ascribed different meanings by different 
scholars. At a basic level, I understand Europeanization as a process whereby the 
existence of the European level of governance impacts national modes of 
representation. However I do not limit the process as a solely top-down one, but also 
consider the horizontal flow of influence between Member States. 
 
 This general chapter lays a basis framework for analysis, however it lacks the 
‘contextual meat’ I have chosen to analyse – the European merger control regime. The 





A Merger Control Regime for Europe 
 
 
Acquiring and divesting firms is common practice. The drivers for merging and 
acquiring may differ, yet the basic feature remains – one firm emerges where two 
existed before. Some of the motives identified by the literature are, for instance, 
economies of scale which relate to the efficiency of production. Greater market 
presence and market share are also cited as other motives for merging or acquiring. 
Diversifying business risk is also mentioned. Globalisation and advanced technologies 
have encouraged the sophistication of merger & acquisition – or M&A – activities; 
and a cross-fertilisation of global practices, through the internationalisation of 
transactions, has contributed to regulatory evolutions in different competent 
authorities.  
 
At the European level, the Single Market/1992-programme goaded unprecedented 
corporate restructuring, via notably merger and acquisition, symptomatic of intense 
global competition (Jacquemin & Wright 1993). In this context the Commission 
(1987) regretted its lack of control over market activities, 
 
‘At a time of extensive takeovers and acquisitions often entailing heavy stock 
market activity, the absence of legislation at a Community level that could 
enable the Commission to authorize mergers that are in the Community 
interest is damaging (...) In the unified Community market to be achieved by 
1992, an industrial structure policy must include powers for assessment of 
mergers between forms in different Member States which are becoming more 
and more common’. (p.16) 
 
From this quote it is clear that a European Merger Control Regulation was a long-
waited and needed milestone in the development of a European market and the ‘first 
supranational policy in the European Union’ – the European competition policy 
(McGowan and Wilks 1995). As Mario Monti explained, ‘a law governing merger 
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control is an essential instrument in any competition policy armoury’66
The Community's competition law system has always been considered as 
'special' (Gerber 1994). Although established to protect competition, unlike national 
systems, it did not primarily aim at promoting consumer welfare or industrial and 
technological progress (Commission 1972). Indeed, it was, from the outset, 
established as a part of a program designed to reach a specific political aim - the 
unifying of the European market. As a result competition did not constitute an end, it 
was considered as a medium to achieve the common goals of economic and social 
development of Article 2 (TEC)
, yet a 
European merger regime was long in gestation.  
    
67
This 'unification imperative' (Gerber 1994) is critical to the understanding of 
the development of the competition law institutional framework and the related 
Commission’s competences. In addition to the political goal of replacing conflict with 
cooperation, the Common Market was seen as serving a variety of economic goals. 
The Member States were still recovering from the ravages of the Second World War, 
and economic integration was widely viewed as necessary for rapid economic growth. 
Many also saw economic integration as the only means of dealing with the combined 
economic and political power of the United States (Gloeckler 1998). References to 
this European integrationist agenda still underline the Commission’s interventions in 
merger cases. Commissioner McCreevy, the current Commissioner for the Internal 
Market, faced with a clear case of nationalism in Italy
. Competition rules would allow the integration of 
the national markets and the reduction in trade barriers which were set up by private 




                                                 
66 Monti, M (2002), ‘Analytical framework of merger review’, International Competition Network 
Inaugural Conference, Speech, Naples, 28-29 September. 
67 Article 2 of the EEC Treaty specifies that "The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a 
common market and progressively approximating the economic policies of member states, to promote 
throughout the community a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and 
balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer 
relations between the states belonging to it". 
68 The Bank of Italy was prohibiting the merger of Antovenetta and ABN Amro.  
, has used speeches and other 
public statements to confront the national supervisor. He promoted the emergence of a 
European capital market and the functioning of that market.  
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This chapter aims firstly at setting the scene and contextualising my project. 
My previous chapter laid out elements essential to the design of a corporate political 
strategy. These elements need further detailing in the context of the European merger 
control regime. This chapter will also provide the contextual framework for the 
analysis of corporate political strategies. The development of the European merger 
regime – both at European and national level, the different legal requirements against 
which the European merger regime is administrated, and the institutions central to the 
development of the policy, are thoroughly analysed. This chapter will thus present 
corporate political activities as an integrated part of the development of the European 
policy.   
  
1. The origins of a European merger control regime 
 
 This section follows, to a certain extent, Bulmer’s (1994) threefold 
categorisation of the ‘different’ regimes of supranational control over mergers. The 
first regime is encapsulated by ECSC – European Coal and Steel Community – 
provisions, limiting regulation of mergers to the coal and steel sectors. Subsequently, 
other sectors were subject to some of the 1957 Treaty of Rome provisions, firstly 
under Article 86 (EEC), and then under Article 85 (EEC) 69. Annex 2 provides a 
chronological overview of the development to the formalised introduction of the 
European merger control Regulation. Finally, the coming into force of Council 
Regulation 4064/89 established a specific regulatory framework of control.  The 
fourth added phase accounts for the recent revamp of the merger regulation – the 






                                                 
69 See Annex 2. It provides a chronological view of the development of the European Merger Control 
Regulation.  
70 Namely Airtours, Schneider and Tetra Laval.  
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1.1. From Paris to Rome  
 
 No merger control provisions are included in the founding Treaty of Rome, 
whilst a regime of merger control was provided for in the ECSC Treaty (1951)71
Some authors see an explanation of this omission in the different nature of the 
documents: whereas the ECSC is a traité-loi which specifies the regulatory content, 
the Treaty of Rome (1957) in contrast represents a traité-cadre that establishes a 
framework of action but which compels further legislation to apply the principles 
(Bulmer 1994).  As a Commission official explains
 and 
this despite attachment to the idea of free competition (see Article 3 of TEC). 
Different explanations are proposed to clarify this omission.  
 
72
Moreover given the political (and military) context and the particular place of the 
coal, iron and steel industries – ‘the industries of war’ – in any such revival, merger 
control was deemed as a necessity for the ECSC (McGowan and Cini 1999). As 
McGowan (2000) further explains, conceptions of economic governance and 
productivity were considered as secondary to the question of German economic 
power containment through the development of competition rules in the ECSC. The 
Schuman Plan was explicitly conceived in light of the question of German 
reconstruction, and de facto the question of German cartels and concentrations
, 
 
 ‘The ECSC Treaty was 100 articles long exactly. They clearly said what they 
were going to do, and how they were going to do it. But (…) when it came to 
writing the [Treaty of Rome] Member States governments had since seen that 
the High Authority have been extremely effective to run this sort of 
supranational power. But they did not feel that they could give away virtually 
that degree of control over their own economies, particularly in the field, I 
expect, of state aids. (…) Generally there was not a great deal of will to have a 
sort of merger control at the time’. 
 
73
                                                 
71 Despite subsequent constitutional changes such as the SEA and the TEU, and the fusion of the 
institutions of the three Communities in 1967, merger control in the coal and steel sectors is based on 
separate treaty provisions from merger control for other economic sectors.   
72 Interview with official, DG Comp, Brussels, 18th January 2006. 
73 The German Konzerns question – that worried other founding Member States companies – was 
addressed by the Americans that proceeded with the post-war decartelisation of the German corporate 




Moreover economic concentrations were not necessarily perceived as problematic in 
the 1950s. National economic capacities were taking precedence, and globalisation 
was not yet a matter of economic concern. As Cini et al. (1998) explain, 
 
 ‘Mergers were not seen as a threat to competition, and economies of scale 
were held to benefit industrial competitiveness. This thinking was also 
reflected in the newly evolving domestic competition regimes which also failed 
to take on board the potentially anti-competitive impact of concentration’ 
(p.117).  
 
In the negotiations for the Treaty of Paris Monnet presented anti-trust 
provisions largely inspired by US expertise74 (Ullrich 2006). They were aimed at 
cartel-like behaviour (even though other provisions effectively endorsed collusive 
practices) and were understood to be set up at a supranational level. Indeed Articles 
65 and 66 of the ECSC Treaty were particularly restrictive towards cartels and 
concentrations (reflecting the concerns of the post-war period)75
1.2. A merger control regime based on Treaty provisions 
. Although these anti-
trust proposals met some opposition, the Treaty was agreed upon with the proposed 
measures largely intact. The broad scope for intervention allocated to the High 
Authority can be explained by both French pressure to bridle German heavy industries 
and the absence of national regulatory authorities dedicated to merger control (Bulmer 
1994).   
 
 
As aforementioned, the Treaty of Rome contains no specific match to the ECSC 
Treaty Article 65 and 66. Yet the Spaak Report (1956) introduces clearly the idea of a 
merger control system (Akman 2007). The omission is unlikely to have been 
inadvertent (Cook et al 2000). Although Articles 85 and 86 (EEC) (now Articles 81 
and 82) deal with concepts such as dominance, there is little evidence that those 
responsible for their drafting intended that these should give control over mergers to 
the Commission.  
                                                 
74 Jean Monnet was assisted by Americans in the design of competition policy provisions – Bowie and 
Tomlinson, both eminent members of the Society of Europeans, and George Ball. See Roussel, E. 
(1996), op.cit., p. 601. 
75 For a comprehensive account of the Treaty of Paris see, for instance, Bebr, G. (1953), ´The European 
Coal and Steel Community, a political and legal innovation´, in the Yale Law Journal, 63(1), pp. 1-43.  
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1.2.1. Articles 85 and 86 (EEC) 
 
Both Articles 85 and 86 (EEC) seek to achieve the same objective, namely the 
maintenance of effective competition within the common market as prescribed in 
Articles 2 and 3 of the EEC Treaty. They together lay down a merger control 
structure, though a weak one. The vagueness of both Articles and the limitations of 
the regime in terms of control meant that mergers remained scrutinised by the 
separate national governments, thereby creating a barrier to the development of a 
European single market.   
 
Framed in very general terms, Article 85 (EEC) can claim to catch almost all 
agreements between direct competitors (horizontal restraints) and anti-competitive 
agreements between firms involved in different stages of the 
production/distribution/marketing process within a market (vertical restraints). 
Provisions to control concentrations are concerned primarily with lasting changes in 
market structure - a distinction emphasised in the final text of the Regulation and in 
its application by the Commission. Article 86 (EEC) is similarly general. It deals with 
the abuse of a dominant position, rather than dominance itself, therefore it has an 
extremely limited use. Indeed it can only be used in merger cases where a pre-existing 
dominant position is strengthened. These articles apply only to conduct that affects 
trade between the Member States. Article 90 (EEC)76
 
 (now Article 86) then adapts the 
principles contained in these provisions for applications to state-owned companies. 
The Treaty framers envisioned (in articles 87 through 89 EEC) that Community 
institutions would create a system to develop, apply, and enforce these principles.  
                                                 
76 Article 90 :  
• In the case of public undertakings and undertakings to which Member States grant special or 
exclusive rights, Member States shall neither enact nor maintain in force any measure contrary 
to the rules contained in this Treaty, in particular to those provided for in Article 7 and 
Articles 85 to 94.  
• Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general interest or having the 
character of a revenue-producing monopoly shall be subject to the rules contained in this 
Treaty, in particular to the rules on competition, in so far as the application of such rules does 
not obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them. The 
development of trade must not be affected to such an extent as would be contrary to the 
interests of the Community.  
• The Commission shall ensure the application of the provisions of this Article and shall, where 
necessary, address appropriate directives or decisions to Member States.   
 61 
The Treaty itself provides little guidance for the construction of a merger control 
system, and there is little evidence that the framers had any well-developed 
conceptions of how such a system might look (Gerber 1994). Articles 85 and 86 
(EEC) provide a basic regulatory structure against anti-competitive practices, and set 
out conditions of possible exemption. They also have the merit to allow for 
negotiating opportunities for firms and governments with the Commission (McGowan 
2000).  
 
The preparation of an institutional framework for implementing Articles 85 and 86 
(EEC) dominated the agenda of the Commission’s competition law officials for 
approximately half a decade. The process involved extensive and sometimes difficult 
negotiations amongst the Council, the Commission, the European Parliament, and 
Member State governments, culminating in the 1962 enactment of Regulation 17 
(now Regulation 1/2003), the blueprint for the institutional structure of the 
competition law system. This document encapsulates the independence of the 
Commission in competition matters, as explained in Article 9 entitled 'powers': 
 
 'Article 9 
Powers  
1. Subject to review of its decision by the Court of Justice, the Commission 
shall have sole power to declare Article 85 (1) inapplicable pursuant to Article 
85 (3) of the Treaty.  
2. The Commission shall have power to apply Article 85 (1) and Article 86 of 
the Treaty ; this power may be exercised notwithstanding that the time limits 
specified in Article 5 (1) and in Article 7 (2) relating to notification have not 
expired.  
3. As long as the Commission has not initiated any procedure under Articles 2, 
3 or 6, the authorities of the Member States shall remain competent to apply 
Article 85 (1) and Article 86 in accordance with Article 88 of the Treaty; they 
shall remain competent in this respect notwithstanding that the time limits 






1.2.2. The 1966 Memorandum 
 
During the 1960s, the Commission made no use77
The Commission published in 1966 a Memorandum on Concentration which was the 
result of a study by a group of eminent Professors. The Commission considered 
Article 85 (EEC) unsuitable as a means of control of merger, only the creation of a 
single new organic unit as a result of a merger was considered relevant - a view to be 
overturned later with the Philip Morris case
 of the available provisions 
contained in Article 86 (EEC) for the control of mergers, although it started in the 
mid-1960s – in a Memorandum – to issue statements on how it might use the 
provision. This was partly out of fear of hampering the growth of post-war Member 
State firms as explained earlier in this chapter. Moreover, the lack of any well-
accepted sense of how the provision should be applied made enforcement by a 
politically weakened Commission – following the 1966 Luxembourg compromise – 
highly risky (Bulmer 1994). The fact that Article 86 (EEC) is concerned with market-
dominating firms made the Member States very wary of any attempts to interfere with 
their 'national champions'. 
 
78
Although the Commission did not take advantage, at first, of the conclusions of 
the above-mentioned Memorandum, its first decision to apply Article 86 (EEC) to 
. The 1966 memorandum did not, 
however, exclude the application under certain circumstances of Article 86 to 
mergers. The Commission had regarded Article 86 (EEC) according to the 
Memorandum as an appropriate instrument to control infringements where one 
undertaking ‘already enjoying a dominant position’ in the Community or a substantial 
part of it, ‘get closer to a monopolistic situation following the joining with one or 
several undertakings, and, as a result, limit the number of choices for clients, 
suppliers and ultimate consumers’ (Commission 1966, Part III, p.26).  
 
1.2.3. Merger control regulation proposals.  
 
                                                 
77 Article 86 (EEC) was applied by the Commission for the first time in 1971 in its Continental Can 
decision (see Case IV-26811 OJ 1972, L7, 9.12.71).  
78 1987 Cases 142 and 156/84 1987 ECR 4487 
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merger decisions in the Continental Can case79
However the EC’s limited merger control regime was reactive – it applied only to 
cases where a dominant market position had already been established. In addition the 
test for intervention under Article 86 (EEC) was a strict one. The Court suggested that 
an acquisition had to result in the virtual elimination of competition in that product 
market before the Article could be infringed
, and in subsequent decisions, was to 
mark the beginning of a European merger regime (Elland 1987). Moreover, in the 
Continental Can case, the European Court of Justice extended the scope of Article 86 
(EEC) to include structural changes brought about by mergers and acquisitions. 
Accordingly, it confirmed that Article 86 (EEC) could apply to the acquisition of a 
competitor by a firm enjoying a dominant position. 
 
In initiating proceedings the Commission was not only taking action towards a 
specific concentration, but also seeking to develop the principle of merger regulation 
via Article 86 (EEC). As the Commission explained in its First Report (Commission 
1971, p.16), ‘subject to contrary interpretation of the provision by the Court of 
Justice, the Commission will also apply Article 86 of the EEC Treaty to mergers 
entered into by enterprises in a dominant position to the prejudice of consumers’. The 
Court of Justice held that an abuse may be committed where an undertaking already in 
a dominant position strengthened or extended its position by acquiring control of 
another undertaking, thus substantially fettering residual competition in the market 
concerned. The Court also added to the test that undertakings remaining in the market 
should be placed in a position of dependence vis-à-vis the dominant undertaking, but 




Following its Continental Can decision and recognising the limitations of Article 86 
(EEC) in the context of mergers and acquisitions the Commission was soon to draft its 
.  
 
                                                 
79 Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Co. Inc. v EC Commission (Case 6/72), OJ C68, 
ECR 215, 21.09.73. 
80 It did, however, comment at paragraph 29 that 'such a narrow precondition as the elimination of all 
competition need not exist in all cases'. The concept of collective dominance developed under Article 
82 and the Regulation implies that Article 82, absent the Regulation, could now be a more subtle 
weapon against increased concentration in oligopolistic markets. 
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first proposal of a merger control regulation in 197381. In October 1972 the 
Commission informed the Council of its intention ‘to submit, independently of the 
application of Article 86 to specific cases, proposals for the introduction of more 
systematic supervision arrangements for mergers reaching a certain scale’ 
(Commission 1972, p.28). The relationship between the Continental Can decision and 
the scope and content of the first draft of the merger regulation issued a few months 
after the decision of the Court (at the request of Member States82
Thus, companies did not feel sufficiently threatened to decisively change their 
behaviour. As a matter of fact, the Commission did not make any formal decision 
prohibiting mergers under Article 86 following Continental Can. Only an informal 
approach to see control of mergers was presented in its Tenth Report on Competition 
Policy. The Commission explained that ‘in dealing with various cases during the 
year, [it] was able to work out, with the firms concerned, solutions geared both to 
industrial requirements and the need to maintain adequate competition on the 
relevant market’ (Commission 1980, p.11). Corporate merger advisers were more 
careful in their assessments of market concentration levels at Community and national 
levels and might have considered informal approaches to the Competition Directorate. 
From its inception the draft proposal had little chance of becoming law given the 
) was, however, more 
psychological than substantive. In retrospect the Commission (1990) concluded, 
 
 ‘Given the inadequacy of the existing competition rules in dealing with the 
entire concentration phenomenon at Community level, the need for such a 
regulation was recognised as early as 1974 in the wake of the Continental Can 
judgement. However, at that time, the Council did not give serious 
consideration to the new draft Regulation’.  
 
Indeed although the ECJ agreed upon the use of Article 86 (EEC) in merger control 
matters, the case was actually dismissed on the premise that the Commission had not 
satisfactorily defined the relevant market. 
 
                                                 
81 1973 OJ C92/1-7, 31 October 1973, presentation of first draft proposal to Council of Ministers on 20 
July 1973. 
82 Point 7 of the final Declaration of the EEC summit of October 1972 said that: […] necessary to seek 
to establish a single industrial base for the Community as a whole. This involves the formulation of 
measures that ensure that mergers affecting firms established in the Community are in harmony with 
the economic and social aims of the Community and the maintenance of fair competition as much 
within the Common Market as in external markets in conformity with the rules laid down by the 
Treaty’, Final declaration of the Conference of the Heads of State or of Governments of the Member 
States of the enlarged Communities, point 7. 
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sensitivity in some national capitals. Despite Council rejection, the Commission 
continued to press for such legislation throughout the seventies and into the eighties, 
but its objectives were not aided by a decline in merger activity resulting from a 
continuing world-wide recession. 
 
Yet, due to stiff opposition from Member States, little progress was made until 
a plethora of mergers and acquisitions was to happen in the mid-80s in anticipation of 
the Single Market. Merger control did not materialise as a prominent issue of the 
European political agenda and all three proposals of merger legislation, in 198283, 
198484 and 198685 respectively, failed to find favour with the Council. Commissioner 
Sutherland, responsible at the time for competition policy, indicated publicly on a 
number of occasions from 1985 onwards that no ratifying from Member States would 
leave the Commission no alternative but to rely on Articles 85 and 86 (EEC) for the 
purposes of a merger control86
However the number, size and speed of Single Market Program-induced mergers, 
and the SEA’s pro-integrationist stance gave the Commission, pressed by interest 
groups
.    
 
1.2.4. The 1989 Merger Control Regulation 
 
87
                                                 
83 1982 LJ C36/3, 12.2.1982. 
84 1984 OJ C51/8, 23.2.1984. 
85 1986 OJ C324/5, 17.12.86. 
86 In memo dated 23 July 1987 Mr Peter Sutherland in his introduction of the 16th Report on 
Competition Policy is quoted as saying 'I agree with Parliament if there is no prospect of progress with 
respect to our legislative proposals, the Commission will have to envisage alternative means of 
achieving Community-wide merger control' (See Elland, W. (1987), p.167).   
87 For the proposing of the legislation the Commission had some input from interest groups such as 
ERT and UNICE (See Bulmer 1994). 
, the ultimate legitimate pretext to convince national governments to cede 
more regulatory authority to Brussels. Prominently the ERT and UNICE pushed for a 
supranational regulation structure and for a clear set of rules to be designed for 
companies engaging in merger activity (Bulmer 1994). As the UNICE announced in 
its 1987 Declaration: 
 
 ‘The completion of the internal market by 1992 and the exigencies of 
international competition will give rise to a major restructuring of companies 
in the EEC.  
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National controls on company restructuring, being based on different national 
criteria, are incompatible with the existence of a really integrated market and 
the increasing geographical extension of a large number of markets. 
 
The EEC does not contain any suitable provisions concerning the control of 
company mergers from the competition point of view.  
 
For these reasons, UNICE is in favour of a Council Regulation providing for 
the observance of the rules of competition in the firm of Community-level 
control over European-scale mergers, including joint ventures having a 
concentrative character’88
                                                 
88 UNICE (1987), Merger Control at EC level, UNICE Declaration, 10 November 1987.  
.  
 
In light of the forthcoming Single Market Programme, Member States started to 
appreciate the threat that uncontrolled EC-wide mergers posed to the emerging single 
market, and also the advantage for big businesses of dealing with one European 
competition authority rather than several national ones.  
 
It was against this background that industry demands for the creation of a level-
playing field,’ an essential feature of any common market, and ‘one-stop shop’ for 
merger control reverberated. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) jurisprudence was 
to assist the Commission as it sought to add merger control to its competition 
armoury. The Philip Morris ruling pleased the Commission and enhanced DGIV’s 
(now DG Comp’s) prestige. As the Commission indicated in its 1987 Competition 
Report (Commission 1988), 
 
‘[…] 1987 was a year of considerable importance in that several Court of 
Justice judgements provided the Commission with particularly useful 
guidelines for the implementation of Community competition policy. 
 
A judgement worth particular attention is one concerning the tobacco 
industry, in which the Court ruled for the first time that Article 85 of the 
Treaty could in certain circumstances, be applied to acquisitions of financial 
holdings between two competing firms. The line taken by the Court would 
suggest that the prohibition on cartels contained in Article 85 could possibly 
be applied to certain mergers, both by the Commission and by a national 
court. […] The judgement has far-reaching implications. It underlines the 
need for an economic approach in interpreting and applying Articles 85 and 
86 (EEC)’.  
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However the ruling failed to compensate for the lack of an independent and effective 
European merger regime. It only served to intensify the level of insecurity and 
confusion felt by the business community. Industry, notably the ERT, was at the 
forefront in pushing for an EU merger control regime (McGowan and Wilks 1995). 
Supranational powers granted to the Commission following the Philip Morris case 
and approval systems sought by companies led Member States’ capitals to be opened 
to the establishment of a supranational merger regime (Shea et al. 2006).    
 
Nevertheless, Member States disagreed on the criteria for the Commission’s scope 
as far as prohibitions and approvals were concerned. Moreover an important 
difference laid between those member states that wanted the criteria expressly limited 
to competition issues (especially Germany and UK) and those, such as France, which 
wanted social and industrial policy issues to remain among the criteria that could be 
applied in evaluating merger cases. Whilst the debates over the drafting of what 
became the 1989 Merger Control Regulation were heated and often acrimonious, it is 
important to note that the arguments were largely about the form the control should 
take, rather than about whether regulation was necessary (Cini and McGowan 1998). 
 
As a result, it was not until December 1989 that the Council adopted a 
regulation providing for the prior authorisation of mergers, thus enabling the 
Commission to control economically dominant structures. The 1989 merger 
Regulation constituted a cornerstone of the EU’s competition policy and reflected its 
commitment to the single market programme (Dinan 1999). Mergers were to be 
notified prior to implementation, and the Commission was to prohibit the merger 
when it would 'create or strengthen a dominant position as a result of which effective 
competition would be significantly impeded in the common market or in a substantial 
part of it' (according to the dominance test). The final agreement on the Regulation 
was a classic case of Council of Ministers compromise – about halfway between the 
two proposed thresholds, the smaller against bigger countries battleground, and 
including provisions such as Article 989 (‘The German clause’) and Article 2290
                                                 
89 Under Article 9 a Member State may ask the Commission to conduct its own investigation of a 
merger, if it can make the case that a merger may create an anti-competitive situation on the domestic 
market. This provision reflected German and British wishes not to cede all possible control to Brussels 
(see the merger between Tarmac and Steetley in the UK). 
 (‘The 
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Dutch clause’), and Article 2191
The introduction of a Merger Control Regulation fundamentally altered 
competition policy in Europe. By centralising authority to investigate large mergers, it 
focused attention on the European Commission and greatly enhanced its potential for 
influencing major business decisions. Whereas prior to the Merger Regulation 
authority was scattered among the competition authorities of the Member States, 
efforts to influence decision-making in this area now focused on DG Comp. 
Moreover, because of its enormous political and economic importance, the Merger 
Regulation immediately became the centre of DG Competition’s own attention, 
occupying an exceptionally large part of DG Comp's time, resources, and interest and 
shifting attention away from the conventional areas of the directorate's activity – with, 
for instance, the setting up of the MTF, the Merger Task Force. As a former official 
explained
 on ‘legitimate interests’ to soothe the French 
delegation. In the case of the latter Article, the European approval is not sufficient for 
a merger to be approved; the national hurdle needs to be lifted as well.  
 
92
                                                                                                                                            
90 According to Article 22 it is open to a member government to invite the Commission to investigate a 
merger which falls below the thresholds but which would limit competition within that member state.  
91 ‘Member States may take appropriate measures to protect legitimate interests other than those 
taken into consideration by this Regulation and compatible with the general principles and other 
provisions of Community law.  Public security, plurality of the media and prudential rules shall be 
regarded as legitimate interests within the meaning of the first subparagraph (…)’.  
92 Interview with author, Brussels, 27th January 2006.  
,  
 
‘The real problem was the deadline. They were set by the Council and 
imposed upon the Commission as an obligation to reach the impossible 
effectively, or so it appeared. A merger between companies or a number of 
companies with complex operations, and these were not just mergers, they 
were concentrations which covered ephemeral and complicated structures 
(joint ventures – concentrative or not), and all of this was to be done in 30 
days’. 
 
Furthermore the number of concentration cases notified to the Commission increased 
exponentially over the years as shown in Annex 3 and exceeding all expectations (the 
Commission (1990) expected that 50 notifications a year would be received), making 




1.3. A Community with a European merger control system 
 
When on 21 December 1989 the EMCR was finally adopted it was decided 
that the regulation was to be reviewed before the end of 1993. However, due to strong 
resistance from the Member States, rather than carrying on with the original timetable 
for process, the Commission decided to postpone the review so that it had to be 
carried out at the latest by the end of 1996 (Broberg 1996).  
 
In its report to the Council published in 199393, the Commission confirmed that it 
would review the state of play regarding the merger thresholds before 1996. The 
Commission was always of the view that the original thresholds were too high94
The Green Paper suggested an extensive period of dialogue between the Commission 
and industrial associations, companies and legal advisors and followed a survey of 
300 EU companies undertaken in 1995. The dialogue focused on three main issues: 
thresholds reductions, multiple notifications and joint ventures, and the turnover of 
banks
. The 
Commission’s Green Paper on the review of merger control published in January of 
that year (Commission 1996) indeed suggested lower thresholds. As Overbury, the 
first Head of the MTF, explained at the birth of the EMCR,  
 
‘It is clear that it would be in the interest of consumers and industry for the 
thresholds to be reduced: the trend towards cross-border mergers within the 
Community constantly increases leading to ever more multiple control by the 
national competition authorities. It is equally important that the 'level playing 
field' for competitors created throughout the EEC by the 92 process is 
mirrored by a similar regulatory approach to concentrations irrespective of in 
which member states they take place’ (Overbury 1990).  
 
95
                                                 
93Com (93) 385 final, 28.7.93. 
94 The turnover of the companies involved in a concentration must exceed ECU 5bn on a worldwide 
basis, for at least of two of those companies, ECU 250 million in the Community. The Green Paper 
(Commission 96) suggested that thresholds of ECU 2 billion and ECU 100 million respectively would 
be more appropriate.  
95 The issue related to the calculation of turnover for credit and financial institutions. The Merger 
Regulation like many other national authorities was using assets instead of turnover for purposes of the 
application of Article 1(2). Two problems arose from this method: 1) certain transactions were 
excluded; 2) the geographic allocation of turnover was difficult.   
 (Commission 1996). 
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In May 1997, thanks to the prompting of the Council presidency, Member 
States agreed to a major change on the merger regulation, a general reduction of the 
notification thresholds, as requested by the Commission. The EMCR had matured. 
The Commission proved to be able to handle an ever increasing workload as 
Monetary Union superseded the single market as the driving force for consolidation in 
the EU. In March 1998 a new set of turnover thresholds, extending the Commission's 
jurisdiction, was introduced to supplement the original thresholds and strengthen the 
one-stop shop concept, which had suffered serious erosion as a result of a 
proliferation of national merger control regimes in Europe (Cook et al. 2000). The 
Council agreed to increase the Commission’s role by giving it jurisdiction over 
mergers falling short of the turnover thresholds that require multiple notifications to 
national competition authorities (subject to new thresholds for these cases) and over 
all ‘full function’ joint ventures96
1.4. The 2002 reform package – a regulation reaching maturity? 
, whether concentrative or co-operative. The 
Council’s intent was to obviate the need for companies in certain merger cases to 




Against a backdrop of only one of its decisions overturned by the European 
Courts, the Commission has seen some of its high profile decisions overturned by the 
CFI97 – the Court of First Instance – since 2002. Although the Commission had 
initiated a review of the Regulation as far back as the summer of 2000 (Vickers 2004), 
heightened media attention meant that DG Comp had to engage in a broader revamp 
of the EMCR98
                                                 
96 See Commission (1998), Commission Notice on the concept of full function joint ventures under 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 4084/89 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, OJ C 66 
of 2.03.98.  
97 Since 1989 an additional Court of First Instance has been responsible for the bulk of cases relating to 
competition policy, its creation reflecting the volume of competition cases.   
98 The 2000 EMCR review primarily focused on the criteria for determining which body – the 
Commission or national authorities – should scrutinise proposed transactions. 
. As Monti, then Commissioner for Competition, commented,  
‘In order to ensure that the EU's regime of merger control will continue to 
successfully face the challenges of today and tomorrow, the Commission felt 
that there was some scope for further improvements.  
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Indeed, despite the recent slowdown in merger activity, our system has had to 
cope with a rapidly growing number of increasingly complex cases. Higher 
levels of industrial concentration necessitate greater sophistication in the 
economic analysis, and our decisions are subject to increasingly close 
scrutiny by the European courts, culminating in the judgements delivered this 
year by the Court of First Instance. Last year's case law of the CFI represents 
the most far-reaching judicial "feedback" that the Commission has received 
on its merger enforcement policy since 1990: the judgements deal with 
fundamental substantive, procedural and systemic aspects of merger review at 
the EU level. In particular, it is clear that the CFI is now holding the 
Commission to a high standard of proof, and this has clear implications for 
the way in which we conduct our investigations and draft our decisions.  
I guess I do not have to emphasise that our reform was not triggered by these 
judgements. Nevertheless, we were able to feed some of the conclusions we 
drew from the judgements into our reform project.  
What emerged is a reform package which, to my mind, will improve our 
merger control regime and enable us to grapple with the major challenges 
ahead an increasingly globalised economy and the prospect of a Union which 
will soon have 25 Member States. At the same time, this reform will preserve 
the very real merits inherent in the current system. In sum, I sincerely believe 
that it will transform what is already a very good system into an even better 
one’99
In December 2001, the European Commission launched a full review of the EMCR 
and issued a consultative Green Paper (Commission 2001). The latter looked at a 




                                                 
99 Monti, M. (2003), ‘European Competition Policy: Quo Vadis?’, XX. International Forum on 
European Competition Policy, SPEECH/03/195, Brussels, 10 April 2003. 
100 The Commission balanced arguments between using the US-Style SLC test – substantial lessening 
of competition test, and the current dominance test. The discussions led to the establishment of a new 
more flexible test – SIEC, the significantly impede competition test, which focuses on effects rather 
than dominance.    
 and procedural issues and a wide consultation 
resulted in a new draft EMCR presented in December 2002. The review aimed at 
minimising transaction costs for business through the 'one-stop-shop’ principle and at 
augmenting the transparency and speed of the assessment procedure, leading thus to 
enhanced legal certainty. For instance, the timetable was widely regarded as too 
compressed. The introduction of ‘stop the clock’ procedures both in phase I and phase 
II to allow extra time at the parties’ request for the consideration of remedies 
concerned, as proposed in the Commission’s Green Paper, seemed a useful way of 
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reducing the pressures (Morgan 2002). The implementing regulation101 explained the 
procedures to follow in merger cases, distinguishing between the parties who notified 
the concentration, other parties involved in the proposed concentration, third 
parties,102 and parties regarding whom the Commission intended to take a decision 
imposing a fine or periodic penalty payments. Notifications were to be submitted in 
the manner explained by the Form CO103
Following the eight high-profile prohibitions under Commissioner Monti’s 
tenure as Competition Commissioner and high-profile withdrawals such as 
Skandinaviska Enskilda Bank/FöreningsSparbanken and EMI/Time Warner, public 
criticism ran high. Serious concerns were raised regarding the role of the MTF - the 
investigator, prosecutor, judge and jury of any transaction. The Commission's original 
Green Paper set out the view that existing checks and balances were sufficient. Yet 




following the Airtours case105
Indeed the Commission in its Airtours decision undermined the credibility of the 
concept of collective dominance and induced legal uncertainty by adopting an 
approach markedly different from its approach in previous cases




                                                 
101 Commission Regulation (EC) No 802/2004 of 7 April 2004, implementing Council Regulation (EC) 
No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004, on the control of concentrations between undertakings 
102 During cases – or at the institutionalisation stage - parties have the right to complain and highlight 
problems. The implementing regulation states, para.13, that ‘third parties demonstrating a sufficient 
interest must also be given the opportunity of expressing their views, if they make a written application 
to that effect’.  
103 Ibid., Annex I.  
104 Monti, M. (2002), 'Merger Control in the EU: A radical reform', European Commission/IBA 
Conference on EU Merger Control, Brussels, Nov 7 2002, p.2, 
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p-
action.gettxt=gt&doc=Speech/02/5450RAPID&lg=EN&display= 
105 In April 1999 Airtours, the international travel group, launched a hostile bid for First Choice, which 
was emerging as an effective vertically-integrated rival in the U.K. The acquisition of First Choice by 
Airtours would have left only three major vertically-integrated travel groups in the U.K.. The three 
groups would have held over 70% of the U.K. short-haul foreign package holiday market. Despite a 
history of competition in the U.K. travel markets, the Commission considered that the rapid 
consolidation and vertical integration which had followed the 1997 report of the U.K. Competition 
Commission into the industry meant that structural conditions in the U.K. had changed radically.  
106 Korah, V. (2001), Cases and Materials on EC Competition Law, 2nd ed., Hart Publishing. 
. The CFI found 
that the Commission had not yet proved to the required legal standard that the merger 
could lead to a collectively dominant position. In the Schneider/Legrand merger case 
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the Court held that the Commission was also to blame on the grounds of ‘several 
obvious errors, omissions and contradictions’ in its economic reasoning107. The 
business community had long criticised the Commission for establishing lawyers at 
the heart of its merger decision-making process, and hoped to push for inclusion of 
economics rigour108 in decision-making procedures. UNICE, representing the 
European business community, described the critics in its response to the Green Paper 
on the Review of the Merger Regulation109
The result of this consultation was the setting up of a new regime under Regulation 
139/2004. The reformed package has taken into account many of the criticisms made 
by the epistemic community surrounding the former MTF – the legal profession, 
academics and the business community – and the European courts. The passage to a 
new test – SIEC
 thus, 
 
 ‘In UNICE view one of the greatest shortcomings of the Merger Regulation 
and the present procedural framework is the lack of due process and proper 
checks and balances in the system. (…) UNICE considers that there is a lack 
of both effective external and internal controls in Community competition 
proceedings, where the Commission acts in fact both as investigator and 
decision-maker. The current system of judicial review of merger decisions is 
unsatisfactory and ineffective’.   
 
110
 The development of the European merger control regime and its four parts, is 
significant to the understanding of Commission-firms relationships. This brief 
description indeed shows the importance of the business community in the merger 
control regime. From the content of the regime, I turn now to study the aspirations of 
a European regime, in terms of economic endeavours and traditions from Member 
States that need to be articulated in the design of pan-European tool – adding a new 
layer to policy-making and enforcement. These considerations are of importance to 
 – was one of the prominent features of the new regime. The new 
Regulation mirrored the maturity and experience of DG Comp in merger activities.   
 
                                                 
107 The Court of First Instance ruled in July 2007 that the seriousness of the errors was so great to 
justify that Schneider deserves compensation. Judgement of the Court of First Instance of 11 July 2007, 
Schneider Electric SA v Commission of the European Communities, Case T-351/03.  
108 The Commission subsequently announced its intention to appoint a chief economist for the 
competition directorate and dissolute the Merger Task Force as a separate unit (Vickers 2004). 
109 COM(2001) 745/6 final, 28 March 2002. 
110 Significantly Impede Effective Competition 
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understand the role of the various stakeholders – roles that will be described in the 
subsequent section.  
 
2. The various rationale for a European merger control regime 
 
2.1. A pan-European merger control regime 
  
The economic rationale for a merger control system can be presented according to 
two divergent schools of thoughts – the divergence has clear policy implications (see 
Furse 2004). On the one hand the Harvard School favours competitive environments, 
and its main concern is the avoidance of anti-competitive structures. Yet free markets 
– i.e. uncontrolled – should not be sought as they can foster the emergence of 
economic concentration and dominant market position. Intervention allows 
competition to be maintained. The Chicago School, on the other hand, assumes that 
free markets result in the best outcomes, even in the event of economic concentration 
and dominant positions. The School rests on the concept of potential competition. 
Accordingly competition policy should enable new competitors to enter markets – and 
entry barriers to be avoided.  
 
Another question that needed addressing focused on the enforcement of a 
supranational competition law when national experiences were scarce. In Europe, at 
the time of signing the Treaty of Rome, Germany accepted, and competition law 
played a minimal, if any, role in government policy and in the business decision-
making111
                                                 
111 See 6th Report on Competition Policy - 1976 
. It was therefore widely expected that Community competition law 
provisions would not be seriously enforced. The fact that competition law came to 
play such a significant role may be explained, at least partially, by the recognition that 
it represented a potentially valuable tool for achieving the Community's central 
mission of economic integration. Indeed the inclusion of competition policy 
represented one of the pillars upon which the Community was to be constructed, and 
an integrated part of its ‘economic constitution’ (Cini and McGowan, 1998). 
Dismantling trade barriers between Member States is meaningful as long as they are 
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not replaced by anti-competitive behaviours – be it in the form of private or public 
trade barriers.    
 
Another issue concerned the nature of the system - Was it to be a legal instrument or a 
political one? Here two quite different images of competition law drawn from 
fundamentally different national experiences confronted each other (Wolf 1997). 
European competition policy resulted in a combination of diverse state traditions 
(Gloeckler 1998). Germany's policy encompassed liberal aspirations and a tendency 
towards 'Ordnungspolitik' rather than 'Interventionspolitik', following the US 
administration post-1945 strong emphasis on anti-trust rules. The German participants 
tended to view a competition law system as fundamentally juridical: legal analysis 
should be the primary guide to decision-making. Constitutional substance can 
undoubtedly be found in Articles 2 & 3 (f) EEC, which clearly tied competition to the 
common market and European economic and social aspirations (Wolf 1997). In 
addition, they had recently worked through these issues in a decade-long controversy 
over the introduction of their own competition law. 
 
The competition law systems of the other Member States, if any, was usually based on 
'administrative control' or the 'industrial policy' model in which political rather than 
juridical processes were dominant. The French, via a ministerial decision-making 
process, tended to see competition law in political terms. They would expect to base 
Community decisions on the evaluation by officials of the needs of the Community 
and its Member States at a given time. A strong tradition of interventionism and 
'dirigisme' was reflected in their values and methods (Gerber 1994).  
 
In 2006, Neelie Kroes, the current Competition Commissioner, reflected on the 
tension between competition policy and industrial policy in Europe in the following 
terms112
‘Industrial policy and competition policy! For Europeans just putting these 
two notions in one sentence still tends to conjure up a great ideological divide. 
A divide between Colbertian “dirigistes” and economic libertarians. On the 
one hand, a faith in the ability of governments to successfully build, direct, 
, 
 
                                                 
112 Kroes, N. (2006), ‘Industrial policy and competition law & policy’, Fordham University School of 
Law, New York City, 14th September 2006.  
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and protect the supply side of the economy. On the other hand, a belief that 
markets should be subject only to rules to guarantee a level playing field, but 
that they are otherwise best left to their own devices. This ideological divide 
has always been something of a caricature, but it has lasted because there is 
some truth underlying it. And as a result, to put it bluntly, “industrial policy” 
has been rather bad-mouthed by the advocates of competition policy’. 
 
Merger control is an instrument that, as a policy tool, can potentially reshape market 
structures. The experience of Brittan113 , then Competition Commissioner, at the 
inception of the Merger Control Regulation reflected the different approaches. Indeed, 
as explained, Member States and Ministers tended to see merger control very 
differently. It was considered as a tool of industrial, regional and social policies, a 
way of shaping industrial structure and location, and an opportunity to create 
European champions to compete overseas with American and Japanese giants. Others 
saw merger control as a pure expression of competition principles – accordingly, 
monopolisation and market domination should be stopped, and everything else should 
be allowed to proceed. These considerations were particularly manifest in the de 
Havilland114
‘I was determined that the Merger Regulation should not be used as a way of 
imposing an industrial policy on Europe, although there were quite a number 
of participants in the debate who wanted to do just that. Whether it was 
because they wished to create European champions, or wanted to allow social 
considerations to have an important impact, they wanted the wording of the 
Regulation to be sufficiently broad for the Commission to be able to consider 
matters going well beyond the effects of the merger on competition in the 
relevant market. In the end, the supporters of an industrial policy were 
effectively beaten back, and the Regulation gives clear primacy to the 
competition criterion, with only the smallest nod in the direction of anything 
else’
 case. On this occasion, the then French Minister of Industry and 
Telecommunications, Mr Gérard Longuet, demanded that the Commissioner for 
Competition Policy, Sir Leon Brittan, resigned, and that the merger regulation revised 
to allow for national industrial policy concerns (see Laudati 1996). Sir Leon Brittan at 
the 2000 IBA conference reminded the audience of the different approaches to a 
European Merger Regulation, 
115
                                                 
113 Brittan, L. (1991), ‘The development of Merger Control Regulation in EEC Competition Law’, in 
Brittan, L, Competition Policy and Merger Control in the Single European Market, Hersch Lauterpacht 
Memorial Lectures, Grotius. 
114 Commission decision IV/M.053, Aerospatiale/Alenia/de Havilland (1991), OJ L334/42. 
115 Brittan, L. (2000), ‘The early days of EC Merger Control’, in European Commission (eds.), EC 
Merger Control: Ten Years On, International Bar Association.    
.   
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2.2. The difficulties of controlling mergers 
 
The basic requirements of a Merger Control Regulation were self-evident to 
the Commission: clear substantive rules providing criteria for prohibition and 
clearance; prior notification, and clarification of the relationship between Community 
rules and national law (Brittan 1991). From a broader perspective, merger control 
relates largely to comparing perfect competition and pure monopoly in terms of 
relative efficiency, discussion showing the inherent inefficiency of monopolistic 
structures (Kemp 1999). Indeed, according to economic theories, monopolies reduce 
output, increase price and reduce welfare in comparison with perfect competition. 
However, this purely economic result depends critically on the assumption that 'other 
things are equal'. In particular, it could easily be contended that subsequent 
monopolisation costs are unlikely to remain unchanged. Mergers can arguably be 
beneficial by fostering economies of scale. Large-scale production is generally 
considered as technically more efficient. Further analysis suggests that there is indeed 
no theoretical justification for condemning monopoly and/or mergers from the outset, 
since output reduction needs to be considered simultaneously with reductions in costs, 
which in turn can be passed on to consumers. 
 
Consequently determining mergers’ knock-on effects require caution. Ideally, any 
reservations regarding merger economics would need to be taken into account whilst 
attempting to design policy. Economic theory solely does not suffice to present clear-
cut parameters to condemn mergers outright. Indeed in light of economic theory we 
can conclude that lack of competition can lead to both market inefficiencies as well as 
benefits of lowering production costs. Empirical studies have not yet given any 
conclusive results as far as the implications of mergers in terms of losses and benefits 
are concerned. It becomes difficult to envisage a policy embracing all of those 
concerns, and as a matter of fact the role of economics in Commission decision-
making processes has been advocated for116
                                                 
116 See 
 - this has been addressed to a certain 
extent by the recent reorganisation of DG Comp. Still few governments feel at ease 




corporate activities. Politics, as much as economics, are important components to the 
shaping of merger policy (Kemp 1999).  
 
The fundamental premise of the European Merger Control Regulation is spelt 
out in Article 2(3) which states that ‘a concentration which creates or strengthens a 
dominant position as a result of which effective competition would be significantly 
impeded in the common market shall be declared as incompatible with the common 
market’. Dominance in itself is therefore not condemned by European provisions 
taking into account the aforementioned considerations. It is worth noting that the 
Regulation applies not simply to mergers, in the technical sense, but to all 
concentrations, whether a) through the acquisition of shares or assets, including 
situations where an undertaking acquires control (defined as the possibility of 
exercising decisive influence) on its own, or b) jointly with other undertakings, over 
another undertaking, such that they can no longer be considered independent. This 
influence may derive from substantial minority shareholdings, but may also arise from 
a number of factors, individually or in combination, such as management agreements 
or close commercial links between the undertakings concerned. 
 
2.3. The coexistence of European and national merger control regimes 
 
In her study of the British merger control regime, Kryda (2002) firstly explained, 
 
 ‘The European Union decision-making framework [of controlling mergers] 
does not limit [national] merger control. The EU’s threshold criteria are 
necessary to segregate jurisdictions between the supranational and Member 
States levels; otherwise, both systems would lose transparency, and firms 
would ‘forum shop’. Once a merger meets the EU’s thresholds criteria, the 
national regulators spin off’.  
 
Merger control is exercised by both the European and the national tiers of governance. 
The European Union as well Member States disposes of a merger control regime 
which is composed of substantive legislation, enforcement agencies and provisions 
for judicial review. The delimitation of the competences followed the calls for a ‘one-
stop shop’ as explained previously. Overlapping competencies and parallel 
proceedings on different levels were supposed to be explicitly avoided (Brittan 1991). 
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The quantitative criteria were to ensure a relatively transparent split between the 
European Union and Member States levels. As the European Commission Notice on 
case referrals117
The amended 2004 merger Regulation only brought minor changes regarding 
competence allocation. The Commission published alongside the Regulation a Notice 
on case referrals
 explains,  
 
‘2. Community jurisdiction in the field of merger control is defined by the 
application of the turnover-related criteria contained in Articles 1(2) and 1(3) 
of the Merger Regulation. When dealing with concentrations, the Commission 
and Member States do not have concurrent jurisdiction. Rather, the Merger 
Regulation establishes a clear division of competence. Concentrations with a 
"Community dimension", i.e. those above the turnover thresholds in Article 1 
of the Merger Regulation, fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Commission; Member States are precluded from applying national competition 
law to such concentrations by virtue of Article 21 of the Merger Regulation. 
Concentrations falling below the thresholds remain within the competence of 
the Member States; the Commission has no jurisdiction to deal with them 
under the Merger Regulation’. 
 
The discussions over boundaries between the competences, and allocation of 
responsibilities between different jurisdictions and referral mechanisms, were 
therefore crucial from the outset. In addition these issues remained the key component 
to the development of the European merger control system. The European merger 
control system has been in fact the result of a multitude of provisions and competent 
authorities, and their constant interactions.   
 
The two levels of the European system are indeed in constant interaction and in fact 
highly interdependent (McGowan and Wilks 1995). Firstly, the Member State 
governments are participating in policy-making at the Council level. They have at 
their disposal formal powers in any major discussions with regards to a piece of 
legislation, and ultimate approval power. Secondly, national competition authorities 
(NCAs) and courts have become increasingly involved in the enforcement of 
Community law.  
 
118
                                                 
117 Commission Notice on case referral in respect of concentrations, OJ C 056, 05/03/2005.  
118 Ibid. 
. The theme central to the Notice revolved around multiple 
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notifications and a proposal towards a system of ‘streamlined referrals’ introduced to 
strengthen the principle of a ‘one stop shop’. As announced in the Notice, 
 
‘5. The revisions made to the referral system in the Merger Regulation are 
designed to facilitate the re-attribution of cases between the Commission and 
Member States, consistent with the principle of subsidiarity, so that the more 
appropriate authority or authorities for carrying out a particular merger 
investigation should in principle deal with the case. At the same time, the 
revisions are intended to preserve the basic features of the Community merger 
control system introduced in 1989, in particular the provision of a "one-stop-
shop" for the competition scrutiny of mergers with a cross-border impact and 
an alternative to multiple merger control notifications within the Community. 
Such multiple filings often entail considerable cost for competition authorities 
and businesses alike’119
 French and British competition policies remained for a long time under tight 
government control (Budzinski and Christiansen 2005). Indeed the first French 
legislation regarding competition that dates back to 1953 was closely linked to the 
price controls regime, and it was seen as little more than window-dressing. It was 
. 
  
The Commission and the national competition authorities have therefore been aware 
of the inherent issues and ambiguities of the formal allocation of cases within the 
European merger control system, and consequently established in 2002 the European 
Competition Network (ECN). The latter network catalyses horizontal flows of 
information between the different national competition authorities. The existence of 
such a platform may facilitate, to a certain degree, the Europeanization of merger 
control practices. 
 
However, it is worth reiterating that national competition authorities have constantly 
been involved in decision-making and policy making processes as far as the European 
merger control regime is concerned. The establishment of the ECN is understood to 
put focus on consolidating cooperation within, and thus strengthening, the system, 
rather than creating a new stakeholder involved in processes. In spite of all 
harmonisation and centralisation, the national systems have retained certain 
peculiarities and continue to pursue partly different goals (Maher 1996), as the 
account of the British and the French merger control regimes below demonstrates.   
 
                                                 
119 Ibid. 
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revisited in 1977 which was the first attempt at the establishment of a merger control 
system. The UK’s competition regime was first enacted as early as in1948. In addition 
it was the first European country to establish merger control rules in 1965. However 
the powers of the competent authority – the Monopolies Commission – were limited 
by the fact that only the government could issue formal requests to act upon. However 
both regimes have evolved, as will now be discussed.  
 
The important reform of the French competition regime was introduced in 1986 
following the enactment of the Ordonnance n° 86-1243 of 1st December 1986 on 
‘price freedom and competition’. The latter specifically introduced a complete and 
coherent merger control regulatory system in France – Titre V de la concentration 
économique and creating a competition regulatory body – Le Conseil de la 
Concurrence. This Ordonnance was replaced in 2000 by the New Economic 
Regulations120
The French authorities in charge of merger control are, on the one hand, the Minister 
of Economy and Finance via its administrative arm – the DGCCRF
 adopted in 2001 and effective from May 2002.   
 
121
                                                 
120 Les Nouvelles Régulations Economiques, NRE.  
121 Direction Générale de la Concurrence, de la Consommation et de la Répression des Fraudes – the 
Directorate General for Competition, consumption and Fraud.  
 - and, on the 
other, the Conseil de la Concurrence – French competition regulator created by the 
1986 Ordonnance. In effect a transaction – within the scope of the turnover thresholds 
set in the New Economic Regulations – is to be notified to the Minister for Economy 
and Finance. The DGCCRF has five weeks to investigate the case. The Guidelines 
issued by the administrative body explains that pre-notification is welcomed. If parties 
present measures to solve competitive problems in the defined market – the so-called 
‘remedies’ – the DGCCRF has an added two weeks to consider them. At the end of 
this first phase, equivalent to the European one laid out in Council Regulation (EC) 
No 139/2004, shown in Annex 1, the Minister will approve any transaction that, 
importantly, does not adversely affect competition in the market. If the competent 
authority has serious concerns about the transaction, the investigation will enter a 
second phase that includes a referral for opinion to the Conseil de la Concurrence. 
The referral is a ‘preparatory act and does not constitute a decision in itself capable 
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of being appealed for abuse of power’122
In competition matters, it is generally accepted that the UK is in favour of 
strong competition rhetoric whereas France prefers an ‘industrial policy’ rhetoric
, and does not anticipate the Minister’s 
decisions. On the basis of the first phase investigation conclusions with the opinion 
issued by the Competition regulator, ultimately the final decision is issued by the 
Minister.  
 
The UK regime has also evolved substantially since the 1965 Monopolies and 
Mergers Act which had formally extended the jurisdiction of the Monopolies 
Commission to the regulation of mergers. In 1973 the Fair Trading Act laid a more 
adequate administrative function with the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) advising the 
Secretary of State on decisions. In July 2003 the UK regime underwent a reform with 
the enactment of the Entreprise Act 2002 provisions. The new regime has three 
objectives in mind: 1) the extrication of political influence from the process of merger 
control, 2) the instigation of procedural reforms to leave the regime more open and 
transparent, and 3) the installation of an exclusively competition-based standard 
against which they might be pursued. Interestingly the UK merger control regime has 
remained relatively unaffected, at least in formal terms, by the parallel existence of 
control established at the European tier of governance. A merger is firstly under 
scrutiny of the Office of Fair Trading (OFT). A decision of referral to the Competition 
Commission may be made by the OFT in cases of further investigation. Any merger 
that may result or may be expected to result in a substantial lessening of competition 
(SLC test) in the UK market must be referred.    
 
123
                                                 
122 Conseil D’Etat, Sogebra case, 9th July 2003.  
123 Ibid. 
. 
In 1996 Schmidt used the examples of European competition policy to evaluate the 
impact of European integration on French government-business relations (Schmidt 
1996). Accordingly, French business and government officials resented the ‘Anglo-
Saxon’ inclination towards liberal economic ideology that they felt had spread 
through DG Comp (then DG IV) especially under Sir Leon Brittan. Despite 
supporting European integration, a majority of French CEOs showed hostility towards 
European competition policy. The de Havilland case was perceived as a decision 
based solely on ‘liberal’ grounds – as in the impact of a takeover on world 
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competition – rather than on the position Aérospatiale would acquire in comparison to 
its main competitors (Dumez et al. 1992). French business and government officials 
supposed wrongly that the process was political, not technical, and failed the 
European lobbying exercise, not providing sufficient technical information at an early 
stage when it might have swayed the Commission (Dumez et al. 1992).  
 
The question of independence of merger control regimes epitomises this 
difference. In the UK the Competition Commission124 – an independent body - is in 
charge of investigating national mergers. An independent competition authority – le 
Conseil de la Concurrence – was set up in France in 1986. However, the French 
merger control regime remained within the remit of the competences of the Ministry 
of the Economy, Finance and Industry125
The choice of the country where head offices are based is particularly decisive to the 
understanding of Franco-British differences towards mergers. When Michel Pébereau 
proposed the merger between BNP with two other French banks (Paribas and Société 
Générale) during the summer of 1999, he promised to create ‘a global banking group 
which will have its decision-making centre in France’
.  
 
126. These words were not 
aimed at the shareholders constituencies of the three banks, as foreign investments 
owned about a third of their capital, but they were aimed at the government which 
support Michel Pébereau, and hoping to push Société Générale to accept its offer. 
This argument seemed to have convinced them as ‘the SBP – Société Générale – BNP 
– Paribas project has always been favourably regarded by the High 
Administration’127
                                                 
124 The Competition Commission is an independent public body established by the Competition Act 
1998. It replaced the Monopolies and Mergers Commission on 1 April 1999.  
125 As explained previously, the General Directorate for Fair Trading, Consumer Affairs and Fraud 
Control (DGCCRF) is in charge of the enforcement of merger control rules. Le Conseil de la 
Concurrence is an adviser in the Phase II cases to the Minister of the Economy, Finance and Industry.  
126 Faujas, A. (16 March 1999), ‘Faut-il avoir peur des entreprises sans frontières?’, Le Monde – 
Economie, p.I.  
127 Santi, P. (7 August 1999), ‘BNP a obtenu finalement 65.1% de Paribas et 36.8% de la Générale’, Le 
Monde, p.10.  
. In contrast, the proposed merger between Barclays and ABN 
Amro – and the suggested establishment of the new entity head office in the 
Netherlands – showed, firstly, how much importance is given to such ‘psychological’ 
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moves128, and secondly, how less protective the British government may seem to be 
of its firms. Clearly Pébereau played the national card that certainly works in France, 
when in Britain this card may be second to that of the intrinsic value of the transaction 
for the economy as a whole. Although this comparison of government-business 
relations draws on the financial services sector, other examples such as the Centrica-
Gazprom suggested merger in Britain129, and Suez-Gaz de France130 reflect similar 
conclusions, as well as the aborted takeover of Danone by Pepsico131
                                                 
128 Head offices may have been established in Amsterdam, yet the new group would still have been 
supervised by the British authority – the FSA – and not the Dutch one.  
129 In Spring 2006, the government was reported to be considering modifying UK merger control 
regime to keep Gazprom out because of energy security worries. Alan Duncan, shadow trade and 
industry secretary, epitomised the mood, "There should be no question of Gazprom being able to buy a 
UK utility without at the very least the company's management being decoupled from the Russian 
government". Tony Blair, the then Prime Minister, ruled out blocking the merger.  
.  
 
Such differences will undoubtedly impact the way firms interact with competent 
competition authorities. Yet, the European level of governance in the control of 
concentrations has probably also had an impact on firms. This will be the focus of the 
Chapter 4 of this thesis entitled ‘Comparing French and British corporate political 
strategies’.  
 
2.4. The ‘soft’ development of the European merger control regime 
 
130 The French government orchestrated the merger of Suez SA and the state-owned Gaz de France in 
order to pre-empt Italy’s Enel which was considering putting an offer for Suez. The merger creates the 
world’s second largest energy utility. De Villepin, then Prime Minister, announced the transaction in 
February 2006, explaining, ‘that given the strategic importance of energy, the fusion of Gaz de France 
and Suez seems today to be the most appropriate path’. Italy’s government labelled the move as a 
declaration of war, ‘we still have time to stop this race by the European states to build protective 
barriers’.  See http://www.abcmoney.co.uk/news/2820062044.htm.   
131 Rumours of a hostile takeover bid from the US company PepsiCo for the French group Danone lead 
to a heated political debate in summer 2005. Although the threat never materialised the Economist 
labelled France ‘a land where protecting the ‘culture’ has come to mean saving the national yoghurt 
from PepsiCo’. As a result the then Minister of the Economy, Finance and Industry, proposed the 
introduction of a new legislation on takeover bids. The Décret n° 2005-1739 du 30 décembre 2005 
réglementant les relations financières avec l’étranger et portent application de l’article L.151-3 du 
code monétaire et financier is inspired by what has been dubbed the Danone amendment, which 
includes: 
- for the company launching the takeover bid, the obligation to state its intentions to the 
Financial Markets’ Authority (Autorité des Marchés Financiers – AMF).  
- for the company that is being bid for, the option of issuing stock purchase warrants.   
 The legislation aims in effect at deterring takeover bids that are either hostile or motivated by 
speculation by increasing the targeted company’s capital through the issuing of stock purchase 
warrants, and the raising of the price to be paid by the bidder.  
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The term soft law is used to describe any system of regulation other than the 
traditional process – explained previously – which involves a democratically elected 
legislature making laws which are then enforced through the civil or criminal 
procedure of the courts. Soft law, therefore, encompasses a broad range of quasi-legal 
activities, from pure self-regulation by a single company, through trade association 
codes of practice and codes developed under powers given to a body by statute, or 
‘guidelines’. Soft law is flexible and adapts to new conditions in the market more 
easily than traditional regulation. The regulator is expected to be responsible for 
ensuring that the codes are regularly reviewed to make sure they deal with current 
problems.  
 
During the first decade of the EMCR, the role of the Courts has been little 
more than of a procedural nature. Although some cases were brought to the Court, no 
major follow-up – in the sense of ‘grand bargains’- was seen. The distinction between 
day-to-day policy-making and grand bargains is key, as well as the ECJ dependence 
upon its external environment. Indeed without firms or Member States going to Court 
against the Commission, the ECJ remains a silent witness. Therefore, as far as the 
judicial process is concerned, the autonomy of the Court is undisputable, but not as far 
as the broad institutional context is concerned.  
 
The use of soft law at the Commission level, most notable in the case of competition 
policy (see Van Waarden & Drahos 2002), echoes the importance placed on judicial 
decisions. In the case of merger regulation, the concept takes different forms: codes of 
conduct, notices, declarations, guidance notes/guidelines, and circulars, for example. 
Some of the concepts highlighted in the Court’s decision are usually incorporated in 
those notices, or remain informally enforceable as the concept of collective 
dominance.  
 
Some notices, based on case-law, further enhance the merger procedural process. 
Some authors have talked about constitutionalisation of the Treaty – henceforth 
giving a key role to European Courts to play in European integration. Path-
dependency is an enlightening concept at this stage (Amstrong 1998). Accordingly 
integration is limited and facilitated. Past decisions have an effect of future 
developments. It echoes a ‘politics under law’ perception of the role of European 
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Courts. Guidelines, notices or block-exemption regulations and established decision 
practice by the competent authority as well as judicial precedents can qualify as rules, 
because they provide guidance beyond the individual case. This refers to the debate 
between the rules of reason against per se rules132
Competition policy is one of the most integrated areas of EU policy-making. 
However, the Commission has long faced criticism for failing to place consumers at 
the centre of its approach to competition. As Cini et al. (1998) explained, ‘it is clear 
that the economic or consumer rationale behind European competition policy is not 
the only justification for the policy […] the promotion of competition at the 
supranational level was not an end in itself, but was a means of promoting a whole 
range of European-level objectives’. Critics claim that it pays too much attention to 
competitors and too little to the needs of the consumers when reaching decisions in 
competition cases. Only in the last couple of years has the Commission stated that the 
competition policy is to benefit consumers. The appointment of a consumer liaison 
officer shows greater commitment to integrate consumer opinions to individual cases. 
In its 2004 communication on a ‘proactive competition policy’
.   
 
2.5. Liberalisation and the unity of the Common market 
 
133
                                                 
132 See 
 the European 
Commission explained that ‘competition policy contributes to the process of opening 
up monopoly sectors (e.g. telecoms, energy, transport) to competition […] It 
encourages Member States to lower barriers of entry on all regulated sectors.’  
 
 The adding of a new layer of governance has been key to the development of a 
European market as the ‘integrative imperative’ expresses. As mentioned in both 
previous sections the business community has used various channels to be active in 
the European merger control regime. By identifying the various stakeholders upon 
which the European merger regime rests, the next section will therefore identify 
where access points are available for the business community to engage in the 
European merger system.  
 
http://www.eale-slovenia.org/papers/Christiansen-Kerber.doc. 
133 European Commission (2004), ‘A proactive competition policy for Europe’, Brussel, 20.04.04 
COM(2004) 293 final, p.6.   
 87 
 
3. The predominance of European institutions 
 
The centre of gravity of the European competition policy lies with the 
bureaucratic and judicial institutions of the EU rather than the political and 
representative institutions. The roles of the European Parliament, Council of 
Ministers, and European Council are relatively limited.  
 
Legislation in the Council has of course been required to establish regulatory powers 
and to extend competences. Yet the amount of legislation required to put in place the 
merger control system has been fairly small in comparison to other areas of policy-
making, and correspondingly the Council and European Parliament have had few 
opportunities to shape the contours and content of competition policy. The bulk of 
day-to-day activities, and even strategic initiatives, are carried out without formal 
recourse to the Council (McGowan 2000).   
 
That is not to say that there are not extensive contacts with member governments. 
National authorities have been (and will increasingly be134
3.1. The European Commission 
) involved in both 
individual cases and broader policy definition, while, more informally, ministries and 
ministers will lobby at both the administrative and political levels, as current cases 
show (Italian and Spanish cases for instance). The Commission, however, does not 
need to engage on the same level of negotiations with Member States as in other areas 
of policy for furthering policy. Indeed the European merger regime relies on the day-
to-day decisions as well as the Regulation, and the European Commission is in charge 
of the enforcement. The possibilities for Member States to clip the wings of European 
competition policy are therefore limited to the Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs) 
(McGowan 2000). 
 
Institutionally, few areas of European policy-making see the Commission in a 
more central and autonomous position than in competition policy (From 2002). In 
                                                 
134 See 2003 Competition Law Forum paper titled ‘cooperation within the European Competition 
Network’, available at http://www.biicl.org/files/1107_cooperation_within_ecn.pdf  
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addition to playing its traditional role of treaty guardian and policy initiator the 
Commission exercises a strong regulatory role as well.  
 
The European Commission is well-known for being understaffed and constrained by 
scarce resources as has already been mentioned in Chapter 1. With an exponential 
increase in merger notifications and over a million pages of documentation submitted 
by companies in support of a deal135
The literature has defined the Commission as either an independent regulator (Majone 
1996, McGowan & Wallace 1996) – a bureaucracy under pressure that might be 
captured by external interests (Mazey and Richardson 1996); or a body whose power 
is derived from policy network membership (McGowan and Wilks 1995), and 
therefore looks to other actors for information and collective intelligence – the view 
expressed in Chapter 1. Although the institutional provisions have indeed allowed for 
the Commission to act as a quasi-federal agency (Cini & McGowan 1998) in 
competition matters, only subject to judicial scrutiny, clearly external pressure is key. 
As one of my interviewees explained, ‘to a certain extent all institutional elements 
are present, yet DG Comp functions as a technocratie’
, the European institution is under immense 
pressure, which provides possibilities for non-governmental actors to interact with 
Commission officials. The Commission’s hunger for information and its lack of time 
and financial resources open a window of opportunity for interest representation 
(McGowan 2000). The Merger Regulation unit (Directorate B, ex-Merger Task Force) 
is no exception. Case-specific interactions take place on an everyday basis in DG 
Competition between the different stakeholders – law firms, firms, on the one hand, 
and Commission officials, on the other. In parallel, economic and legal experts keep 
the competition debate alive. The epistemic community influence underlies moves 





. In merger control 
regulation, protagonists are expected to interact at the different stages of the 
regulation life cycle – in instrument design as well as in operational matters.  
 
                                                 
135 Bannerman, E. (2002), The future of EU competition policy, CER publication, p.10. 
136 Interview with author, Luxembourg (CFI), 29th June 2006.  
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3.2. The European Courts of Justice 
 
As aforementioned the Commission is not a law unto itself in making 
competition policy. As in other areas it is subject to legal challenge. The European 
Courts of Justice adjudicate on the basis of complaints from the Commission, member 
governments, or firms, or in response to a referral from a national court. Overall the 
trend in the jurisprudence in respect of merger control has been to strengthen the role 
of the Commission for a long time. The ECJ and the CFI had been generally found in 
the Commission's favour and some landmark cases (such as Continental Case in 1973 
and Philip Morris in 1987) expanded the scope of its ‘supranational’ responsibilities 
(From 2002). As previously explained the European Courts have recently been 
thoroughly scrutinising the Commission’s judgements and overturned them. Up to 
2002, the Courts had mainly circumscribed and criticised the Commission on 
procedural grounds137




the special characteristics of competition law and ensured the system was an 
important medium of integration and this at the moment all too often dismissed by the 
European literature. Indeed the 1960s and 1970s are often dubbed as stagnation and 
sclerosis as far as other EU institutions are concerned. In the latter period however, 
the Court had laid the foundations for the development of a comprehensive 
competition law system, as mentioned in the first section of this chapter. It articulated 
a broad conception of competition law as important to the process of integration, and 
its decisions in this area sought to make that conception viable and convincing139
Since the Grundig case
. 
 
140, the Commission's windows of policy opportunity141
                                                 
137 Indeed the Continental Can case pinpoints the ECJ attitude. Although the Court did confirm the use 
of Article 86 (EEC) in merger matters, the judicial body also penalised the Commission for not 
satisfactorily defining the relevant market. 
138 The need to achieve effectiveness of EC law.  
139 See cases such as Aquiline Dyes, Consten-Grundig or Hoffman-la-Roche.  
140 Consten and Grundig v. Commission (Cases 56 & 58/64) [1966] ECR 299, [1966] CMLR 418. 
141 The ECJ held that the object of the agreement was to eliminate competition at the level of supply by 
the wholesaler to the distributor. Therefore vertical agreements are clearly brought within the scope of 
Article 85(1).    
 have 
come from the ECJ's willingness to interpret the European competition provisions in a 
broad and generous manner (see also Continental Can case in the specific case of 
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merger control). Arguably, the ECJ's most important contribution to competition 
enforcement has been its espousal of market integration as the determining principle 
in its competition judgements. Although this is now largely taken as a given, other 
principles, such as efficiency or consumer protection, might quite easily have been 
prioritised at the expense of the single market.  In placing market integration at centre 
stage, the ECJ identified competition policy as fundamental to the European 
integration process, giving the Commission scope to increase its competition 
competence. The European body conveyed a clear message that this goal-driven 
methodology was not merely to be one of many principles to be used in interpreting 
the treaty, but rather the dominant interpretative method. 
 
This espousal played a determining role in the inception of a European 
Regulation to control mergers. The Court of Justice was the catalyst for change. The 
comforting position that Article 85 (EEC) had no application to mergers, following 
the Philip Morris case, had upset the established regime. If the Philip Morris ruling142 
did not provide for an effective merger control regime, it created such an uncertain 
environment for the industry that corporate actors joined the existing alliance 
promoting supranational solutions to merger regulation (Bulmer 1994). Unlike the 
Continental Can case, companies started to adapt to this new environment when 
norms and rules were not clearly defined. Plans for mergers were notified voluntarily 
to the Commission. And indeed, the Financial Times reported, 25 formal decisions on 
mergers and 36 written clearances from the Commission143 by 1989. The uncertainty 
towards merger regulation was further intensified by the Commission action towards 
the British Airways/British Caledonian merger (1987)144, and the GEC and 
Siemens/Plessey145
 
 (1989).    
                                                 
142 In 1981, Philip Morris Inc. bought from Rembrandt Group Ltd. one half of Rembrandt's controlling 
interest in the Rothmans Group. Following the complaint of three other tobacco companies the 
Commission commenced the proceedings under Article 85 and 86 (EEC). Philip Morris and Rembrandt 
twice amended their agreements and the Commission eventually decided to close proceedings and to 
reject the three complaints on the grounds that the amended agreements did not infringe the Treaty 
rules. BAT and R.J. Reynolds challenged the Commission's decision and the Court of Justice gave 
judgement on 17 November 1987 
143 FT, 6 Feb 1989 
144 In this case the Commission significantly strengthened the conditions for allowing the merger after a 
weak response by the UK competition authorities (the MMC). The decision created uncertainty 
regarding the geographical scope of the Commission’s investigation powers.  
145 This transaction highlighted difficulties inherent to multiple jurisdictions being responsible for 
decisions, and not having a one-stop-shop for European-wide mergers.  
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Moreover there was much less belief in old-fashioned industrial policy where 
politicians and bureaucrats sat in their offices playing with industrial structures much 
as children do with Lego sets (Brittan 1991). The Commission's prestige as a 
responsible and effective enforcer of competition policy was riding high. Finally the 
European executive arm fully exploited the ambiguities of the Philip Morris 
judgement, and the resulting uncertainty was used skilfully, particularly by the then 
Competition Commissioner, Mr Peter Sutherland, to persuade Member States to 
return to the negotiating table on a new draft of the Regulation first proposed by the 
Commission in 1973. 
 
Yet the Commission manages issues through the legislative route, as the 
judicial route can prove burdensome. It takes approximately six months for the 
Commission to intervene at the Member States level. From the moment a formal 
notice from the Commission is issued a Member State has two months to reply. The 
reply needs to be reviewed by the Commission to ensure that it is reasonable. A 
Commission proposal to take action against a Member State is reviewed by the 
College – on infringement procedures matters the College of Commissioners only 
meet four times a year, although there are some exceptional meetings that can be 
scheduled. Infringement procedures can be done on the basis of Article 56 or Article 
226 of the Treaty. Then the case is with the Court and from then on it can take two or 
three years to get a settlement. This is a difficult instrument to use for the 
Commission. Another problem linked to the previous reasoning is the presentation of 
the case. Should it be done on the basis of Article 21146
                                                 
146 Under Article 21 of the EU Merger Regulation, the Commission has exclusive competence to assess 
the competitive impact of concentrations with a Community dimension. Member States cannot apply 
their national competition law to such operations. Moreover, Member States cannot adopt measures 
which could prohibit or prejudice (de jure or de facto) such concentrations unless the measures in 
question: 
 of the EU Merger Control 
regulation if the intervention of a Member State is supposedly contrary to the Treaty 
and cannot be justified on prudential grounds or Article 226 as will be explained 
• protect interests other than competition, and  
• are necessary and proportionate to protect interests which are compatible with all aspects of 
Community law. 
Public security, plurality of media and prudential rules are interests that are recognised by the Merger 
Regulation as being legitimate, but specific measures must still be proportionate and fully compatible 
with all aspects of Community law. 
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below? The cooperation between DG Market and DG Comp is clearly key to resolve 
such legal conundrum.  
 
The Article 226 could be used very quickly against the Spanish government. But the 
fact that it all ends in Court is problematic. However a certain ‘announcement effect’ 
accompanies any public statement. On the basis of the Commission announcement 
and action private parties can go directly to national courts and appeal the decision – 
as it is incompatible with EU law. This was the case in the Endesa case – parties went 
to the Tribunal de Commerce and the Supreme Court. When the Commission takes a 
Member State to Court, it is not an ideal situation, and 1) it should be avoided, as the 
Commission aims for minimum friction, and 2) open discussions are initiated between 
the services and the Member States to avoid such situations and resolve problems. 
Therefore the number of cases that actually go to Court is limited compared to the 
number of proceedings/open discussions that have occurred. The information has to 
go to the Member States and therefore the Commission is responsible for ensuring the 
truthfulness of the information that may be given informally or formally by the 
Member States but also the firms. However there are limits to what the Commission 
can do with limited information.  
 
3.3. The Member States 
 
Although the role of the Commission, and to a lesser extent the European 
Courts of Justice, are central in the merger regulation, Member States have been able 
to leverage some political influence. The absence of merger control provisions in the 
Treaty of Rome reflected to a certain extent Member States preference with regards to 
economics and institutional considerations at that particular time. Moreover 
intergovernmentalists are certainly right to focus on Member States in the grand 
bargains as far as the EMCR is concerned, as shown by the delays of the initial 
Regulation and its subsequent amendments. Member States are also able to invoke 
Article 9 for a case to be referred to their national authority – the subsidiarity 
principle is also present in the Commission’s attitude. Moreover national authorities 
have also always retained a consultative role in the merger review as part of the 
Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Policies and the Advisory 
Committee on Mergers or as part of the European competition network (ECN).  
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More importantly, Member States have been involved in the shaping, to a certain 
extent, of the European merger regime, notably in its judicial aspect. Indeed some 
Member States have intervened in judicial proceedings in favour of national firms. As 
will be discussed in my comparative chapter (Chapter 4) cultural differences affect the 
terms under which Member States interact at this level. However, at this stage, it is 
important to note that Member States also take part in the enforcement of the merger 
regulation. For instance the French decree (the so-called ‘Danone amendment’, 
explained earlier in this chapter) regarding takeovers is symptomatic – and the 
traditional reflex some Member States have. Other Member States are also extremely 
keen to protect their national security. However the Commission and Member states 
have also bilateral discussions to smooth interpretations mishaps. It is clear that 
Member States are quite active in engaging with the Commission to expose their 
views and interpretation of rules, or explain decisions more thoroughly. 
 
Yet the Commission is particularly proud of the independence it has achieved 
over the years in competition policy. Therefore the European body has been reluctant 
to become influenced by national capitals. This chapter therefore acknowledges the 
impact of the day-to-day running of European affairs through the cases and soft law 
instruments inter alia, on the EU merger control system, alongside more important 
reviews of the European regime. 
 
3.4. The industry 
 
Most forms of consolidation alter market structures and thus competition. 
Mergers can be divided into three broad categories (see Annex 4 for more detailed 
explanations): 1) horizontal - mergers between firms at the same level in the 
economic chain, for example, two manufacturers merging, or two wholesalers, 2) 
vertical - mergers between firms at different levels, such as a manufacturer merging 
with a distributor or vice versa. Where a firm at a higher level takes over one at a 
lower level (nearer the ultimate consumers) it is 'forward integration', and where the 
reverse obtains, it is 'backward integration', and 3) conglomerate - mergers falling 
outside both the aforementioned types of mergers, as where a firm seeks to diversify 
its activities by spreading into another industry. In all three cases mergers alter the 
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structure of industries, in that they alter the direct or indirect ownership of enterprises. 
The European merger control regime therefore represents the framework within which 
corporate restructuring takes place and can, in short order, force a radical change on 
companies involved in corporate restructuring or indeed force a change on a whole 
industry (Heim 2003). 
 
From the outset, at the drafting of the first version of the future merger control 
regulation, the Commission worked with representatives of industry, the legal 
profession, and national competition authorities to ensure that the merger regulation 
worked well. Firms welcomed a single EU-level procedure ensuring a level playing-
field instead of having to deal with a number of procedures at the national level. Most 
companies complied fully with the notification requirement. But many actually 
complained that because of the law thresholds levels, many mergers and acquisitions 
had still to be dealt with multiple national authorities rather than benefit from the 
Commission’s ‘one-stop shop’ (Dinan 1999). 
 
Mergers were also taking place at an increasing pace and companies were, in 
any event, coming to the Commission for advice and clearance under Articles 85 
(EEC) and 86 (EEC) as they believed that there was a real risk that these provisions 
might be used to stop mergers which the Commission regarded as detrimental to 
competition. Companies did not want to face a succession of test cases to probe the 
outer limits of the Treaty and were concerned with the run up to 1993 and its 
implications for the European economic landscape (Brittan, 1991).  
 
The industry usually complained that they had to seek approvals from several national 
authorities147 as well and that the establishment of a 'one-stop shop' in merger policy 
was needed, to reduce transaction costs and legal uncertainty. A single authority, the 
Commission, would examine and assess mergers having a ‘Community dimension’148
                                                 
147 A classic case of multiple filling is the GEC Siemens bid for Plessey. British, French, German and 
Italian authorities, as well as the European Commission and four authorities outside the then European 
Community, were involved. 
148 The concept of ‘Community dimension’ expresses policy objectives fundamental both to the 
European Community generally and to the specific requirements of EMCR, encapsulated in Article 1.  
 
uniformly within a strict and short-timetable and with an exclusive Community-wide 
competence. Mergers which were of a dimension to have a significant effect within 
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the Community should be dealt with by a Community authority whose decision 
should be final throughout the Community, subject only to judicial review. As Cook 
argued, in large part the desire of businessmen in a Single/Community market to 
operate under one clear system of merger regulation at the E.C. level had prevailed 
over the concerns of Member States’ governments to retain (sometimes well-tried) 
national regimes (Cook et al. 2000).  
 
Obviously the rapidity with which the Commission reached its decisions following 
merger notifications was crucial for companies engaged in restructuring strategies. 
Tight deadlines had always appeared on the Commission agenda regarding the 
EMCR. Indeed time scheduling in the two-phase process of the investigation laid at 
the heart of the debate, reflecting the industry concerns. 
 
The critical role of the industry from the outset is still very present today. Earlier in 
this Chapter I discussed concerns of the industry with regards to the revamp of the 
European merger control regime. The industry has monitored closely the regime 
development and participated actively to this development at each stage. Chapter 4 
will explain the different strategies put in place to interact at different points of the 
EU merger control regime and at different stages of the public policy life cycle with 




The European Commission expected that some 55-60 mergers a year would 
need to be dealt with by the Merger Task Force, which was set up within the 
Competition DG specifically for this purpose. Merger activity has far outstripped this 
estimate. The intensity of merger activity affecting Europe has been the major 
influence on the inception of a European merger control regime and the development 
of the Regulation, as it formed the backdrop for the maturity of the policy.   
 
The addition of a new layer of governance, particularly in the area of economic 
concentrations, proved a political and institutional challenge. Indeed political tension 
and industrial preferences had to be reflected in the design of a new instrument and its 
day-to-day running. Yet it is clear that merger control regulation has been one of the 
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successes of European policy-making – responding to a gap in the market and 
ultimately helping the unification of a European market and a level-playing field.   
 
As the multi-level governance literature explains access points can be found at 
different levels. The examples of the French and British merger systems also show 
institutional differences between the layers of European merger governance. As a 
result firms are able to strategically choose which forums they should interact in to 
push for their preferred outcomes. The descriptions of the institutional framework and 
the historical developments show that indeed the business community has been active 
throughout the establishment and the development of the EU merger control regime.  
 
Whereas my previous chapter was concerned with the establishment of an analytical 
framework to account for the design of corporate political strategies, this chapter sets 
out the context in which firms interact with governmental bodies in merger situations. 
Both chapters provide crucial elements to understand the rest of this research project. 
The next chapter represents the junction of my project. In light of my first two 
chapters, I have designed a research method project that will provide data to firstly 
compare corporate political activities, and at a later stage engage with the 





Research Design and Research Methods 
 
 
The basic framework for analysis of corporate political strategies was explained in my 
first chapter. The present chapter will define the research design aimed at addressing 
research questions posed in my introduction on the nature of the interaction between 
firms and the European institutions in charge of the EU merger control regime.  
 
This chapter will follow the view that research design is a ‘blueprint’ of research. 
Accordingly, the research design needs to take into account at least four basic 
components: what questions to study, what data is relevant, what data to collect, and 
finally, how to analyse the results (Yin 1994). This chapter is constructed around 
these four questions.  Thus it will not limit itself to a mere logistical problem, but will 
try to uncover the logic behind my research project.  
 
The project is, in terms of research methods, of a qualitative nature. The main drivers 
for such a choice will be identified in this introduction and referred to throughout this 
Chapter. Firstly, merger control related issues are secretive and notoriously difficult to 
research. As a result the literature on political aspects of merger control was scarce 
and no data was available. My research methodology was designed to generate new 
data in an environment difficult to access. Qualitative data gathering was expected to 
produce quality data and ensuring that I did not miss vital information that may come 
from semi-structured interviews. Moreover the qualitative research methodology has 
been carefully designed, as described in this Chapter, and can be easily reproduced by 
other researchers.  
 
My first attempt at laying out my research strategy did not entail all the data 
collection procedures explained in this Chapter. The main component of my research 
strategy was a comparative geographical case study between French and British firms. 
However my first semi-structured interviews showed that solely relying on the 
 98 
literature, notably the literature on French corporate political activities, would not 
provide the full picture of corporate political strategies – where internal 
considerations are as important as external ones. Yet the former considerations are 
much harder to uncover from a purely external observational viewpoint. In addition, 
the financial services industry started to rapidly consolidate – offering at the same 
time a rich contemporary research field. Although I kept the comparative case study 
element of my research design, I adapted my research strategy to include an 
ethnographic component – that of participant observation. As explained in this 
chapter, this research tool enabled me to generate data to confirm my framework for 
analysis, and detach the project from current theoretical propositions, in fact 
questioning the latter, as will be done in Chapter 5.  
 
This chapter accounts for the research journey I took and explains the research 
design in terms of form - the questions that the project is investigating – which in turn 
has an impact on the data to be collected and the choice of the research strategies, and 
therefore the substance and the results produced. I will discuss qualitative and 
quantitative research methods. Throughout the text I attempt to evaluate the research 
strategies used balancing merits against weaknesses.  
 
1. Questions to study 
 
The purpose of the research questions posed at the beginning of this thesis was 
to firstly provide a sound basis for this project and, as a result, to generate actual 
evidence to study corporate political strategies, in the case of French and British 
firms. The framework, as designed in my first chapter and the results of my 
comparative study, will in turn be analysed in terms of Europeanization of interest 
intermediation.   
 
My research project is original in the types of questions it asks. As my previous 
chapters noted many academic contributions on interest representation are focused on 
collective action problems, whereas my own focus is corporate behaviours in political 
activities – and therefore joining an association, for instance, represents one strategy, 
out of the possible ones available to firms. Therefore the nature of the relationship 
with European institutions and the choice of the type of relationship is of prime 
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significance. This question underlies the emphasis put on studying the nature of 
linkages within governance constructs.  
 
The organic concept of organisations is a synecdoche for all living and 
adapting units. The apparent distinctiveness of organisation behaviour is resolved by 
seeing it/them as mere cases of general principles of evolution, adaptation, and/or 
natural laws. Deciding what is to count as a unit of analysis is fundamentally an 
interpretive issue requiring judgment and choice. It is however a choice that cuts to 
the core of qualitative methods – where meanings rather than frequencies assume 
paramount significance. 
 
This research project attempts to supplement previous academic work and, 
building upon previous conclusions, tries to explain different corporate political 
strategies; as a result it hopes to make wider conclusions with regards to 
Europeanization. The latter concept is generally accepted to be a dynamic process 
rather than a static form. The research construct was designed with this is in mind. 
Moreover because of the nature of the context studied – European merger control 
regulation – I am able to provide a cross-sectoral view, whereas many studies are 
confined to a particular sector.  
 
1.1. Ontological considerations 
 
 Methodology is scarcely defined in research methods publications. It was 
defined by Hall in a 2003 contribution to a larger volume, as ‘means scholars employ 
to increase confidence that the inferences they make about the social and political 
world are valid’. He further explains that one of the most methodologically 
researched inferences rests upon causal relationships when one variable or event 
exerts a causal effect on another. This definition suggests, however, a determined path 
of deductive research and leaving aside inductive research. This is too limiting to 
encompass all methodologies, as will be further discussed below.   
 
My first chapter on corporate political strategies has concluded on three core 
interdependent elements –staging, arenas, and vehicles – that establish a framework 
for analysis within the wider strategy design scheme, on the basis of Hambrick and 
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Frederickson’s strategy framework. These elements were to come together following 
the identification of the message to convey. In this context, the distinction, touched 
upon earlier, made between inductive and deductive considerations in research 
methods is to be apprehended. Patton explained (2002), 
 
 ‘Inductive analysis involves discovering patterns, themes and categories in 
one’s data […] in contrast to deductive analysis where the data is analysed 
according to an existing framework’. 
 
Although I have established a framework for the analysis of corporate political 
strategies, my project, centred on the Europeanization of these strategies, remains 
inspired by inductive research methods. This project follows a grounded theory’s 
research type – the theory on Europeanization is developed inductively from a pool of 
data gathered by participant observation as will be explained in the following 
Chapters of this thesis. In order to construe on the problem of Europeanization in the 
context of the European merger control regimes, I have undertaken to study the 
patterns, themes and categories of my data. Such an endeavour is consistent with an 
ethnographic research method.  
 
Methodological considerations underpinning this project such as ontological 
and epistemological questions need discussing. Both meta-theoretical concepts 
underlie all research inquiries (Bates et al. 2007) as they are both concerned with 
knowledge and the production of knowledge. Hall (2003) further explains, ‘ontology 
is ultimately crucial to methodology because the appropriateness of a particular set of 
methods for a given problem relates to assumptions about the nature of the causal 
relations they are meant to discover’. Ontology questions ‘the very nature of ‘being’’ 
– the nature of the social and political reality (Marsh et al. 2002). Entities can 
therefore be conceptualised as either existing independently of social actors or as 
being constructed by social actors. Epistemology ‘reflects [the researcher’s] view of 
what we can know about the world and how we can know it’ (Marsh et al. 2002) – the 
fact that the reality is out there independent of observation. The literature offers 
competing views regarding the directional relationship between ontology and 
epistemology but acknowledges their value in furthering research processes. The 
literature, discussing between ontology and epistemology, distinguishes here between 
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the knowledge acquired by an interpretivist approach and the knowledge acquired by 
a positivist approach respectively. 
 
The ultimate question of this project is interested in furthering the academic 
discussion of the concept of Europeanization in the case of European interest 
intermediation. This question is primarily an ontological question. As a result the set 
of research methods that will be used in this project reflects such a consideration, as 
will be discussed below. However Featherstone (2003) explained, ‘the ontology of 
‘Europeanization’ is also complex. Within the international system, the relationship 
between ‘Europeanization’ and globalisation is often difficult to distinguish in case 
studies of domestic adaptation, obscuring the key independent variables’. As touched 
upon previously, the literature with regards to the relationship between ontology and 
epistemology is not clear cut. Epistemological considerations need, to a certain extent, 
to be taken into account carefully in light of the pitfalls of the topic of study.  
 
2. Relevant data to collect 
 
Downey et al. (1983) explained that in the literature, discussion usually 
focuses on choosing between so-called ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ methods of 
research. ‘Objective’ in the positivist context – from the view that human studies must 
conform to the methodology of the physical sciences – usually refers to the 
tabulations of objects/subjects or events in a specific environment. Such measures are 
thought to be gathered, essentially, from surveys or archival sources. Examples of 
such data might be the number of firms in an industry, the number of government 
regulations specific to a firm’s industry, etc. Conversely, ‘subjective’ is usually 
applied to tap participant’s perceptions of their organizations’ environments, and is, 
almost de facto, linked to qualitative methods. Indeed qualitative research methods 
have been perceived as simple set of methods that are employed to collect data. 
However qualitative methods offer the possibility, through data collecting, to further 
one’s understanding of the perspective of its participants and their interactions within 
social life – an element that will allow conclusion regarding the dynamic process of 




2.1. Limits of quantitative research methods 
 
With quantitative methods the investigator attempts to isolate the various 
elements in a complex situation. To do this, the evaluator usually knows (or assumes 
he or she knows) what the elements are, and to separate them out he or she usually 
employs pre-developed instruments and analyses the results quantitatively (Parsons 
1995, Hogwood et al. 1988). He or she then identifies the dependent, independent, 
and intervening variables, and assesses the links between them.  
As Morgan et al (1980, p. 498) explained, 
 
 ‘In manipulating ‘data’ through sophisticated quantitative approaches, such 
as multivariate statistical analysis, social scientists are in effect attempting to 
freeze the social world in to structured immobility (…). They are presuming 
that the social world lends itself to an objective form of measurement, and that 
the social scientist can reveal the nature of that world by examining lawful 
relations between elements that, for the sake of accurate definition and 
measurement, have to be abstracted from their context’.    
 
A lot can be missed by quantitative methods partly because pre-developed 
instruments used may not suit the particular situation and partly because these 
methods cut reality up into discrete fragments of surface behaviour which are then 
recombined into statistical clusters. As aforementioned in my introduction, this 
particular project has adopted a qualitative methods because of the research questions 
it poses. By contrast a holistic path would consider a complete set of activities 
including training for instance as an interrelated system with a deep structure. Part or 
all of it may be hidden from view, implicit in the qualitative study. Outcome measures 
on defined objectives are important data, but until they are combined with a holistic 
analysis of the process/programme, they do not explore the ‘black box’ that 
stakeholders enter at one end and leave at the other. One gains no insight into what 
the outcome measures mean in terms of the process itself. Of course, those running 
the process are sure they know how the process works; after all they designed it and 
ran it. But this may in fact be deceiving as the deep structure of the process may be 
quite different from what its designers assume it to be. This is particularly in terms of 
values, habits, self-esteem, self-identification, and the more subtle aspects of the 
process.  
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Many researchers use questionnaires but fail to exploit the information stimulated 
by the request. The number of respondents and therefore the response rates do reveal 
theoretically relevant information. The non response is as much behaviour as a 
response. Much non-responding is predictably random. Respondent loss, for instance, 
usually follows an exponential function with time.  
 
The limits of quantitative research methods – notably for this project – should not 
make one lose sight of the problems inherent to qualitative research methods. A 
problem with qualitative data methods in general and case studies in particular, is the 
limitations that are placed on the possibilities for statistical analysis, replication, and 
secondary analysis of the data. However this study is embedded in a contemporary 
setting, and tries through the use of different research methods to overcome these 
criticisms by setting out clearly, for instance, the steps taken through the research 
design and data collection.  
 
Finally both qualitative and quantitative research methods, and the production of 
data, are highly dependent upon the clear definition of the unit of analysis throughout 
the design of the research project. The next section will be looking at this.  
 
2.2. Unit of analysis 
 
The appropriate unit of analysis is a critical factor in any research strategy. As 
mentioned in other parts of this thesis, many research projects have been looking at 
collective action as a unit of analysis. In this study, individual firms are the prime unit 
of analysis. An enhanced study of corporate political behaviours in the European 
integration process calls for more definition in the unit of analysis. Indeed the 
different corporate political behaviour forms – individual action, collective action, and 
third party representation – each need investigating. The secondary level of 
investigation is related to the different national traditions of political behaviours – 
France and Britain.  In addition it would be too limited to study just the unit of 
analysis – single organisations – as my questions are in fact ultimately concerned with 
the organisation’s relationships with other organisations.  
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The choice of data collection strategies is further explained in section 3 of this 
chapter. However before explaining in detail the data collection stage of this project, I 
will be looking at the complementary aspects of the different qualitative research 
strategies that were used throughout this project – namely ethnographic and case 
study research tools.   
 
2.3. The choice of complementary qualitative research strategies 
 
As explained by the qualitative research methods literature, ethnographic 
methods and therefore, to a certain extent, the more general ‘grounded theory’ 
approach rely on the production of data to design theories and theoretical 
propositions. The rationale is that theory based on experimental data ties it to the data 
and makes it irrefutable. It reduces room for maneuver for researchers to use available 
theories or force fit existing theories to the data they generated. Finally it also avoids 
"exampling", i.e. finding examples to match a theory. 
 
As I explained in the introduction of this chapter, the ethnographic research strategy 
was not one I envisaged straight away. It first came about following my initial semi-
structured interviews. Indeed the latter highlighted the fact that mergers and 
acquisitions are operations that are conceived and realised in secretive environments – 
notably if I were to uncover political influences. Secondly, research in corporate 
political strategies, especially in France, was scarce, and usually limited to activities 
in Brussels, failing to take into account the European political activity done from 
Paris. Ethnography became an obvious choice. However the breadth and depth of a 
case study cannot be replaced by a purely ethnographic project.   
 
3. The data collection stage 
 
 This thesis is based upon a choice of various and varied research tools – 
namely semi-structured interviews, participant observation, a case study, and 
comparative work. Most of the literature on European corporate political activity is 
based upon surveys and quantitative data gathering, sometimes combined with 
interviews (Coen 1998, Markussen et al. 2005, Bouwen 2002, 2004, Eising 2004, 
Broscheid et al. 2003). The context of my own research does not make the choice of 
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quantitative methodologies appropriate. The confidentiality surrounding merger 
transactions and the lack of publicly available information affected the project 
profoundly. From basic internet, library and archives searches, the lack of readily 
available information meant that quantitative methods would necessarily affect the 
quality of the responses and, in fine, my conclusions, as it would enable respondents 
to avoid, to a certain extent, addressing political issues.  
 
3.1. Appropriate qualitative methods to collect data 
 
Qualitative research is a sociological and anthropological tradition of inquiry. 
Most critically, qualitative research involves sustained interaction with the people 
being studied in their own language, and on their own turf. Less important is whether 
or not, or at what level of sophistication, numbers are employed to reveal patterns of 
social life. To see qualitative research as strictly disengaged from any form of 
counting is to miss the point that its basic strategy depends on the reconciliation of 
diverse research tactics.  
 
Basic research paradigms can be identified along the epistemological continuum from 
positivism to post-modernism. This continuum represents the degree of objectivity 
and subjectivity attached to theoretical perspectives – positivism being perceived as 
the most objective perspective and post modernism as the most subjective.  
 
From these paradigms in the context of qualitative research methods, a range of types 
of research methods are derived: case study, grounded theory, phenomenology, 
ethnography, and historical research. Two different types of methods identified along 
the epistemological continuum from positivism to post-modernism will be used in this 
project – namely ethnography and case study. 
 
In the case of this project participant observation generated data that has been 
complemented by semi-structured interviews with identified key players in the 
European merger control regime. The interviewees were drawn from seven categories 
of actors. The table below identifies the number of interviews per actors.  
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Type of actors No of interviews 
Firms 16 
National and European officials 12 
Legal profession 10 
Consultants 8 




         Table 1: Number of semi-structured interviews per type of actors 
 
The number of interviews led in each category is a fair representation of the 
importance of each actor involved in the European merger regulation regime, and also 
emphasises the particular angle of the research with a clear choice for interviews of 
firms’ representatives. In addition, in terms of industry distribution, my project is 
obviously oriented towards financial services. As a result 11 interviews out of the 55 
conducted are related to this sector – 2 associations and 9 of interest representatives. 
However, for confidentiality reasons and at the request of most of my interviewees, 
no name is mentioned.   
 
Qualitative methods traditions assume that systematic inquiry must occur in a natural 
setting rather than an artificially constrained one such as an experiment (Marshall et al 
1995). Qualitative methods are described as ‘thick’ (Geertz 1973 in Marshall et al. 
1995), ‘deep’ (Sieber 1973 in Marshall et al. 1995), and ‘holistic’ (Rist 1977 in 
Marshall et al. 1995). By contrast quantitative approaches can be characterized as 
‘thin’ (Geertz 1973 in Marshall et al. 1995), ‘narrow’ (Rist 1977 in Marshall et al. 
1995), but “generalisable” (Sieber 1973 in Marshall et al. 1995). These distinctions 
often extend to fundamental epistemological differences resulting in the mutual denial 
of validity to the data of the other approach.   
 
Technically, a ‘qualitative observation’ identifies the presence or absence of 
something, in contrast to ‘quantitative observation’, which involves measuring the 
degree to which a feature is present. When open-ended interviews are ridiculed as 
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‘impressionistic’ and ‘anecdotal’, it is against the standard of econometric theory that 
they are being judged. The term anecdotal usually implies that the observations are 
not randomly collected and are not sufficiently numerous to identify a systematic 
pattern of behaviour. The term impressionistic usually implies that the answers are 
neither quantitative nor quantifiable. Open-ended interviews may not meet the 
standards of econometric evidence. However, as mentioned in my introduction, the 
standard that also needs taking into account is appropriateness and suitability of the 
research tools.  
 
3.2. The choice of the financial services industry 
 
 This project has a strong focus upon the financial services industry. This 
choice derived from the fact that, inter alia, my first placement was in the field. 
Indeed, in order to draw comparable conclusions in both countries, my second 
placement was to be done in the same industry. In addition, this first-hand experience 
gave me greater access to this particular epistemic community.  
 
Moreover contextual aspects made this choice appealing. This industry has been 
notoriously challenging in terms of creating a European single market because of the 
high degree of fragmentation along national lines. The European merger control 
regulation has aimed, as discussed in Chapter 2, at creating legal certainty in the 
marketplace by establishing a one-stop shop for instance. However, the Regulation 
also refers to ‘legitimate interests’- and prudential matters can come under this 
umbrella term. Member States have therefore been able to intervene in operations 
with a Community dimension on the basis of this legal concept as discussed in 
Chapter 2 of my thesis.  
 
Sequentially DG Comp is examining the case, according to the criteria laid 
down – defining the Community dimension of a transaction – in the European Merger 
Control Regulation. Because of the degree of fragmentation of the sector banking 
transactions are approved without any problem. Yet a merger needs to also be 
approved by target’s national authority in charge of banking supervision149
                                                 
149 According to Article 16 of the Banking Directive.  
. At this 
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stage, banks may experience political barriers to mergers. My interviewees referred to 
these political obstacles in terms of ‘national champions’ and ‘legislative measures 
against foreign ownership’ in this category.   
 
Therefore the institutional framework, as previously described, allows for the national 
political side to be more salient – and therefore more identifiable from an analytical 
point of view – than in other sectors. Unlike other sectors the national competition 
authorities still play a role in the supervising of large mergers. The main contentious 
cases, as far as the industry is concerned, are that involving the Portuguese, Italian 
and finally Polish supervisors. I will refer to these cases throughout this thesis. They 
blocked or delayed the process the mergers on national political grounds. The analysis 
of this sector thus allows me to identify political interventions as well as the 
interconnections between the relevant DGs in the Commission – DG Markt and DG 
Comp have worked a lot under Commissioners Kroes and McCreevy.  
 
There was also no case for consolidation until recently. The introduction of the euro, 
and soon of European payments (SEPA), will change the landscape. In terms of 
research strategies, focusing on the financial services industry was a reasonable 
option. Although other studies have been interested in interest representation in this 
particular sector (Bouwen 2002, Grossman 2004, Quaglia 2005), none has looked at 
corporate political strategies from a firm’s perspective.  
 
Ayadi et al. (2002) explained in their report on pan-European consolidation 
movement, that the financial services industry has probably entered a second phase in 
its European development, that of an acceleration of pan-European consolidating 
operations. A clear goal of the European Commission has been to create a functioning 
pan-European single market for capital, one of the four freedoms of the original 
Treaty of Rome. The fact that the industry movements are contemporary of my field 
research stage may have meant that stakeholders were less likely to discuss some 
aspects of the deals, in some instances. I avoided this pitfall, to a certain extent, by 
immersing myself in this field and joining public affairs departments in France and 




3.3. Ethnography and participant observation 
 
3.3.1. The Ethnographic Method 
 
Methodologically, organisational researchers schooled in an ethnographic 
tradition take the prescription of less theory, better facts; more facts, better theory. In 
essence, ethnographers believe that separating the facts from the fictions, the 
extraordinary from the common, and the general from the specific is best 
accomplished by lengthy, continuous, firsthand involvement in the organizational 
setting under study. As a result the method is capable of generating massive amounts 
of data. 
 
Conklin (1968, quoted in Van Maanen 1983, p.38) described the ethnographic method 
as, 
 
‘a long period of intimate study and residence in a well-defined community 
employing a wide range of observational techniques including prolonged face-
to-face contacts with members of local groups, direct participation in some of 
the group’s activities, and a greater emphasis on intensive work with 
informants than on the use of documentary or survey data’.  
 
The holistic style is the oldest and is represented by at least two opposing 
cultural theories. On the one hand there are the configurationalists represented by the 
work of Benedict and Mead and on the other there are functionalists of British social 
anthropology represented by the work of Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown. These 
four scholars were alike in their commitment to the study of culture as an integrated 
whole, and a desire to interpret behaviour as observed in the studied particular 
configuration.  
 
Ethnographical studies have traditionally focused on the sociology of meaning 
through close field observation of phenomena. This methodology focuses on the study 
of human existence and interaction as seen from the standpoint of insiders. Typically, 
the ethnographer focuses on a ‘community’ (not necessarily geographic, it may be 
work, leisure, and other communities), selecting informants who are known to have 
an overview of the activities of the community. Such informants are asked to identify 
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other informants representative of the community, using chain sampling to obtain a 
saturation of informants in all empirical areas of investigation. Informants are 
interviewed multiple times, using information from previous informants to elicit 
clarification and deeper responses upon re-interview. This process is intended to 
reveal common cultural understandings related to the phenomena under study. These 
subjective but collective understandings on a subject are often interpreted to be more 
significant than objective data.  
 
As a result of this process, my own research tools developed and my questions – or 
my way to respond to my informants’ replies – became more sophisticated, thus 
yielding better and more accurate data. As an example, one of my informants – who 
introduced me to many Commission officials – explained the role of these officials, 
and more importantly the cases they worked on. This is not publicly, easily accessible 
information. However it was extremely helpful. It was, in effect, easy to direct the 
Commission officials I met towards the explanations of the cases they worked on – 
the ones they would have the best available knowledge about – rather than attempt to 
gather information using other cases as examples when they would have followed 
only as outsiders.   
 
 From this perspective ethnographical techniques can be a great 
methodological component in so far that they helped to more clearly identify 
sociological aspects of the studied environment. The sociological aspects are part of 
the strategic behaviours of firms. For instance, in the financial services sector, an 
informal ECOFIN meeting was held under the Dutch presidency and was at the 
origins of policy developments regarding the question of banking consolidation. 
Three CEOs were invited to this meeting – from ABN Amro, Royal Bank of Scotland, 
and BNP Paribas. It is easy to account for the invitation of ABN Amro, one the major 
Dutch financial institutions, to this exclusive meeting. Sociological considerations and 
my ethnographic work (at BNP Paribas and ABN Amro) provided some evidence on 




            3.3.2. Schools of thought and participant observation 
 
The Chicago School and its school of sociology have based the emergence of 
participant observation as a research method upon two intellectual traditions, namely 
pragmatism and formalism. The former perceives social life as dynamic and in 
constant change. The consequence for the researchers is that they must participate in 
order to record how the participants experience these dynamics, the effects on social 
life, as well as how changes are interpreted. Participation in the social environment 
enables the understanding of actions within the context of the participants. 
Researchers can make sense of the meanings. Researchers must become part of the 
context as this is the only way they are able to understand the actions of the people. 
This intellectual tradition is formalism which argues that although social dynamics 
may differ from each other, their forms may still display similarities. Researchers are 
therefore encouraged to stroll in order to observe the dynamics of social life to which 
the individual is subject to. The two conceptions have an impact on the degree of 
participation the researcher should endorse when engaging with his/her research field. 
In this project I have opted for a pragmatic method as far as participation is 
concerned.  
 
3.3.3. The participant’s role 
 
This project advocates a research strategy that goes beneath stated objectives 
and surface behaviour. A way to achieve the required standards is participant 
observation as explained previously. Indeed, although questionnaires and interviews 
have their value, systematic observation has a number of advantages for 
organisational analysis and this project. Longitudinal data is also important. If one 
wishes to analyse a continuing process then one needs continuous data that measure 
each stage in the process. In terms of research timeline, this project starts at the 
inception of the European Merger Control Regulation. This can be done using 
questionnaires, interviews, and observations but since observations focus on process, 
they are the most likely of the three to provide valuable information about how the 
programme affects the stakeholders.  
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Observation allows one to develop hypotheses, test them, alter them, and retest them 
while the study is going on. Fixed instruments tend to lock one in until external 
information suggests that new instruments need to be developed and another study 
conducted. Observations are easy to quantify as any other data, so the issue is not 
whether to use quantitative or qualitative. Rather, the central point is that organization 
behaviour requires holistic analysis and that direct observation is a critical element of 
the analysis.  
 
This methodology requires that the researcher become directly involved as a 
participant in people’s daily lives. As explained previously, this participatory 
methodology provides access to the world of everyday life from the standpoint of a 
member or an insider. Human meaning and interaction is approached through 
sympathetic introspection, verstehen, a humanistic coefficient or sympathetic 
reconstruction (Jorgensen 1989). As a participant, the researcher must sustain access 
once it has been granted, and maintain relationships with people in the field. The 
character of field relations heavily influences the researcher’s ability to collect 
accurate, truthful information. Jorgensen (1989) provides some extreme examples – a 
researcher becoming a professional card player (the phenomenon studied) as part of 
his participant observational investigation of poker players, another becoming a jazz 
pianist to study improvised conduct.  
 
In my own case, the changes were less dramatic. My academic background was suited 
to my research field. My first degree was in international management and contained 
financial elements in its curriculum, as well as European politics. My Master’s degree 
was entirely devoted to European politics and governance. Both of these academic 
experiences were helpful in getting to grips with the studied environment. In addition 
I already had practical contact with interest representation in Europe – I had some 
experience working in a think tank in Brussels – and in financial services – my 
undergraduate placement was within the business banking division of a bank. By the 
time I started the participant observation phase of my study, I had already spent a year 
and a half working on my PhD and strategies in interest representation, and I had 
conducted more than half of my semi-structured interviews and analysis. Although 
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my practical experience in interest representation was limited, I probably had already 
received the adequate academic background.  
 
My methodological journey has been strengthened by awareness of a variety of 
assumptions upon which this project has developed and strengthened. The 
significance of assumptions is further explained by Morgan and Smircich (1980).  
 
Ethnography assumes an ability to identify the relevant community of interest. In 
some settings, this can be difficult. Community, formal organization, informal group, 
and individual-level perceptions may all play a causal role in the subject under study, 
and the importance of these may vary by time, place, and issue. My preliminary 
interviews allowed me to clearly identify the relevant community. Moreover, the 
public accessible documents – showing the Commission’s commitment to transparent 
policy-making – was helpful in cross-checking my findings. As a result, it became 
clear that although public affairs (in a general sense) departments were relevant to the 
study of European merger control regulation, especially from a political viewpoint, 
legal departments and General Counsels were equally and maybe more significant to 
firms’ interaction with the Commission. Therefore the community that needed to be 
studied was wider than it was expected at first.  
 
Ethnography assumes the researcher is capable of understanding the cultural customs 
of the population under study, has mastered the language or technical jargon of the 
culture, and has based findings on comprehensive knowledge of the culture. This 
assumption is relevant at two levels. The ‘public affairs’ jargon is easily identifiable, 
for instance, in responses to consultation papers that are publicly available. Moreover 
practical guides to lobbying are helpful. In my own research, the fact that I can speak 
and write both English and French – and that I have lived extensively in both 
countries – have been extremely helpful to gain trust in the environment I studied. I 
was able to interact in a suitable manner to enter circles quite rapidly. This was further 
highlighted in the Netherlands where the limits of my basic Dutch became a barrier to 
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interact with stakeholders (mainly governmental) and consequently affected my 
understanding of national corporate political processes. 
     3.3.4. The 5-step to the ethnographic method 
The ethnographic method starts with the selection of a culture, review of the 
literature pertaining to the culture, and identification of elements of interest - typically 
elements perceived as significant by members of the culture. The ethnographer then 
goes about gaining entrance, which in turn sets the stage for cultural immersion of the 












Fig. 5: Steps of the ethnographic method  
It is not unusual for ethnographers to live in the culture for months or even years. I 
personally stayed six months at BNP Paribas and the British Bankers’ Association 
(BBA). The three months at ABN Amro and my current position are considered as 
outside this data collection phase – to the extent I have not kept comprehensive diaries 
1. Selection of the culture 
Choice of PhD topic and 
first research papers 
(Year 1) 
2. Review of the literature 
related to the studied culture 
Year 1 
 
3. Gaining entrance 
Original contacts/interviews 
and chaining process  
(Year 2) 
4Cultural Immersion 
BNP Paribas, British 
Bankers’ Association, ABN 
Amro (Year 2 and 3) 
5. Data analysis and 
Theory development 
Year 3  
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as I did during the other two placements. The middle stages of the ethnographic 
method (steps 2 and 3 of the above diagram) involve identifying informants, gaining 
more relevant informants through a chaining process, and gathering data in the form 
of observational transcripts and interview recordings. Data analysis and theory 
development (step 5) come at the end, though theories may emerge from cultural 
immersion and theory-articulation by members of the culture. However, the 
ethnographic researcher strives to avoid theoretical preconceptions and instead 
searches to induce theory from the perspectives of the members of the culture and 
from observation. The researcher may seek validation of induced theories by going 
back to members of the culture for their reaction. 
 
3.3.5. Recording data as part of participation-observation methodology 
 
The literature on research methods usually indicates that data should be 
recorded in a systematic manner (Marshall et al. 1995) – this is true in both participant 
observation data collection and interviews. Following the ethnographic tradition, I 
used the same diary (my data log) during any of my meetings – internal and external – 
(who attended, where it was held, the outcomes and the intervening parties etc.), the 
different papers I worked on (consultation paper, internal circulars, responses to the 
Commission, European bodies and national authorities etc.), the conferences I 
prepared and attended, and more informal gatherings I may have been invited to.  
 
However there is a real danger as the researcher becomes immersed in the 
setting that he/she will find it increasingly difficult to stand back and generate a 
fruitful perspective on what is of interest. Whilst recording data, I have been 
concerned to focus solely on corporate political strategies, rather than getting 
personally engaged in discussions outside this remit – such as office politics, although 
I noted their existence in my reports. I also refrained to, as much as I could, answer 
any questions on evaluations of corporate political strategies, as my answers could 
have an effect on the setting I was trying to observe. This may have been the most 
difficult element of being a participant-observer in my case. Finally I constantly 
questioned my research methods and interview questions – such as: Am I generating 
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adequate material for my analysis? Can I start drawing conclusions as far as corporate 
political strategies are concerned from an insider’s viewpoint? Can I add new 
elements to my initial framework? Is it a reflection of insiders or my own 
interpretation of what a corporate political strategy should be? This type of constant 
questioning was the support I used throughout the year-long participant observation 
stage of my project.   
 
            3.3.6. Preparing data for analysis 
 
Selected strategies must be employed by the ethnographer to build conceptual 
frameworks. The strategy most commonly employed by a fieldworker is to explicitly 
examine the linguistic categories used by informants in the setting to describe various 
aspects of their routine and problematic situations.  
 
A central postulate of the ethnographic method is that people lie about the things that 
matter most to them. Penetrating fronts, a phrase used with powerful effect by 
Douglas (quoted in Van Maanen 1983), then becomes one of the more important 
goals of the competent fieldworker. If the ethnographer can uncover the lie, much is 
revealed about what is deemed crucial by the individual, group, or organization. 
Evasion too enters the calculus of deception for it is unfortunately true that most 
informants are only as good as the questions put to them.  
 
A prime objective of participant observation is the definition of key concepts in 
terms of the insiders’ perspective. A first step recommended is to list key words used 
by members of the environment studied. With my study, I had to learn two main sets 
of new terms. Indeed the financial services sector has its own language and acronyms, 
which I did not know before. I remember for instance going to a conference in Paris 
regarding a new directive which ‘cesar’ was going to publish an advice on. ‘Cesar’ is 
in fact what I wrote in my notes.  I used a search engine to identify this body called 
‘cesar’ and could not find anything with the spelling. I traced the body back on the 
European Commission website and under the Directive it was referred to at the 
beginning. ‘Cesar’ is in fact CESR – the Committee of European Securities 
Regulators – which is in fact in French CERVM – le Comité Européen des 
Régulateurs des marches de Valeurs Mobilières.  
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The most relevant example in corporate political strategies terminology in both my 
experiences was to become familiar with new acronyms that are used on a daily basis. 
For instance, to draft a response to a CP/DP means to respond to a consultation paper 
and a discussion paper respectively. Another key concept that is relevant with regards 
to my framework of analysis is ‘high-level’. This is referred to for example in the 
possible following contexts: a trade association can be high level, or a response can be 
high-level (‘keep this response high-level’). The concept is usually opposed to 
‘technical, detailed’. ‘High-level’ relates to anything that is probably upper-
management, destined to the Commissioner’s cabinet rather than a policy officer in 
one of the directorate general, and therefore is written with a very general message. 
Interestingly, during both experiences, lobbying as a term was nearly never 
pronounced, whereas the term ‘strategy’ was mentioned quite a lot. These key 
definitions and concepts will be incorporated into the next Chapter of my thesis.   
 
The identification of terms and concepts has been carried out throughout both my 
placements, in two different cultures in terms of nationality and type of corporate 
political activities, but similar in terms of the generic interest representation element. 
In addition, because I worked in the Netherlands and I am now working with a trade 
association in London in a similar environment, I have been able to constantly cross-
check the validity and reliability of my findings.  
 
3.4. Geographical comparative case study 
 
Case studies tend to be selective, focusing on one or two issues that are 
fundamental to understanding the system being examined. Following my section on 
the unit of analysis of my research project: corporate political strategies of individual 
organisations when interacting with European institutions, notably the European 
Commission – from the individual organisations viewpoint – are the ‘cases’ 
investigated.  
 
Levy (1988) studied a single case to study progress in information 
technologies at the University of Arizona. Yin (1994) explained that single cases are 
best used to corroborate or test a theory, or to characterize a unique or extreme case 
 118 
(Yin 1994). Single-case studies may also reveal new phenomenon when an observer 
is able to access data that was previously difficult to get to (Tellis 1997). My case 
study confirms two of these three rationales. It relies on fresh, new data that no other 
project tried to reach, relying on new research methods that generated excellent access 
to many actors. It also tries to challenge or qualify the Europeanization conclusions of 
other academic work on interest intermediation.  
 
Multiple-case studies, two dimensional in the case of this project, follow a 
reproduction process. Yet this process is not to be confused with a simple sampling 
logic, whereby a selection is made out of a population for inclusion in the study. The 
objective of multiple-case studies consist of each individual case representing a 
"whole" study, in which data is gathered using various sources and conclusions based 
upon the collected data. The most telling example is that of interviewing lawyers. 
Indeed European competition lawyers are involved in many cases, usually cross-
sectoral. Interviewing these types of actors, who have a real overview of DG Comp 
work and, as a result, the European authority’s interaction with firms has been 
particularly valuable and informative in my comparison between French and British 
corporate political activities. This has been validated by interviews of public affairs – 
in the largest sense – or General Counsels in different sectors. I have replicated my set 
of interviews in both countries – four sectors were selected in the end (aerospace, 
financial services, postal services and telecommunications).  
 
3.4.1. The aim of case studies 
  
Logically my choice of case studies is to be justified in this context. As Yin 
(1994) explained, ‘case studies are the preferred strategy when ‘how’ or ‘why’ 
questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and 
when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context’.  The 
characteristics and features of the context of this research project, as explained in 
Chapter 2, reflect the aforementioned quote. Indeed M&A is a famously volatile and 
instable environment. Since the summer of 2007 the market has experienced 
turbulences that have slowed down the number of mergers and acquisitions to a near-
standstill. Some bids were even abandoned in light of the economic outlook.  
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The ethnographer – participant observation – step has helped in observing and 
understanding the various aspects of Commission-firms relations and how a strategy 
could be designed according to the three elements highlighted in my previous chapter. 
The case study would provide a deeper analytical focus to this initial data collection 
stage.  
 
Yin (1994, p.8), in the second version of his seminal work on case study, explained 
that ‘the case study is preferred in examining contemporary events, but when the 
relevant behaviour cannot be manipulated. The case study relies on many of the same 
techniques as a history, but it adds two sources of evidence not usually included in the 
historian’s repertoire: direct observation and systematic interviewing’. Tellis (1997) 
further explained that case study is an ideal methodology when a holistic, in-depth 
investigation is needed. 
 
As mentioned in my account of my work experiences, contextual contemporary 
conditions are prime in my project and the understanding of corporate political 
strategies. Case studies are particularly valuable as a research method in this context. 
Unlike experiments, it does not separate, outcomes from context. In fact, case studies 
are multi-perspective analyses. This means that the researcher considers not only the 
voice and perspective of the actors, but also of the relevant groups of actors and the 
interaction between them (Tellis 1997). 
 
The aim of this comparative case study is to replicate in two distinct environments the 
same ‘experiment’. Therefore it was key, in the case of this project, to mirror the 
gathering of data in both countries. However it was also important to ensure that other 
stakeholders – in the case of this project: European institutions, competitors, and third 
party representation venues – were involved in the data collection process. The 
analysis of the date also had to ‘follow cross-experiment rather than within-
experiment design and logic’ (Yin 1994).   
 
3.4.2. Semi-structured interviews  
 
 Research methods using semi-structured interviews attempt to introduce 
flexibility in the communication process between the interviewer and the interviewee. 
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Indeed the open framework allows for conversational communication flow. As a 
result, information can be received as well as given. I have noticed with my 
interviews that interviewees were generally interested in the preliminary conclusions 
of my data collection. Unlike detailed questionnaires and surveys, semi-structured 
interview questions are not formulated ahead of time, but introduce general themes on 
the topic to begin with. Indeed questions are being designed throughout the interview, 
adapted to the interviewee’s reactions. Semi-structured interviewees can therefore be 
as intrusive as the interviewee allows it to be.    
 
At first, I developed an elaborate list of questions for the ‘preliminary’ part of 
the interview, but I quickly found that the questions had very little to do with the 
success or failure of the interview. As I learned in descriptions and analytical work in 
relation to the Hawthorne effect, most people have a story to tell. Indeed the 
Hawthorne effect has been broadly described as the change in behaviour and 
performance as a result of any new or increased attention by third parties (an external 
observer for instance). The Hawthorne effect was a term coined by Landsberger 
(1958) when he revisited experiments that were conducted at the Hawthorne Works 
factory, based near Chicago, between 1924 and 1952. Landsberger in fact defined the 
Hawthorne effect as ‘a short term improvement caused by observing worker 
performance’, which is a more limited definition than the one currently used in 
organisational behaviour.  
 
The interviewees also used my questions as an excuse for telling their stories. Since I 
thought of my initial interview as a means of developing rapport, this did not bother 
me at first. Indeed, I was glad to be relieved of the burden of keeping the conversation 
going, and I began to look for ways to get the respondent to do his or her thing. Later, 
I became interested in using the same interview format to obtain the answers to a 
specific list of questions, but I was unable to change the interview process. Either I let 
the respondent tell his or her story using my questions as an excuse, or else forced 
him or her to treat the questions seriously and give me a ‘code-able’ response to each 
item. If I took the latter approach, the respondents soon lost interest in the project and 
began to concentrate on getting through the questionnaire and on to their next 
appointment. In this process, they often provided misinformation in order to avoid an 
anticipated follow-up question.  
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A common criticism is that you can never believe the answer to a direct question 
about behaviour, or more crudely, ‘businessmen always lie’. This interpretation, 
however, suggests that this law misses the point: what interviews can reveal is not a 
set of specific answers to a specific questions, individual bits and pieces of 
information. What they reveal are patterns of responses. Each answer, whether true or 
false, is a piece of that pattern. Individual responses cannot be interpreted in isolation. 
But the responses grouped together and taken as a whole are clues to the mental 
processes of the participants.   
 
The virtue of using ‘insider’ informants in case studies of organizations is that 
these informants can think in terms of the organization as a whole as well as in the 
various settings within it, and they can be used to keep researchers in continuous 
contact with the setting. These advantages do not, however, eliminate two 
fundamental methodological problems in using informants. It is important to select 
informants who are knowledgeable and also to know what sayings of the informant 
are accurate. The problem is not that bias exists but how to control it in the research 
design. Salamone (1977) argues that even lies, when identified as such, are useful 
sources of information: ‘Lies in short, are a form of communication, not its negation’. 
Moreover lies, incomplete perceptions, and ulterior motives are not random features 
of a setting, and it is possible to strategically select informants who represent desired 
variation in perspective.  
 
Freilich’s (1970 quoted in Salamone 1977, p.118) discussion of rapport and 
humanism suggested that the relationship between anthropologist and informant in 
transactional terms strives to structure the situation in the most favourable terms 
possible for each actor.   
 
Not all informants are good informants since the information they possess – 
regardless of their willingness to part with it – is hardly equivalent. What is proper 
may be either popular or rational to all members of an organization and informants 
will differ greatly along these lines. The distribution of knowledge about what is 
going on in any organization is an important part of the sociology of that organization 
and the fieldworker must take care to establish the limits of an informant’s expertise.  
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Freilich offered a table describing the rapport between the interviewer and the 
informant, and the information that will be provided as a result. I have, in turn, used 
this table, adapted to the information provided to me, to categorize the different 
interviews I led.  
 
Rapport level Information provided (Total:55) 
Lying Zero 1 
Image Social Niceties 10 
Low Public Information 10 
Medium Confidential Information 21 
High Secret Information 8 
Intimacy Private Information 5 
         Table 2: Levels of rapport and information provided 
  
The most interesting contribution of this table is the first category as the lying aspect 
of the interview was regarding questions about the political aspects of the European 
merger control regime. While the interviewee suggested that there was no political 
involvement as far as she could see, at a conference for a specific audience she 
indicated that political involvement in European merger cases was not unheard of. I 
was able to cross-check this fact via a third-party to whom I did not reveal the name 
or answers of my interviewee. In fact it was pure luck for me to be able to gain 
insights of what had been said during the conference I referred to. 
 
Freilich (1970) put forward a typology of reasons for lying. Firstly, lying informants 
may do so for personal reasons, for example perhaps the data giver wishes to appear 
wiser, or of higher status, or richer than he actually is. Secondly, the scholar evoked 
social reasons, i.e. pressure from the audience present in an encounter with the 
interviewer. Finally cultural reasons may explain that certain information is not given 
truthfully in that socio-cultural system. 
 
Whitten (1970 quoted in Salamone 1977, p.120) indicated the importance of 
discerning motives for lying as an aid to discovering an informant’s network and his 
evaluation of it at a given time as ‘[the] discernible motive [for the informant is] to 
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place himself/herself in the most advantageous position according to his perception of 
social relationships at any particular time'. I can link this lie to cultural reasons as 
there was no audience during the interview and, as she was in secondment and was 
about to leave DG Comp, this lie would not have granted any higher status.  
 
3.4.3. Strengths and weaknesses of semi-structured interviews 
 
 Most interesting respondents are the ones that become ‘informants’. Such 
persons suggest sources of corroboratory evidence and may even initiate access to 
such sources. Interviews are an essential source of case study evidence because most 
case studies relate to human affairs. The latter should be reported and interpreted 
through the eyes of specific interviewees, and well-informed respondents can provide 
valuable insights into a situation.  
 
Interviewing has limitations and weaknesses that need addressing at this point. 
Interviews involve personal interaction; cooperation is essential. Interviewees may be 
unwilling or uncomfortable sharing all that the interviewer hopes to explore, or they 
may be unaware of recurring patterns in their activities. The interviewer may not ask 
questions that evoke long narratives from participants either because of a lack of 
expertise or familiarity with local language or because of lack of skill. By the same 
token, responses to the questions or elements of the conversation may not be properly 
comprehended by the interviewer. And, at times, interviewees may have good reason 
not to be truthful. Finally reliance on other people’s cooperation selects the 
knowledge an interviewer gathers. At an early stage in the research process I 
identified the events, settings, actors and artefacts that would have the greatest 
potential to yield good data about corporate political strategies in the context of 
European merger control regulation. 
 
Interviews can generate huge volumes of data, but these are time-consuming to 
analyse. Moreover the issue of the quality of the data needs highlighting. When 
interviews are used as the sole way of gathering data, the researcher should have 
demonstrated through the conceptual framework that the purpose of the study is to 
uncover and describe the participants’ perspectives on events; that is that the 
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subjective view is what matters. Studies making more objective assumptions would 
triangulate interview data with data gathered through other methods.  
 
3.4.4. The recording of data  
 
The process of preserving the data and meanings on tape is known to greatly 
increase the efficiency of data analysis. However, I was limited by my respondents’ 
requirements. Half of them were more comfortable not talking to a tape recorder, but 
allowed me to take notes. One of my interviewees did not allow me to take notes at 
all. The reluctance to have recorded evidence of the interviews proves the sensitivity 
of the topic. I have on tape 17 semi-structured interviews, and 37 notes taking 
recordings. I also conducted phone interviews (7) which explain the number of note 
taking.  
 
Type of recording No of interviews 
Taped semi-structured interviews 17 
Phone interviews 7 
Note taking 30 
Not allowed notes 1 
Total 55 
          Table 3: The recording of semi-structured interviews 
 
During my various interviews I had to stop the recorder three times as my respondents 
felt that their responses could not be taped, or they spent their time looking 
worryingly at the tape recorder and being aware of its presence.  Still the table above 
also shows the openness of the European Commission vis-à-vis researchers as all 
officials accepted to be recorded.  
 
There are probably underlying cultural differences here. For instance, French 
respondents were more likely to refuse the use of a tape recorder compared to 
interviewees from Brussels or London. Consequently, in order to create a more 
trusting environment and get more interesting insights, I asked whether I could take 
notes and did not try to get the interviews taped at the start of interviews.  
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Manning explained in 1983 that the problem of qualitative analysis based on 
fieldwork is that of avoiding solipsism on the one hand and avoiding positivism on the 
other. He advocates for an approach that makes language the locus of analysis and not 
to confuse the language systems used to ‘explain’ or formulate the world with the 
objects of study.  
 
My interviews were led in two different languages, although when I had the choice, I 
tried as much as possible to lead them in English. I have chosen not to fully translate 
the interviews to keep the value in the wording formulation. Key concepts were 
matched throughout the coding phase.  
 
The Table 4 below identifies the types of data collected according to each element of 
the original framework of analysis established in Chapter 1 – which contextual 
element is linked to which element of the framework of analysis. I have therefore 
given reference of which circumstances I have been able to gather the data according 
to to four contextual components. Firstly events I attended – this type of data has 
mainly been collected through participant-observation. The second contextual 
component relates to the setting in which I collected the data, i.e. the institutions I was 
based at when each element of the framework was mentioned. The third element 
directs to the documents I gathered. I collected this data at different stages of this 
project. Finally the last component is linked to the actors I interacted with throughout 
my project and categorised according to the different elements of my framework. In 
order to prepare the grounds for the next chapter, I have distinguished between 




 Table 4: Types of data collected 
  Arena 
 
Arena 
 Staging Vehicle Vehicle 






 Events      
P.O. In working groups x x  x x 
P.O. / I. In conferences/seminars  x   x 
P.O. In internal meetings (same 
departments) 
x x x x x 
P.O. In internal meetings (cross-
departmental) 
x x x x x 
P.O. In external meetings (formal) x   x x 
P.O. In external meetings (formal, limited 
access) 
x   x x 
P.O. In external meetings (informal – 
lunch, etc.) 
x    x 
       
 Settings      
P.O./ I. Association x x  x x 
P.O./I. Firm x x x x x 
I. Investment Bank   x x x 
I. Competition authority (DG Comp)    x  
I. Competition Cabinet    x x 
I. Court of Justice  x x   
I. Law firm offices x  x x x 
P.O./ I. Ad hoc coalition (association) x x  x x 
I. Ad hoc coalition (firm) x x   x 
I./D.A. Council  x    x 
       
 Documents      
P.O./I/D.A. Response to consultation paper 
(public domain) 
   x  
I. Response to consultation paper (not 
in public domain) 
x   x x 
P.O. Conference presentation  x   x 
P.O./I/D.A. Newspaper article  x x  x 
P.O./I/D.A. Newspaper quote  x  x x 
P.O./I./D.A. Research Papers/Report x x x x  
       
 Actors      
I./D.A. Lawyer x  x x x 
I./D.A. In house – Brussels x    x 
P.O./ I. In house – national capital x   x x 
I. In house – both x   x x 
P.O./I. General Counsel   x x x 
I. Upper Management x x x  x 
I. Consultants – political  x x   x 
I. Consultants – economist   x x  
P.O./I./D.A. Association  x x  x x 
P.O./I./D.A. European Federation x   x x 
P.O./I./D.A. European Roundtable x    x 
P.O./I./D.A. Journalist  x   x 






3.4.5. Coding for analysis 
 
Case study methodologies vary and scholars advocate the use of structured 
observation schedules by which one may code observed behaviours or cultural 
artefacts for purposes of later statistical analysis. Coding and subsequent statistical 
analysis is treated in Hodson (1999).  
 
In order to make sense of the volumes of gathered data I relied on a two-stage 
coding exercise as far as the interviews were concerned. The first stage deals with the 
main themes and derives, to a great extent, from the questions I asked. Theses themes 
are corporate political strategies (CPS), staging (STA), arenas (ARE), vehicles (VEC), 
mergers and acquisition (M+A). The second stage qualifies the themes, for instance, 
under the ‘corporate political strategies’ theme, I identified several main answers 
about the definition (CPSDEF), French corporate political strategies (CPSFR), British 
(CPSUK), and comparison elements of corporate political strategies (CPSCOMP).  
 
The categorisation remains intentionally large to keep whole sentences of the answers 
given by my interviewees and therefore keep the formulation my interviewees used to 
refer to each different code. This is used to identify the different vocabulary used by 
each of the communities studied (as according to the seven categories of actors 
identified at the interviewing stage).   
 
3.5. The different role of the researchers according to methods 
As aforementioned, typically, ethnography and ‘grounded theory’ avoid 
specifying any theoretical propositions at the outset of the inquiry. The case study 
method requires having some insight into the theoretical considerations that are taken 
into account. As a result, this project is constructed around these two steps. The 
ethnographic work is intended to provide data for the second step analysis of the 
Europeanization concept by the case study strategy – to study the linkages between 
the addition of a level of supranational governance on corporate political strategies. 
The literature has already offered theoretical propositions in this regard. This research 
project tries to shed new light on these propositions.   
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Sanday (1983) has discussed the different data collection procedures available 
to the ethnographer. Of importance for this project is the fact that the researcher is an 
instrument which involves him/her becoming part of the situation being studied in 
order to feel what it is like for the people in that situation. I therefore needed to learn 
to use myself as the principal and most reliable instrument of observation, selection, 
coordination, and interpretation.  Yet the total immersion can also create a kind of 
disorientation – culture shock – arising from the need to identify with and at the same 
time to remain distant from the process being studied.  
 
The role of a qualitative researcher entails varying degrees of ‘participateness’ 
– that is, the degree of actual participation in daily life. At one extreme is the full 
participant, who goes about ordinary life in a role or set of roles constructed in the 
setting. At the other is the complete observer, who does not engage at all in social 
interaction and may not even be involved in the world being studied (see Table 5 
below). 
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Table 5: Different roles of researcher and data collection methods 
 Roles  
Data Collection  









1. Observation and 
recording of 
descriptive data 
+ + + 
Particularly useful 
in understanding 
the different uses 
of arenas and 
vehicles 
2. Informal 




interviews – tape 
recorded 
- * + 





interviews – taking 
notes 
- + + 




interviews – no 
notes during 
interview 
- * + 
Could be during a 
taped interview or 
for the full 
duration of the 
interview – mostly 
about cases not in 
public domain or 
about the 
community 








Official minutes + * * Policy agenda 
Cases + + + 
Interviews 
revealed which 
cases were more 
problematic 




Correspondence + - - Community 
Speeches + + + Used in computer aided analysis 
Adapted from Marshall, C. et al. (1995, p. 102) table on the data collection methods related to observation role. 
NOTE: + = likely to be used, * = may occasionally be used, - = difficult or impossible to use.
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My personal experience constitutes a mix of these two extremes. I have been fully 
involved in the environment studied, be it a firm or an association, but I a made a 
conscious decision not to take part in the merger regime aspects of the political 
strategy. As mentioned in my section on the issues of inherent ethnographic strategies 
I was wary that my two hats – that of a researcher and that of a ‘public affairs’ 
employee – would send mixed messages to future interviewees. I therefore refused 
two 'stage' offers from a consultancy, which would have allowed me to work more 
closely on merger and acquisition transactions, but would have endangered chances to 
gain access to authorities or change the messages I would have received from 
interviewees.  
 
Some sort of participation was however becoming necessary as I conducted my 
interviews. Some interviewees actually advised me to pursue such an option. It eased 
my learning process on the particular activity that is corporate political activity. I also 
chose to fully disclose my research topic to my colleagues. However I noticed a real 
difference in the responsiveness of solicited interviewees when I contacted them as 
solely a PhD student or as also a member of a public affairs department. Some in-
house lobbyists ignored my email when I first contacted them with my university 
email address, whereas they contacted me as soon as I sent my email with my 
employer’s name – because I belonged to the community. I spent a total of nearly a 
year in both a firm and an association. I was able to conduct my interviews 
simultaneously, thus my second year was solely dedicated to data collection. This 
allowed me to conduct an extensive and intensive research regarding corporate 
strategic behaviours of firms – I was able to develop trusting relationships in my 
studied environment, follow different issues, and be exposed to many behaviours. As 
a novice researcher, it would have been harder to stay a shorter period within the 
institutions and identify patterns and strategic development.  
 
Participant observation is supplemented by a variety of data collection tools. They are 
employed depending on the issue studied, the likelihood of access to data, and the 
theoretical orientation of the project. They may range from key-informant 
interviewing, collection of life histories, structured interviews, and questionnaire 
administration to the less well-known techniques of ethno-science. The main reason 
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for employing a variety of data collection procedures is that it enables the investigator 
to cross check results obtained from observations and recorded in field notes. 
Triangulation will be discussed more thoroughly later in this chapter.  
 
Two questions are frequently posed by anthropologists regarding the methods 
of ethnography. The first concerns the criteria by which a person’s qualifications for 
conducting an ethnographic study are to be judged. One of the most important criteria 
in the past has been prior experience in another culture. Such a restriction may appear 
overly demanding. Its rationale is based on the assumption that one comes to 
understand something by seeing it as an outsider. An outsider is likely to be more 
sensitive to the nuances observed in a different culture, which otherwise might be 
ignored.  
 
This point has been particularly acute in my experience. In joining the department of 
European public affairs in BNP Paribas I only had my literary background to explain 
strategic behaviours and did not have any expectations regarding the why and how 
these strategies should be chosen. However when I moved to my second observational 
experience – in a radically different context – I had some experiences of what I should 
be looking for. Yet, as I mentioned, the context was sufficiently different from the 
first one to enable me to detach myself from my first experience and identify 
strategies. Moreover this second observational experience validated my first 
experience’s findings and allowed me to go deeper in being able to identify strategies.  
 
The second question in connection with doing ethnographic studies concerns 
the criteria for judging the descriptive adequacy of the completed ethnography. If, 
after having completed the project the ethnography can communicate within the rules 
for proper and predictable conduct as judged by the people studied, he or she has 
produced a successful product. The ethnographer is like the linguist who has studied 
and recorded a foreign language so that others can learn the rules for producing 
intelligible speech in that language – anticipating the scenes of the society. 
 
Through contacts made during my participant observation experiences I was 
able to cross-check my findings with key actors working in corporate political 
activities. Moreover European merger control regulation is obviously still being 
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applied and provides many fresh examples for me to check the validity of my 
conclusions.  
 
4. The analysis of the results  
 
4.1. A two-level triangulation project 
 
To enhance the validity of my research I multiplied the source points of 
information and interviewed actors with different roles in merger regulation. 
Therefore I chose a two-level triangulation that is hoped to increase the soundness of 
the conclusions. Denzin (1984) identified four types of triangulation: data source 
triangulation, when the researcher looks for the data to remain the same in different 
contexts; investigator triangulation, when several investigators examine the same 
phenomenon; theory triangulation, when investigators with different view points 
interpret the same results; and methodological triangulation, when one approach is 
followed by another, to increase confidence in the interpretation. The data source 
triangulation was chosen for this project. The conclusions of this project relied, due to 
its very nature, on a case study comprising of the analysis of the financial services 
sector, and a geographical comparative study of Franco-British corporate political 
behaviours. This choice can be understood by my reflection on a quote from Schramm 
(1971, quoted in Yin 1994, p.12), ‘The essence of a case study tendency among all 
types of case study, is that it tries to illuminate a decision or set of decisions: why they 
were taken , how they were implemented, and with what result’.  
 
Of course triangulation is not without its shortcomings. First of all, replication 
is exceedingly difficult (Jick 1983). Replication has been largely absent from most 
organisational research, but it is usually considered to be a necessary step in scientific 
progress. Replicating a mixed-methods package, including idiosyncratic techniques, is 
a nearly impossible task and not likely to become a popular exercise. Qualitative 
methods in particular are problematic to replicate. Secondly, while it may be rather 
obvious, multi-methods are of no use with the ‘wrong’ questions. If the research is not 
clearly focused theoretically or conceptually, all the methods in the world will not 
produce a satisfactory outcome. Similarly, triangulation should not be used to 
legitimate a dominant, personally preferred method. That is, if either quantitative or 
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qualitative methods become mere window dressing for the other, then the design is 
inadequate or biased. Each method should be represented in a significant way. This 
does however raise the question of whether the various instruments may be viewed as 
equally sensitive to the phenomenon being studied. One method may in fact be 
stronger or more appropriate but this needs to be carefully justified and made explicit, 
otherwise, the purpose of triangulation is subverted. The following table shows the 
different advantages of each research method.  
 
The ethnographer path I discussed so far reflects both strands of the 
triangulation exercise – henceforth linking the different research methods. I worked, 
as part of my research project150, for one bank (BNP Paribas) and an association of 
bankers (the British Bankers’ Association). I was based in the first instance in Paris at 
the head office, and in the second in London. During both experiences I was mainly 
exposed to European legislation discussed at the EU level or implemented at national 
level, but never directly involved in the merger regulation process. However I started 
my work placement at an interesting time. BNP Paribas was at the time merging with 
BNL (Banca Nazionale del Lavoro) in Italy – a country that was notoriously difficult 
as far as banking mergers were concerned151
Moreover my experiences following these two periods of fieldwork have allowed me 
to refine, to a certain extent, my conclusions. The opportunity to work for ABN Amro 
. It enabled me to gather unprecedented 
data from the team who worked on the transaction. The BBA had been very involved 
in the discussions leading to the revamp of Article 16 – which forms the basis of the 
supervision of bank mergers at the national level – in order to prevent national 
supervisors to intervene in merger matters.  
 
                                                 
150 Obtaining these two placements was subject to the fact that I was a PhD student and that I would 
have access to all meetings and documentation, in the context of my research. As a result, in line with 
my comparative framework, I had to work in France and the United Kingdom, and for a firm and an 
association in order to understand the full sense of ‘corporate political strategy’.  I later worked for 
ABN Amro in the Netherlands, Barclays in U.K. and currently work for ICMA London.  Although 
these experiences supplemented my overall understanding of corporate political activity and provided 
further examples, they were not originally planned in my research project. 
151 BNP bid for BNL in February 2006 and the final sale ended a period of Italian banking mergers that 
have damaged the nation's credibility. A number of scandals have sprung up around the takeover of 
BNL and another Italian lender, Banca Antonveneta. The head of the Bank of Italy, Antonio Fazio, was 
forced to resign following allegations that he favoured a domestic buyer in a tussle for control over 
Banca Antonveneta.  
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in The Hague – at the time of its takeover152
The second level of my triangulation resides in the additions I was able to 
make to the field I have been researching. This followed a two-pronged strategy. 
Firstly, during my participant-observation phase, I was exposed to more aspects of 
corporate political strategies than those of the European merger control regime. 
Indeed I have worked on different projects of the Financial Services Action Plan 
 – on the Dutch implementation European 
directive (MiFID, the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive) allowed me to 
further investigate national differences in corporate political strategies. Finally my 
return to London and positions within Barclays – then still in the battle to takeover 
ABN Amro – and subsequently ICMA (the International Capital Market Association) 
permitted analysing further the choice of vehicles in corporate political activities.  
 
 As abovementioned, although I ‘participated’ – to use the ethnographic jargon 
– the data produced by the case study is different from that produced by participant 
observation. As Jorgensen (1989) explained,  
 
‘Direct involvement in the here and now of people’s daily lives provides both 
a point of reference for the logic and process of participant observational 
inquiry and a strategy for gaining access to phenomena that commonly are 
obscured from the standpoint of participants’.  
 
Firstly, they do not use the same techniques and did not focus in the same way on my 
topic of study as was explained throughout this chapter. My geographical case study 
of French and British corporate political strategies, in the context of European merger 
control regime, covered grounds as far as corporate political strategies were 
concerned, irrespective of the types of issue at hand – with a clear stir away from 
working on competition concerns in the sector. Yet there is a certain amount of cross-
fertilisation between both research methods. My interviews provided data and 
sharpened my understanding of the different political strategies. Participating 
permitted me to explain decisional outcomes and corporate political behaviours. The 
fact that I interviewed financial services experts, amongst others, and also worked in 
the banking sector provided useful data for my case study.  
 
                                                 
152 During the three-month period I worked at ABN Amro, Barclays seemed to be the likely winner of 
the takeover battle between themselves and ‘the consortium’ (RBS, Fortis and Santander). In the end, 
(October 2007), the consortium was to ‘win’.  
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(FSAP)153 – such as MiFID154  or SEPA155
Moreover researchers are also interested in the generalisability of their project. Yin 
rightly presents the notion that two types of generalisation are to be considered – 
namely analytical generalisation and statistical generalisation. The latter reflects the 
fact that an inference is made about a population on the basis of empirical data 
collected from a sample. This is the most common way used to generalise data from 
surveys and experiments. However with case studies statistical generalisation cannot 
be conceived in the same way. Indeed case studies are not selected in laboratory 
. As a result my results are cross-checked 
to a certain extent to the financial services field. In addition, I have also interviewed – 
in addition to my core financial services semi-structured interviews – other public 
affairs experts (9 semi-structured interviews, with a 4 British and 5 French firms split) 
that have dealt with other economic environments, such as the travel industry, postal 
services, the defence, telecommunications, agrochemicals, and the equipment 




This chapter represents my methodological journey. It is a mix of theoretical 
considerations, practical issues and opportunities and my research experience. 
Throughout my year in fieldwork I was constantly aware of obtaining objectivity, 
validity and reliability of the results of the data collection phase of this project. The 
use of different research methods epitomises such an endeavour. The use of different 
research strategies, the different experiences I was able to acquire during my project, 
and the data I collected meet the standards of reliability.  
 
                                                 
153 The FSAP represents part of a wider scheme to create a European single market in financial services 
aimed at unlocking potentially huge economic advantages. At present a company wishing to offer 
financial services products in different member states faces considerable barriers, through having to 
comply with the different regulatory requirements of each state. The banking sector has already 
demonstrated that it is possible to lessen such costly bureaucracy through mutual recognition by the 
different national regulatory regimes. This means that once a company has fulfilled the regulatory 
requirements of one state it can offer its products across the EU. The initial regulatory clearance 
effectively acts as a "passport" and it is this concept which lies behind the European single market in 
financial services. The FSAP is the means by which the Commission is seeking to harmonize the 
regulatory regimes of the member states, to make this mutual recognition viable. The introduction of 
the single currency in many of the member states has acted as an additional stimulus in driving forward 
this agenda. 
154 The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive implemented on November 1, 2007.  
155 The Single European Payment Area 
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conditions. The method that should be used, as a result, is analytical generalisation – 
whereby a previously designed theory is used as a template to cross-check the newly 
produced data.   
 
I have seized as many opportunities as possible to interact with the community that is 
important in my studied context – going to launch parties, participating in conferences 
and making contacts while working. I am therefore confident that my access and 
analysis of data have been representative of the realities. The cross-checking with 
contacts is invaluable to validate my conclusions.   
 
This project is primarily inductive – relying on ‘real’ data collected, qualitatively, 
through experience and open-ended interviews to generate interpretations and 
understandings regarding corporate political behaviours. This is a key recognised 
difference between qualitative and quantitative research methods. Accordingly 
quantitative researchers tend to adopt the deductive approach, using a theory to 
generate hypotheses, which are then tested empirically. The choice of qualitative 
research methods was necessitated by the type of questions asked and the information 
sought.    
 
The following chapters present my analysis of the data I collected. Firstly, I analyse 
the interaction between firms and European and national competition authorities in 
terms of strategic behaviours and make some early pointers to the Europeanization 
literature based on a comparison between French and British firms in the financial 
services sector. Some conclusions made in the financial services sector are validated 
and other elements refined my overall conclusions. Finally my last chapter embodies 
these results and goes theoretically further challenging the Europeanization 






Comparing French and British 
Corporate Political Strategies: 
the Case of the Financial Services Industry 
 
 
Using the research strategy and methods explained in my previous chapter, this 
project examines the interaction between firms and European institutions responsible 
for merger regulation – understood as encompassing institutions based in Brussels and 
national bodies. The competition directorate of the European Commission is the main 
Brussels-based authority studied in this section of my project; yet an investigation of 
its relationship with other directorates and national levels of authorities will provide a 
broader understanding of European governance dynamics. 
 
Through the analysis of a generic framework for corporate political strategies, 
as designed in my first chapter, this chapter highlights important themes in corporate 
political strategies. As previously explained the case study, supplemented by data 
collected through the ethnographic method, tests the framework on a geographical 
level. How do French and British firms interact with competition authorities in merger 
cases, and how differently? Is there a generic model – maybe European – of corporate 
political activities? If there are differences, at which level and how can they be 
accounted for?  
 
Maclean et al. (2006) made interesting observations regarding the attitudes of French 
and British firms in the context of merger and takeover activity. These observations 
are tangent to my own project, but shed light on the usefulness of the Franco-British 
comparison. They encouraged the taking into account of national traditions when 
analysing the European merger regime. 
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In the UK, takeover activities have been generally accepted as providing a necessary 
discipline that works in shareholders’ interests, facilitating where necessary the 
replacement of inefficient management by a more effective management team better 
able to add value. A convergence of interests between management and shareholders 
is thereby fostered, at least in theory, as boards are alerted to the need to achieve a 
high level of performance. The downside is that by focusing attention on the share 
price, the use of takeover activity as a stick to beat poor management may encourage 
short-termism at the expense of long-term growth, with profits distributed as 
dividends rather than ploughed back into the company to fund future investment.  
 
Traditionally, the situation in France with respect to takeover activity has been rather 
different. Until relatively recently, it would have been almost impossible to see the 
share price ever sparking a takeover battle. Since the 1960s large French firms have 
sought to arm themselves to the hilt with a battalion of takeover defences, including 
crossed shareholders. The combined effect of these weapons has been to shield 
management from potential challenges from outside investors and to impede share 
movement, encouraging a ‘reciprocal complacency’ designed to protect the status quo 
by preserving intact the establishment network – a sort of ‘nomenklatura’ – which has 
long held France’s large companies in its grip. In Anglo-American terms, managerial 
failure has been allowed to continue uncorrected, with the main threats to the position 
of an incumbent Président Directeur Général (PDG) – French CEO – often coming 
from journalists or judges rather than corporate predators. How do these observations 
help the study of French and British firms’ corporate political strategies? How do 
these observations fit in the overall analysis of Europeanization? 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, there is agreement in the field of European interest 
politics that business interests are much better represented than other societal interests 
(Mazey and Richardson 1999). Organised interest groups are important and accepted 
actors at the EU level of governance. They provide the EU with information (Perez-
Solorzano 2004, Commission 2006), political support, and the possibility of 
democratic potential that some have defined as ‘input legitimacy’ (Scharpf 1999). A 
certain symbiosis can be detected between interest groups and bureaucracies. The 
latter have a tendency to construct stable relationships with the former as a means of 
securing a sort of ‘negotiated order’. Interest groups, for their part, also exhibit a 
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preference for public bureaucracies as a venue for obtaining reliable information and 
influencing public policy, particularly planned or impending legislative measures.   
 
Indeed the very establishment of a European merger control regime directly derives 
from a direct push from European interest groups (as explained throughout Chapter 
2), which became a valuable support tool in the hands of the Commission to 
legitimise and concretise the first European merger regime. The development of the 
European merger regime is also to be analysed in terms of industry-Commission 
interactions at different public policy life cycle stages. Yet, if the literature refers to 
European collective action regarding the development of the European merger control 
regulation (Cini et al. 1998, Bulmer 1994), no study has looked at the role of 
individual firms – when these actors are primarily affected by the EMCR – or tried to 
define where these pressures came from geographically. It is clear from Chapter 2 that 
not all Member States were at the inception of the European competition policy, or 
even at that of the European merger control regulation at the same development stage. 
Is it conceivable that corporate pressure from certain members of the most advanced 
Member States could have been felt at the European level? There is no answer from 
the literature. Yet Chapter 2 suggested in light of an analysis of the development of 
the European merger control regime that the industry – through trade associations or 
individually – had a critical impact on this development. This chapter will look at the 
design of corporate political strategies in this context in more depth.  
 
At the European level lobbying was defined as ‘all activities carried out with 
the objective of influencing the policy formulation and decision-making processes of 
European institutions’ (Commission 2006). ‘Lobbying’ as a concept is regarded 
differently in different national cultures’. In France ‘lobbying’ activities remain 
suspicious and controversial. Colbertist culture156, a French peculiarity, is one of the 
possible explanations. Colbertism favoured a leading role for the State157
                                                 
156 Jean-Baptiste Colbert, King Louis XIV’s financial controller, first set out to make France 
economically self-sufficient with a state-orchestrated industrial policy; successive French leaders have 
seen it as their duty to intervene in commercial affairs in the general interest.  
157 See FT article (27th September 2007), ‘National champions, French energy mergers test Europe’s 
free market puritans’, p. 13.  
; as a result 
interest representation by groups was seen as ‘specific’, in contrast to ‘general 
interest’ legitimately symbolized by the State (Meny 1986, Manin 1995, Saurugger 
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2004). This perception of the State is to be compared with the more liberal stance 
taken by the United Kingdom. There all-powerful prerogatives are less likely to be 
attributed to the State. Indeed its field of action is more prone to be limited. As Knapp 
and Wright (2001) explained,  
 
 ‘It was a view that contrasted with those more liberal ‘Anglos-Saxon’ less 
ready to attribute god like qualities to the State and more inclined to limit its 
role to holding the ring between competing private interests whose social role 
was viewed as broadly beneficial’.  
 
The State predominance in France and the antagonism between specific interests and 
the general good are strong explanatory variables (Aubry 2006). As a result as 
Kohler-Koch et al. observed, national traditions do matter in designing lobbying 
strategies (Kohler-Koch et al. 1999).  
 
In another paper (Berkhout and Aubry 2007) I have collaboratively assessed 
comparative work regarding the study of interest intermediation, and called for more 
studies of this type. The above-mentioned article argued for a ‘functional 
segmentation’, along the lines of the influence production process, to build a common 
research program. The influence production process was further divided into four 
stages (Lowery and Brasher 2003): 1) the mobilisation and maintenance stage, 2) the 
interest community stage, 3) the exercise of influence stage, and 4) the political 
outcome stage (see Table 6 below). This project is essentially based on the third 













Table 6: Interest representation segmentation 
Segmentation Description Related literature 
The mobilization and 
Maintenance Stage 
Explains how certain latent 
interests become organized 
Population ecology, 
collection action theory 
Messer (2007), Olson 
(1965) 
The Interest Community 
Stage 
Explains the dynamics 
between different groups 
Truman (1951), Schmitter 
and Lehmbruch (1979) 
The Exercise and Influence 
stage 
Explains the strategies and 
tactics of organizations. 
What do groups do?  
Boléat (1996), Fairbrass 
(2003) 
Political and Policy 
outcome stage 
Explains the effect of a 
group’s politics on public 
policy 
Greenwood (2003), Duer et 
al. (2007) 
 
Much of the literature on corporate political activity falls into two main categories: 
‘how-to’ books written by practitioners, which seek to describe those activities which 
are commonly employed in a given institutional environment, and another set of texts 
following theoretical and academic approaches. Importantly this also reflects a 
Franco-British dichotomy. Despite a nascent French academic literature (Dahan 2003, 
Saurruger 2003, Grossman 2004, Woll 2007), most volumes on lobbying remain 
technical manuals (Nonon et al. 1991, Lefébure 1991, Autret 2003, Coste 2006). The 
British literature is more varied, but has usually been at the forefront of academic 
research on interest representation (Grant et al. 1989, McLaughlin et al. 1993, Coen 
1997, 1998, Greenwood 2003, 2007).   
 
As explained in other parts of this thesis, generally speaking, approaches to the 
study of interest representation have tended to take an external, systemic view. 
Theories of interest representation would then analyse the role of pressure groups in a 
given political system. An effort to challenge traditional literature and use other 
academic resources to explain corporate political activity is visible (Fairbrass 2003, 
Attarça 2001, Dahan 2003). This chapter analyses corporate political activity from 
within the firm and asks questions about strategic behaviours – how do firms design a 
strategy? Which channels do they choose and why? Who interacts with the European 
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institutions and at what stage? These questions will be calling for questions regarding 
the importance of national government and the importance of national ‘lobbying’ 
traditions. Indeed Europeanization scholars are interested in understanding whether 
the emergence of large multinational firms, apparently subject to no single 
jurisdiction, led to the dispelling of national political reflexes. These issues are 
essential to understand corporate behaviour.  
 
Building upon the framework of analysis of corporate political strategies 
design – established in Chapter 1 – and the contextual aspects of the European merger 
regulation – in Chapter 2 –, and the data collected as explained in Chapter 3, this 
chapter is interested in the analysis of corporate political strategies by comparing 
French and British financial services firms. As with other comparative projects in 
interest representation, the Europeanization theme is latent throughout the chapter. 
My case study work and this comparative project are stepping stones to the next, more 
theoretical, chapter regarding Europeanization.   
 
1. Why a Franco-British comparison?  
 
 As previously mentioned the most favoured means of quickly developing 
global presence is by taking over the operations of other companies. Mergers and 
acquisitions have occurred in a series of waves since the second half of the nineteenth 
century (Maclean et al. 2004). The appetite for mergers and acquisitions shown by 
French and UK firms at the beginning of the twenty-first century was not sector 
specific. Nor was it confined to cross-border transactions. Quantitatively comparing 
takeover activity of both countries, Maclean et al (2006) concluded that the approach 
taken by French companies, most typically but not always, is to internationalise 
within the EU before expanding further afield, whereas UK companies look more 
naturally to the US and Commonwealth countries, as well as the EU, for major 
strategic opportunities.     
 
In the context of the European merger control regime, it is important to distinguish 
between the national and the European level. Both coexist, as was explained in my 
second chapter. The latter chapter indicated that considerations such as the 
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independence of national authorities in charge of merger control, the substantive tests 
applied and so on may explain differences in behaviours of firms.  
 
1.1. Comparing government-industry relations 
 
Other projects have been built upon a Franco-British comparison (Josselin 
1996, Fairbrass 2003, Maclean et al. 2006). Indeed, the UK and French government-
industry relations have exhibited some distinctive characteristics, as a result of 
contrasting, of core politico-administrative and economic institutions – more 
fundamentally governance structures – and sociological background.  
 
In terms of similarities, as political and economic actors within the EU, they have a 
broadly comparable role and status, with equal weighing in the EU’s institutions 
reflecting their similar demographic and economic characteristics. Crucially for this 
project both countries have been subject to the European merger regulation at the 
same time.  
 
However, the two countries have exhibited some striking differences in terms of 
certain politico-economic structures, macro-economic management, and industrial 
policy aspirations. In the immediate post-war period, the UK showed political 
commitment to nationalisation, economic planning and state direction of industry and 
in a limited way attempted to emulate the French indicative planning model in the 
1960s. During the last two decades of the 20th century, the UK has opted for the 
espousal of market-led responses to economic crises, its early and extensive moves to 
market liberalization, and largely laissez-faire treatment of industrial matters. In 
contrast, France has been distinguished from other EU Member States and the UK in 
particular, for its third model of capitalism (Schmidt 2003). The latter shows its 
enduring attachment to ‘le service public’, and its support for industry. Although 
Schmidt acknowledged that the post-war state-led capitalism may be gone, she also 
argued (Schmidt 2003), 
 
 ‘ […] that continuing importance of the state or state-related institutions in 
the economic management systems of countries which have evolved from post-
war ‘state-led capitalism’ to what one might call today ‘state-enhanced 
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capitalism’, [means that] the state having played a highly directive role in the 
past, continues to exercise significant albeit less direct influence’.    
 
In terms of the centralisation of the governance system, both systems present a certain 
degree of centralisation. However the British devolution effort has had more impact 
than the French decentralisation efforts.    
 
In competition matters, it is generally accepted that the UK is in favour of 
strong competition rhetoric whereas France prefers an ‘industrial policy’ rhetoric158
One of my interviewees, from the Competition Commissioner Cabinet, made this 
point very clear in reference to French firms. He explained
. 
In 1996 Schmidt used the examples of European competition policy to evaluate the 
impact of European integration on French government-business relations (Schmidt 
1996). French business and government officials complain in particular of what they 
see as distinctively ‘Anglo-Saxon’ bias, or the liberal economic ideology, that they 
insist has pervaded DG Comp (then DG IV) especially under Sir Leon Brittan. A 
majority of French CEOs, despite their general support to the acceleration of 
European integration were quite hostile to a European competition policy. Their 
‘fears’ were ‘confirmed’ by the de Havilland case, where the French criticised EC 
civil servants for basing their decisions not to allow the acquisition by Aérospatiale 
and Alena on purely ‘liberal’ grounds, that is on the effect of a takeover on world 
competition, rather than, say, in what position this would leave Aérospatiale by 
comparison with its major competitors (Dumez et al. 1992). French business and 
government officials incorrectly assumed that the process was political, not technical, 
and were not up to the European lobbying exercise, having failed early on to provide 
the kind of technical information that might have swayed the European Commission 
(Dumez et al. 1992).  
 
159
‘Schneider was not the only one to be totally wrong. Any French firm  which is 
misled by the fact that the European Union’s structure resembled that of the 
French structure with its ministries and Directorate-Generals and a President 
– at the thirteenth level of this Berlaymont building – and therefore supposes 
that you lobby here as you would in Paris – which means that you do not do 
, 
 
                                                 
158 Schmidt, V. (1996) 
159 Interview with author, Competition Cabinet Member, January 16, 2006, translated by author.  
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anything, you do not try to convince with valid arguments, and in fact you only 
have to wait to go the Head of the Cabinet – is wrong. This is not how you go 
about things here. The main difference here, contrary to Paris, is that there is 
no argument of authority. I, as a member of the Competition Commissioner 
Cabinet, cannot tell the Head of DG Comp that although he has valid 
arguments in his technical file about a merger case, I am going to go against 
his decision only because I am an important Member of the Cabinet. This sort 
of argument does not work here, whereas I can guarantee you that in Paris, it 
does exist to a very large extent’.  
 
1.2. Is there a national interest representation model? 
 
National policy-making patterns can be situated along an axis from statist to 
corporatist (Schmidt 2006). For Member States showing signs of statist patterns, state 
actors have traditionally provided interest representatives with little access or 
influence in policy formulation but have generally accommodated them in 
implementation. By contrast, for Member States closer to corporatist models of 
governance state actors have traditionally brought certain societal interests, mainly 
business and labour, into both policy formulation and implementation.  
 
A number of general studies on interest representation exist in both countries. These 
often suggest that a national ‘model’ of interest representation can be ascribed 
specifically to France and Britain. This model would be closely linked with the notion 
of ‘policy style’ as defined by Richardson (1982) and originally developed by 
Anderson (1979) as the interaction between the form of approach intentionally 
envisaged by the government in order to find solutions to public policy issues on the 
one hand, and the relations between the government and other actors in the political 
process, on the other (Saurugger 2003). Accordingly a four-element matrix of policy 
styles was established. On one side it would qualify the relationship between 
governmental actors and interest representatives, consensual or coercive relationships, 
and on the other a distinction would be made between anticipating and reactive 
governmental attitudes towards public policy issues. Policy styles are defined as the 
result of different systems of decision-making and implementation processes. This 
concept assumes that governmental actors usually design standard operating 
procedures thanks to which they deal with issues on the political agenda. 
Consequently, the relationships between interest representatives and the public sphere 
will also be subject to standardised procedures – such as regular meetings, 
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institutionalised consultation processes, or close relations between actors of a similar 
community, for instance graduating from the same Grandes Ecoles.  
 
In France the principle of pluralist democracy gives the State the mission of 
guaranteeing – beyond the specific interests of individuals and interest groups – the 
primacy of the general interest. In this context, many constitutional, legislative and 
customs dispositions, as identified by Mény (1986), aim at preserving the ideal of the 
general interest. The statist intermediation processes indeed perceive the influence of 
lobbies as illegitimate, and traditionally use formal consultation processes with a view 
to inform rather than incorporate interest views (Hayward 1995, Schmidt 1996). 
Despite this legal and constitutional construct the government and the French 
administration have nurtured personal relationships. This attitude can be explained in 
terms of legacy of Le Chapelier laws which, in the 19th century, prohibited any 
grouping around interests. Wilson (1987) in his seminal work on French interest 
groups explained that in fact no model – neo-corporatism, neo-Marxism elitism, or 
pluralism, could be applied in its entirety to the whole of the French interest 
representation landscape. Accordingly a mix of the three may be a more appropriate 
model.  
 
As far as corporate political activity is concerned, the role of elites that link the 
management board of companies to ministerial cabinets as well as administrations – 
relationships based upon common education paths (at the French Grandes Ecoles) – 
characterised the ‘French model’ of corporate interest representation. The concept of 
‘pantouflage’ encapsulates the possibility of senior civil servants to leave the civil 
service to work in the private sector, mostly in public enterprises or former public 
enterprises. This particular relationship encapsulates a type of French dirigisme made 
up of interventionist policies and top-down policy-making processes. While dirigisme 
today is very much diminished (Cohen 1992), the movement of individuals between 
the private and the public sector is still very common (Saurugger 2004). The 
European layer of governance has as a result sociologically diluted the old French 
network established by the Grandes Ecoles and the pantouflage160
                                                 
160 Athenora conference, Brussels, 31 May 2005, ‘les francais a Bruxelles: un lobbying professionel a 
visage decouvert’.  
. The object of this 
study is to assess whether the dilution of this model has led to a different –
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Europeanised – model. However, the national model of British interest representation 
needs also explaining at this stage.  
 
 The British government is associated with the model of representative 
democracy. The determination of specific policies in government emerges from a 
complex process involving consultation between a triumvirate of ministers, civil 
servants and representatives of those interests likely to be affected (Jones et al. 1998). 
Finer’s work161
The case study and comparison between French and British firms is therefore 
expected to be analysed at two levels. Firstly, it will be analysed in generic terms and 
will provide insight in the design of corporate political strategies in the context of 
European merger control regime. Secondly it will provide analytical data regarding 
differences between French and British corporate political strategies according to the 
 concluded that, 
 
 ‘[Pressure groups’] day-to-day activities pervade every sphere of domestic 
policy, every day, every way, in every nook and cranny of government.’  
 
As a result the representative democracy, which is based upon geographical areas, is 
therefore supplemented in practice by what can be seen as ‘functional democracy’ or 
‘group representation’. 
 
The government has always had to deal with groups in society, but in the last two 
centuries they have organised themselves more effectively as society has become 
more complex and as government has intervened in more areas of life. The anti-
slavery movement and the Anti-Corn Law league were two early examples. The 
nineteenth century also saw the formation of the major groups concerned with 
industrial production. Trade unions increased in membership and coalesced to form 
bigger units, while business groups too formed federations in order to negotiate more 
effectively with the unions and the government, itself an increasingly important 
economic interest. This was catalysed by two world wars and Labour’s 1945-50 
nationalisation programmes.    
 
                                                 
161 As quoted in Jones et al. (1998, p. 195) 
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different elements of the framework of analysis. In turn, the resulting analytical data 
will be used in Chapter 5 to contribute to the Europeanization literature.  
  
2. A generic analysis of corporate political strategies in the financial services sector 
 
2.1. High-level and technical organisational levels of interaction  
 
 My research project’s participants – contributors to the participant-observation 
research phase as well as the case study one – seem to unanimously agree that they 
are using high-level as well as technical strategies in interacting with the European 
Commission in merger cases. This has an impact on the arenas and vehicles elements 
of my original framework for analysis.   
 
This dichotomy further qualifies Bouwen’s (2002) typology of information. Bouwen 
explained that each European institution needed one type of information: Expert 
knowledge in the case of the Commission, Information about European 
Encompassing Interest in that of the European Parliament, and finally Information 
about Domestic Encompassing Interest in the Council. I contend that considering the 
organisational structure of the Commission, the European body expects differentiated 
information from interest representatives.   
 
The organisational structure of BNP Paribas is particularly relevant in this 
context. Indeed, different ‘public affairs’ departments were scattered throughout the 
business units and one had prime access to upper management levels, i.e. the 
Chairman and the CEO. The type of documents produced by the different 
organisational entity reflected the internal audience the public affairs dealt with and 
represented. Indeed, public affairs departments within the different business units 
were interested in specific and technical issues, whereas the upper-management 
public affairs departments overviewed all the issues at a very early stage, usually at 
the Commissioner’s level. No response paper would be formally drafted in this 
particular structure. The briefing papers would refer to long-term objectives and 
would identify European issues where it was felt that the Commission had a clear role 
to play. The EFR will therefore be the prime interlocutor of such departments. The 
EBF or other banking associations and their working groups will be seen as more 
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‘technical vehicles’. In merger cases, the Chairman or CEO would be expected to 
meet the Competition Commissioner whereas the legal department would provide 
detailed feedback to the case team.  
 
Within the British Bankers’ Association such a structure was not apparent at first 
glance. However the organisation is much smaller and the staff has to be able to 
deliver at different levels. The dichotomy appeared in the language used when 
strategy was talked about. On the one hand, the BBA drafted position papers and 
organised different meetings with Commission Directorate-General’s officials in 
charge of drafting a legislative proposal. On the other hand my department also sent 
‘high level letters’, i.e. signed by CEOs of major banks, which contributed to debates 
through articles in the Financial Times and/or wrote ‘academic’ papers on general 
issues. Based on my diary and subsequent research into papers produced by the 
banking industry, I tried to explain this dichotomy by a scaling exercise (Figure 6). I 
took into account the audience that would receive this type of interaction, the 
participants in the drafting of the documents in preparation or as result of these 
interactions, and the content of the latter162
 
 
.   
Fig.6: Spectrum of high-level/technical examples of output from public affairs organisations 
 
                                                 
162 For instance, some responses details all articles of the legal text and the wording of it. A ‘high level 
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 This continuum from high-level to technical interactions with the European 
Commission also reflects the organisational structure of the European Commission, as 
will be discussed below.  
 
2.2. The impact of the high-level/technical dichotomy on the framework of analysis 
 
 My framework of analysis can be refined in light of the discussion around the 
high-level and technical dichotomy. Indeed the type of the information along this 
continuum can be provided by different vehicles. Therefore the choice of vehicle will 
be highly dependent upon the information that will be contained in the message.  
 
A certain amount of political sensitivity regarding the arena in which the corporate 
political strategy will be designed should guide the choice of the ‘internal vehicle’ 
that will be discussing merger regulation implications. As one of the Brussels-based 
lawyers interviewed163
It is, therefore, probable that corporate top management will meet Commissioner’s 
cabinets rather than Directorate General officials – the ‘arenas’ element of corporate 
political strategies to which the message should be conveyed to. The dichotomy 
between high-level and technical reflects in effect the type of discussions that they 




‘You have to realise that you have a case manager, one of the heads of unit, 
and a team of officials. The case manager reports to a director, the director 
reports to the deputy Director-General of the Directorate General, and above 
that there is the Director General and then there is Neelie Kroes and above 
that there is the Cabinet. And each of these people has a say in the process. 
(…) This is how the system works, and it is easier if you have some sensitivity 
about the process and institutions’. 
 
164
‘It depends what we would want to achieve. Clearly if we go to see a 
Commissioner, we will probably try to get someone more senior. But if you 
are talking to a Commissioner you are probably talking policy rather than 
details anyway. And then, the issue is more about how technical it is. If it is 
, 
 
                                                 
163 Interview with author, Brussels, 18th January 2006 
164 Interview with author, London, 13th December 2005 
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technical, I will try to get a technical person that is able to explain the 
technical details of a particular issue. (…) The higher you go up [the 
hierarchy], the more distant individuals are from the technicality of the topic 
and the more they are able to lead overview discussions of the issue (…). It is 
a balancing act around what you are really saying. It is a case of importance. 
You are sending a strong signal if you have top management coming, as a 
senior member of the company has taken the time to come and explain how 
serious the issue is, and the Commission should therefore take it seriously’. 
 
Indeed the choice of internal vehicle reflects the fact that the arena, in particular the 
Commission, is a multi-layered organisation (Cram 1994, 1997) as explained by the 
bureaucratic politics approach (Downs 1976, Crozier 1963). The latter suggests that 
different units of the governmental system follow three objectives: increase their 
budget, reinforce their legitimacy, and guarantee their autonomy (Pollack 1997, Peters 
1992). Page (1997) indicates ‘there is clear evidence that shows that different 
ministries and agencies within a government develop distinct ideologies’ (p.11).  
 
European institutions are easing policy-making processes at the European level but 
are also bodies that wish to gain, widen or at least keep its own competencies, which 
leads to intra- and inter-institutional struggles (Cram 1994, Pollack 1994). The 
Commission, as an executive entity in the case of mergers, is obliged to find a 
compromise at the highest level. Coate (2002) explained this tension through a two-
stage policy modem in the case of bureaucracies. Accordingly,  
 
 ‘In stage one, the bureaucrats choose a desired outcome based on their 
interpretation of the agency mission (this interpretation could be coloured by 
self-interest). Then in stage two, the politicians interact to affect the policy 
outcome. In some cases, transaction costs preclude political control, such that 
default bureaucratic outcome occurs, while in other cases, the political 
control model determine the outcome. Although bureaucrats may have limited 
power in the policy process, their influence now stems from a first-mover 
advantage associated with making the initial choice’.  
 
The case of the Mannesmann/Vallourec/Ilva merger referred to in my introduction165
 
 
is telling. The technical level is in constant interaction with the political level within 
the Commission.    
                                                 
165 The latter is considered a controversial decision for the collegiate Commission. Indeed the decision 
went against the Advisory Committee – made up of representatives of Member States – 
recommendation, and Competition Commissioner Karel Van Miert was outvoted. 
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This distinction suggests that the more aggregated or 'macro' levels of analysis used in 
political science, economics and sociology may have its flaws. Indeed in the case of 
the Commission individual DGs play different roles and command different budgets 
(Bellier 1997). The separation between the distinct elements of an organisation 
provides a more comprehensive analytical basis for corporate political strategies, as 
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Fig.7: The design of a corporate political strategy 
 
The distinction between high-level and technical also highlights the inter-




3.  Comparing corporate political strategies – and elements of strategies  
 
Boléat (1996) used the analogy of a salesman to explain the importance of the 
presentation of a position to the authorities (also in Van Schendelen 2005). This 
analogy can also be usefully applied to firms presenting their case to DG Comp 
officials. In this context presenting a merger case is like selling a product. 
Accordingly, the client or customer would be the case team. It follows that the sales 
technique should be that employed by any responsible salesman. The first essential is 
to have a good case, well presented, that is likely to be acceptable to the person 
buying the product. One is not dealing here with ignorant customers who will buy 
anything but rather with highly expert people. While clever packaging and aggressive 
sales techniques might work in selling a product that is inappropriate, with experts 
these techniques not only do not work but are also counter-productive166
 ‘I can guarantee you that when you investigate a merger in the satellite 
systems industry in order to grasp competition issues you need to know how it 
works, and what the product substitutes are. And therefore you need engineers 
and not any engineer. In France, we would hire graduates from X-Mines
.  
 
Indeed merger case teams are primarily interested in understanding how market 
dynamics hold and what competition structures are like to ultimately be able to assess 
the market structure and how the transaction is going to affect that market. Within a 
couple of months the case team is considered the experts of the European Competition 
authority regarding the industry where the transaction is taking place. Indeed DG 
Markt, rather than DG Comp, would usually have the expertise and the relationships 
with the stakeholders within this industry. One European Cabinet official, while 
explaining how case teams were assembled, pointed out the difficulties regarding the 




Bouwen (2002) explained the importance of the ‘access goods’ to European 
institutions. He also distinguished between different types of expertise according to 
.  
                                                 
166 Interviews with European Commission officials, Brussels, January 2006.  
167 Students graduating from the Ecole of Polytechnique who aspire to enter the Corps of Mines – the 
great technical corps of the French state, attached to the French Ministry in charge of the industry.  
168 Interview with European Commission official, translated by author, Brussels, 17th January 2006.  
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the different vehicles. This concept is taken, to a certain extent, in my own project 
under the ‘internal vehicles’ banner.  
 
3.1. The delivery of the message 
 
Apart from confirming the high-level/technical dichotomy, the comparison 
between French and British firms highlighted the importance of the attitude of firms 
when establishing relationships with the authorities in merger control cases. The role 
of expertise in regulatory contexts was highlighted in my first chapter. The European 
level of governance is seeking to aggregate knowledge. Interest representatives 
capable of displaying the required competencies are better positioned. Analysing the 
Commission or a firm as one entity may distort an otherwise thorough study of 
corporate political strategies. The financial services case study used as the basis of 
this chapter confirms such an approach.  
 
Different Directorate Generals provide – vertically – different expertise. 
However DG Comp stands out as its decisions affect all sectors, and as a result 
impact, to a certain extent, all other DGs on a permanent basis. One of the 
Commission’s officials explained that thus DG Comp and DG Markt, in the financial 
services sector, work in concert. DG Comp does not hold the expertise in banking, 
neither does it have the long-term established relationship with that industry. Most of 
the European public affairs experts in the financial services industry I interviewed 
explained that they do not see DG Comp on a regular basis whereas they are all 
permanently in contact with DG Markt. Moreover the use of different regulatory tools 
in DG Comp influences in turn their behaviour. As the Commission official 
explained, 
 
‘When I left DG Markt everyone told me that I was going to see the same 
companies but with their lawyers, and this proved to be true.  
 
The procedures are very different. Commissioners cover different aspect of the 
same area, and they use different tools, which in turn influence their attitude. 
DG Comp is not a talkative service – people are scared of information leakages. 
There is a definite culture of secrecy here compared to DG Markt. DG Markt in 
a sense is a lot more transparent because the services deal with policy-making 
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and need input from firms about the realities of the market. It is a bottom-up 
approach that is encouraged. It is done through consultation.  
 
De facto there are different attitudes in people. The way DG Comp operates is a 
lot more confrontational than in DG Markt - because they are more cautious of 
corporate operations. But firms interact with DG Comp the same way, i.e. by 
involving a legal team. When you come to DG Comp it is because you may be in 
breach of a European provision, and this shows in attitudes’169




170, it is worth noting that the infringement proceedings were coordinated 
at DG Comp and DG Markt levels. Both services joined forces at the start of the 
proceedings171. The European body started proceedings on the basis of Article 21 (of 
the EMCR) – within the remit of DG Comp –, and Article 56 (EC Treaty rules of the 
free movement of capital), Article 43 (the right for establishment) – within the remit 
of its internal market responsibilities. The infringement procedures also followed 
those of Article 226 of the EC Treaty. Such an approach takes advantages of both 
instruments in merger cases proceedings. The famous case involving the Bank of 
Italy172
The coordination aspect of this inter-institutional relationship is accentuated by a 
phenomenon of cross-fertilisation between the two DGs; some senior officials, such 
as Alexander Schaubb former head of DG Markt were formerly with DG Comp and 
vice-versa. Indeed, the recently appointed head of the financial services unit at DG 
 also shows the interaction between both services. Every sentence of a decision 
is revised by both services. DG Markt endorses the role of guardian of the Treaty and 
DG Comp has executive powers on authorising mergers. Therefore DG Markt will be 
interested in stability whereas DG Comp will look at market share or other technical 
economic elements.  
 
                                                 
169 Interview with author, Brussels, 9th January 2007 
170 According to a Commission Press release of March 8, 2006, ‘The European Commission came to 
the preliminary conclusion that the Polish Government has violated the EU’s Merger Regulation 
(Article 21), which gives the Commission exclusive powers to take decisions on mergers of a 
Community dimension. In particular, the Commission considers that the Polish Government has 
encroached on the Commission’s exclusive competence by requiring Italian bank Unicredit to divest its 
shares in Polish bank BPH, despite the fact that the Commission already authorised, on 18th October 
2005, Unicredit’s acquisition of BPH as part of its takeover of German bank HVB. The Commission 
has therefore decided to send a letter to the Polish authorities, asking them to justify their actions 
within fifteen working days. The Commission has also opened an infringement procedure against the 
Polish measures based on the EC Treaty’s Internal Market rules’.  
171 Two separate press releases were issued as a result of the proceedings – on the same day, March 8, 
2006 –, IP 06/276 for the Internal Market services, and IP 06/277 for the competition services.  
172 The Bank of Italy had delayed the ABN Amro bid for an Italian bank, Antoveneta, in March 2005.  
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Comp comes from DG Markt and has already established a relationship with DG 
Comp officials. Mutual recognition is therefore fostered by staff movements.  
 
This does not mean that the services always agree on everything – as different 
approaches to a case demonstrate. The procedures are very different from one service 
to the next. For instance, DG Comp may want a reply within three hours according to 
internal procedures regarding mergers when the normal timeline for DG Markt is ten 
working days. The current situation is exceptional. As Cini (1995) further 
encapsulated,  
 
 ‘It should come as no surprise (…) that directorate-generals within the 
Commission [have] their own policy style, their own ways of working, and 
their own policy and organisational objectives. In addition DGs tend to be 
protective of what they consider to be their own sphere of policy influence, in 
Commission cases even seeking to ‘steal’ policy competencies from elsewhere 
in the Commission’.   
 
A Weberian defined bureaucracy that is the Commission, the different Directorate-
Generals, and the particular culture of DG Comp, have an impact on the way 
corporate political strategies are conducted, as a European public affairs expert 
explained plainly173
One of my interviewees, based at the CFI, related that the surge in merger Court cases 
is in fact symptomatic of bureaucracy issues
, 
 
‘Well, [going to DG Comp] is very much like going to the police station. You 
go in there completely innocent but you are made to feel you are a criminal. 
Because their job is to get industry, find cartels and punish them. That’s all 
they are thinking about. Whereas none of the DGs are protecting consumers 
and they are not there to point out the flaws of the industry. So they have a 
different mindset.  
 
My experience of them is that there is not a sense of open dialogue with them 
because their function is different’ 
 
174
                                                 
173 Interview with author, London, 13th December 2005. 
174 Interview with author, by phone, CFI référendaire, 29th June 2006, translated by author. 
, notably its capture by conflicting 
interests which in turn stalls the decision-making processes. He referred to the 
Airtours, Schneider-Legrand and Tetra cases. As mentioned in Chapter 2 these three 
judgements had an impact on organisational arrangements within DG Comp. A study 
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in the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) studied the political influence on merger 
bureaucratic decision-making processes (Coate 2002). When asked how stakeholders 
and observers explain the string of prohibitions as shown by Annex 3175
‘Firms have the feeling that they hold a counter-power. When firms are 
interacting with the Commission, they feel they go against a brick wall. 
During a CFI audience they can bring to the fore all they would have liked to 
produce during the administrative phase of the review of the merger cases’
 – and 
subsequent surge in Court cases, one interviewee explained, 
 
176
One government affairs official explained that his legal department was great for 
ideas and conceptual thinking but that they could not translate those into 
understandable political messages, or prioritise items
.   
 
The differences that can be observed within the Commission, as exemplified 
by the relationship dynamics between DG Comp and DG Markt above, are mirrored 
in important organisational elements in firms.  
 
Unsurprisingly, within firms, mergers are primarily the responsibility of the 
legal department and, in particular, of the General Counsel. The tension between 
public affairs and legal departments is palpable regarding the interaction with political 
stakeholders and legislative developments. Indeed both units are interested in policy-
making, and inter-departmental frequent meetings are usually organised within firms. 
For instance, BNP Paribas set up a monthly European legislative overview composed 
of public affairs and legal experts, in order to discuss forthcoming policies and 
allocate responsibilities. Merger cases meetings are also scheduled to ensure best 
representation and information gathering as cases developed.  
 
177
                                                 
175 From 1994 to 1999, 7 cases judgements were made by both European courts; from 2000 26 cases 
were closed.  
176 Ibid.  
177 Interview with author in the Hague, 8th February 2007 
. That may explain why many 
legal firms now have a public affairs department attached to them in charge of 
competition issues, especially in Brussels or Washington (DLA Piper, for instance). 
However this complementary of expertise is better acknowledged within firms than 
between legal firms and their clients – probably because they work on a permanent 
basis together. Therefore a firm’s legal department will be in charge of the legal 
 158 
documentation of a merger transaction – useful in competition cases – whereas the 
public affairs unit will ‘talk to its stakeholders’178
Interestingly a British debate highlighted this tension between public affairs and legal 
departments and their role. The Legal Services Bill was supposed to allow for the 
involvement of non-legal participants in a business of delivering legal services
, i.e. national politicians in the 
Ministry, Parliament etc and its designated EU sectoral Directorate-General. 
Unsurprisingly corporate lawyers have switched to public affairs. The task of a public 
affairs department is based upon the deciphering of legal texts and a legal background 
is perceived as helpful. 
 
179
The style of interaction between firms and EU policy makers was one area where 
major differences emerged between the UK and French firms as far as EMCR is 
concerned, as will be discussed in the ‘arenas’ section. Several observers commented 
that the UK firms were ‘pragmatic’, more ‘technical’, and more concerned with the 
. The 
importance of the legislation from the perspective of public affairs lies in Part 5 of the 
Bill. This part of the Bill aimed at a) removing barriers thus preventing those outside 
the legal profession from investing in, and b) holding equity in law firms therefore 
allowing non-lawyers to enter legal services.  
 
 Such considerations need careful attention when interacting with the European 
Commission in merger cases. The differences in organisational culture, and awareness 
of the latter, should be taken into account in conveying messages for merger cases. 
Although the Commission remains, as a whole, a bureaucracy in need of expertise as 
highlighted in the literature, the type of expertise should be adapted according to the 
interlocutors and the issue to be discussed at tend. A phase I and a phase II of a 
merger cases do not require the same level of details. It is indeed usual that economic 
reports are presented in investigation.   
 
                                                 
178 Ibid. 
179 In October 2007 the Bill passed into law as the Legal Services Act. The Legal Services Act is the 
first attempt to draw the entire legal services market into one regulatory framework. It is a far reaching 
and radical departure from existing regulations and legal business structures and achieves this departure 
by allowing the creation of what has been termed "Alternative Business Structures" (ABS).The Act 
maintains the status quo in relation to "reserved activities" i.e. advocacy, conducting litigation, 
conveyancing and probate, yet fails to regulate unreserved legal activities e.g. Will writing, 
employment advice, health & safety, although the Act does give the ability to quickly apply regulations 
to these unreserved activities. 
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details of policy and/or legislation than the French firms. By contrast, the French were 
perceived to be ‘philosophical’ and ‘political’ in their approaches to EU policy 
makers, and more concerned with broader ‘architectural’ issues than the fine detail of 
a policy or directive.  
 
However as DG Comp is keen to be perceived as an independent agency in the 
different strands of its competences, political intervention may be viewed as 
‘aggressive’ – in the sense that it questions the powers of the Commission, and in 
contrast to an expert relational strategy. Moreover, the Commission, especially in 
competition matters, relies heavily on its independence180. Throughout my interviews 
with European officials, notably within DG Comp, the same logic of asserting the 
concept of independence in merger cases investigations could be felt. Many officials 
were keen to explain the latest economics techniques applied to merger cases181
Yet critics of the European merger regime point out that the system is too politicised - 
unlike for instance the German Bundeskartellamt. They advocate for a European 
Cartel Office
, the 
checks and balances in place, the appointment of a Chief Economist, for instance. I 
conducted my interviews after the overhaul of DG Comp and the merger case teams. 
The impact of industry comments and CFI judgements was clearly palpable.  
 
As a result calling upon the Competition Commissioner or his/her Cabinet or other 
Commissioners may be a risky strategy. Commissioners are very different from 
European officials as was experienced by Schneider and Volvo. The argument of 
Commission independence despite the national legacy as highlighted by Bellier 
(1997) still stands.  
 
182
                                                 
180 Interview with author, Cabinet to Nellie Kroes, Brussels, January 2006. 
181 The Commission has started to develop and apply new economics-based theories of harm. 
Economic analysis shows that harm can in principle arise from diagonal mergers, where a firm 
acquires, but does not supply inputs to, a rival to one of its customers, or from partial ownership or 
minority stakes that confer positive or negative control. These theories are reflected in the approach 
adopted in Universal/BMG Music Publishing. Equally, whereas entry conditions are traditionally used 
as a theory of defence, the Commission has also examined mergers to establish whether they may 
reduce competition by eliminating a potential entrant (e.g. Aker Yards/MTX), a case that mirrors the 
2005 UK investigation of Bucher/Johnson. 
182 See Wilks et al.(95), McGowan (96).   
 as a solution. Indeed Commissioners are remembered as other 
politicians for their decisions and policy developments. However Commissioners are 
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not experts in each and every case going through DG Comp. Commissioner Monti, 
for instance, heavily relied on the work of the case team and its members when 
dealing with firms. As a former spokesman of DG Competition recalled, 
 
 ‘Monti was very supportive of his team. This is one trait that everyone can 
agree upon. It really came through when companies came to meet him to 
expose the facts. Monti was defending the machinery and the documents that 
his services would produce and this could be in front of other Commissioners 
as well as in front of companies. The case team and the whole team which 
worked on the case would be present throughout the process. He took the view 
that they were the expert in the case’183
 ‘Your case should always be presented as being able to make a contribution to 
the aims of European integration, which is based on a number of principles; 
such as free movement of goods and persons, social cohesion, the fight against 
unemployment and competitiveness. Highlighting these principles, on which 
all European legislation and initiatives are based, will enhance your 
profile’
.   
 
It is then the role of the Commission to decide upon the ‘political correctness’ 
(Saurugger 2003) of the information presented to the European institution. As a 2003 
working paper of the European Parliament advises as a best practice, 
  
184
‘More basically, the French need to renew their vocabulary in a universe 
where certain terms are not well-received whereas they are right on target at 
national level. Many expressions do not simply need a "translation": 
Community interest for general interest, service of general interest for public 
utility, consumer’s protection for social protection, cohesion for regional 
planning... Some actors, besides, understood it well and make a virtuoso use 
of Community rhetoric, hoping to relegate to the background points which can 
cause mistrust, if not the reprobation of the institutions’.
.  
 
This advice was directly given to French firms during an Athenora conference in 
Brussels supported by MEPs. French firms were urged to adapt their messages when 
interacting with European institutions. Accordingly, 
 
185
                                                 
183 Interview with author, translated by author, Brussels, 12th January 2006.  
184 European Parliament (2003) 
 
 





Although the Commission is dependent upon expertise, one of the organ’s roles is to 
manage public policies and to filter the information. Indeed the fragmented structure 
of the European Commission – referred to throughout this Chapter – lead to situations 
where the bureaucratic entities may be in conflict and that the gathered expertise may 
also be used for political ends. In fact providing information to the Commission, 
within a corporate political strategy, should be perceived from two angles: expertise 
in order to legitimise the European institutions’ activities and enhancers of 
competencies of Commission entities in an intra-institutional context.  
 
As will be explained later French firms have been slower to recognise the importance 
of the European level of governance. Yet it should be recognised that French firms 
have now taken a much more active role. British firms, on the other hand, have 
quickly recognised the opportunities that a new layer of governance provides. In 
previous chapters I referred to the ‘output legitimacy’ debate. The Commission 
welcomes interest representatives as the European body is hungry for information, 
and recognises the importance of external expertise in policy-making. In addition in 
the European merger regime, the Commission is attached to its independence – 
underlying this concept is the notion that the Commission does feel it has to be 
pressurised by Member States.  
    
The fact that French firms may be relying in European merger cases, to a certain 
extent, on French authorities has an effect on the quality of the relationship French 
firms have with European bodies. This may be explained by two factors. Firstly 
French authorities have been perceived to ‘intervene’ in merger cases as related in 
newspapers, overtly criticising the Commission (De Havilland, 
Schneider/Legrand186
 ‘We tried to contain the French company’s willingness to manage everything 
from Paris and get involved in all aspects of the case. We advised Schneider 
). This has been mentioned by my interviewees as a major ‘faux 
pas’ in merger cases. As one lawyer interviewed explained, in the case of the 
Schneider case,  
 
                                                 
186 I have heard contradicting stories on this front. All interviewed lawyers familiar with the case accept 
the intervention of French authorities, but they dispute the timing of it and therefore the actual 
influence this intervention may have had on the Commission’s final decision.  
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CEO […] to keep quiet until the Commission came out and to take it from 
there’.187
As a result the delivery of messages also plays a crucial part in the comparison of 
French and British corporate political strategies. This added dimension to the overall 
  
 
Secondly, French firms may have different visions of the European policy-
making system in merger control regulation. It is viewed as an economic system that 
simply goes against industrial policy (Van den Hoven 2002). Understanding decision 
making mechanisms and aspirations of the European merger regime is key. In merger 
cases the case team is a crucial element. Commissioners generally become involved 
only when an issue is politically important, requiring in-depth analysis. The majority 
of decisions are handled by DG Comp officials and even where a matter is ultimately 
determined by a Commissioner, because they are at the top of a directorate-general, 
Commissioners will normally accept the advice of their officials, as explained earlier 
with the example of Mario Monti. Where there are issues to a merger decision or 
where there are significant political implications then officials will properly put 
forward a range of options with the pros and cons of each, leaving it to the 
Commissioner to decide. This system, also applied in other segments of public policy 
and in other political systems (see Boléat 1996 for an example of the British system), 
ensures that merger cases are examined professionally. Regardless of who is doing the 
examining the same end result should be reached. 
 
This latitude in attitudes towards the European level of governance has an impact on 
the type of relationship firms have with the Commission.  Indeed resorting to Member 
States’ governmental intervention challenges the perception the Commission has of 
itself as an independent authority, and the ultimate objective the European authority 
has: the integration of the European market. This explains why ‘national champions’ 
– the merger of firms of the same nationality - pose more problems. Airtours/First 
Choice and Schneider/Legrand are prime examples of this.  More recently, the merger 
involving the former gas monopoly GDF and the French company Suez was a clear 
defensive move to counter Suez's hostile takeover launched by Enel.  
 
                                                 
187 Interview with lawyer based in Brussels, 25th October 2005.  
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strategy encapsulates the degree of recognition of the European level of governance in 
its own right and how the discourse firms present to European authorities is adapted to 
its perception of itself and its objectives.  
 
Using exchange theory jargon, corporate political actors do not possess a monopoly of 
the good of information (or only in exceptional cases). Moreover, information is not 
readily available, rather it has to be generated and adapted to the demand side. 
Depending on the issue, specific firms can deliver specific information about the way 
legislation will affect for instance their sector and the amount of conflict or consensus 
that can be expected from a certain regulation. The information good delivered can 
also specify how to curb conflict and foster consensus. Related to the specific needs 
of European decision-makers, this involves, for instance, information about effects in 
all EU Member States. Merger cases require similar adaptation of information, 
depending, for instance, on which phase of the proceedings the case has reached – the 
different stages are explained in Chapter 2 - , or which type of operation is 
considered.      
 
3.2. Case study data analysis and the ‘staging’ element 
 
In my first chapter I referred to the definition of a strategy from the 
management literature. Hambrick et al’s (2005) definition of a strategy identifies five 
critical elements to its designing – namely arenas, vehicles, differentiators, staging, 
and economic logic. From this definition I identified three core elements –staging, 
arenas, and vehicles. The three core elements are to be understood within a wider 
corporate political strategy design framework that incorporates the importance of 
messages as described in Chapter 1. 
 
Merger decisions should be reached as quickly as possible, with the least possible 
number of remedies given to the authorities. Therefore designing strategies promptly 
is essential. As one French commentator explained, 
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‘The prime aim of the ARFA188 is to work on the time of the transaction. It is 
looking at how to reduce it (…). Indeed the time spent on the one transaction 
affects directly to the implementation of the overarching corporate strategy. A 
firm cannot do several transactions at the same time’189
 As explained in Chapters 1 and 2 of my thesis, the 'staging element' is 
particularly important for firms and drives the design of corporate political strategies, 
as it will determine which 'arenas' to interact with and which documents to provide. 
Indeed responses to a consultation paper on a new European merger regulation  - such 
as the 2001 consultation led by the Commission on the review of the EMCR - are 
radically different from filing a Form CO – the formal notification form in European 
merger cases – sent to the Commission to seek approval on one transaction. My 
second chapter discussed the consultation period under 'the politicisation stage' of the 
public policy life cycle. I will, in this chapter, focus on two different stages – namely 
the institutionalization and litigation phases of the public policy life cycle
.   
 
190
                                                 
188 The ‘Association des Responsables de Fusions et Acquisitions’ – a Paris based association that 
represents corporate managers in charge of mergers and acquisitions.  
189 Interview with author, translated by author, Paris, 1st February 2007.  
190 See Aubry (2006) 
, where 
similarities and differences between French and British firms are prominent. This 
analysis will re-emphasise the interdependence between different elements of the 
analytical framework of corporate political strategies design highlighted in this 
chapter.  
 
The literature studying corporate lobbying has been interested in the setting up of 
Brussels’ offices and their role in corporate political activity (Michalowitz 2005). My 
experiences and interviews helped to identify two main types of European 
presentation – ‘diplomatic bureaux of representation’ or ‘expert bureaux in European 
affairs’. National patterns are harder to uncover in the set up of either structure, 
although the effectiveness of national associations is an important factor – as 
discussed at a later stage of this Chapter. Despite this there is some merit in placing a 
senior officer at the Brussels level of public affairs, or ensuring that upper 
management levels interact with the Commission. Indeed policy views should not 
come from one particular quarter in a company. In addition appreciation of the public 
policy life cycle, and showing sensitivity to it, is a prime function of these bureaux. 
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Moreover Commission officials are keen to discuss cases with ‘people who have some 
weight in the company’, and ‘can commit on behalf of their organisation’191
As explained in my section regarding the interaction between DG Comp and other 
Directorate-General of the Commission, such as DG Markt, the need for expertise is 
grander for merger case teams than any other part of the Commission. Does it mean 
that DG Comp is ‘captured’ by corporate interests? Merger decisions tend to evidence 
that this may not be the case, in terms of ‘political capture’. Indeed throughout the 
public policy life cycle DG Comp has put in place a ‘pluralist’ structure consultation 
on each case, whereby all stakeholders (competitors, consumers) are invited to 
provide information. Checks and balances are more robust, internally as well as 
externally, since the revamping of European merger control regulation. Finally, 
economics and legal analysis are more advanced. The introduction of new prohibition 
criteria, explained in Chapter 2, intends to close an alleged gap with regards to 
mergers in heterogeneous oligopolistic markets, and is hoped to strengthen economic 
analysis. The 'more economic approach' has also led to a number of organisational 
changes within DG Comp. One is the appointment of the first Chief Economist. 
Another is that the Merger Task Force has been disbanded and its members have been 
integrated into existing sector-specific directorates. However, it may be the case that 
DG Comp, and merger case teams to a certain extent, is ‘technically captured’. Indeed 
European Commission officials
. These 
offices are the company's ‘eyes and the ears’ in Brussels. However in merger cases, 
most of my respondents saw the Brussels structures as a monitoring aid and political 
system advisers, as transactions decision-makers, were usually similar within the 
companies’ headquarters.  
 
192
                                                 
191 Interviews with Heads of European public affairs and Commission officials, 2005 and 2006.  
192 Interviews with author, Brussels, January 2006.  
 were keen to discuss their visits to the industry 
according to my interviewees as they felt it enabled them to understand market 
dynamics, corporate organisation and processes. Increasing reliance of economic 
work to push through mergers comforts this conclusion. Technically advanced merger 
decisions also create ‘soft law’ and precedence to future merger investigations, as 
Airtours explained when they went to Court. This type of technical lobbying has 
therefore a long-term impact on shaping policy directions. In turn, this will have an 
impact on the choice of vehicles used by firms internally and externally. A CEO is 
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more likely to wish to meet the Commissioner than a case team handler – and the 
dialogue may also be more fruitful as a result. The technical side of a firm is 
understood by the interviewees to be handled by ‘the business people on the ground’.  
 
However the stage at which the case impacts the nature of the expertise is needed 
from the case team. One lawyer explained that he was willing to disclose everything 
at a very early stage, even at pre-notification stage. His ‘own philosophy which has 
worked for [him] is to make a complete disclosure and even more that is required. 
Indeed, [for him], there is nothing more useful than credibility. When [a lawyer] 
communicates with the official the fact that [he/she] is honest and will cooperate fully 
then already [he/she] is in good shape’193
‘And there is still an element of career developing, by working on phase 2, and 
Commission officials are remembered for working on their work on phase 2 
cases. It is much more interesting’.
. A phase II case receives more media 
attention than a phase I, as the trio cases looked at in Chapter 2 show – Airtours, 
Schneider and Tetra - and necessarily becomes more political as more layers of 
decision-makers are involved, because in essence it questions the whole transaction. 
One of my interlocutors explained it thus,  
 
194
National competition authorities (NCAs) are also included in case filing 
process formally through the Advisory Committee – although its actual influence is 
limited. However not all NCAs display the same level of involvement in EU merger 
cases. Some national competition authorities are willing to advise firms, at different 
points of the public policy life cycle, and gather information through their contacts
   
 
195. 
This is the case for the French authority, for instance196
Despite their quasi-institutionalised relationship the UK government and 
firms, on the other hand, tend to have a fairly distant relationship when it comes to 
competition matters (Fairbrass 2003). Government officials are reluctant to act as 
. This remains at a very 
technical level – Form CO, argumentation of the transaction, etc. – rather than 
exercising political influence over the European institution.  
 
                                                 
193 Interview with author, Brussels-based lawyer, January 18, 2006 
194 Ibid. 
195 Interview with French merger authority, Paris, December 2005.  
196 Interview with former French merger regulation officer, Paris, 26 June 2006 
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spokesmen for British firms. In the Airtours case, the legal team representing the 
British package holiday operators tried to get the UK government on board, and the 
latter refused197. In France, the French government has been keen to openly and 
politically support Schneider in its bid for Legrand, and was involved in judicial 
proceedings198. The independence of the competition policy in the United Kingdom 
can explain such a detachment.  
 
This is clearly reflected in Court cases. The French government is, statistically, more 
willing to intervene at the European Courts level. Indeed, from the introduction of the 
Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89, the French Republic was party in the proceedings 
eight times, when the United Kingdom of Britain has never been party. Seven out of 
the eight interventions were made in reflection of a decision affecting a French 
company.  
 
Table 7: Number of Court cases and role of the French and British governments (since 1994) 





French Republic 2 5 1 8 
United Kingdom 
of Britain 0 0 0 0 
     
 Two salient points emerge from this section. Firstly, as would be expected in 
light of the context of the European merger control regime as described in Chapter 2, 
different expertise is needed at different stages of the public policy life cycle. 
Secondly, the French government is more willing to intervene at different stages of 
the cycle, in comparison with the British government. In this instance, the 
involvement of the French Republic in European courts cases affecting French firms 





                                                 
197 Interview with Airtours legal team, London, September 2005.  
198 According to Le Monde (5th October 2001), after the prohibition, announced on 27th September 
2001, the French political class had been trying to rescue the two national champions. Mr Fabius (left-
wing) rang Mr Monti, and Mr Chirac (right-wing) rang the then President of the Commission – 
Romano Prodi.   
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3.3. Case study data analysis and ‘arenas’ element 
  
 3.3.1. The political and technical game  
 
As far as corporate political activity is concerned, the de Havilland case 
provides some insights as what one might expect from a French and British 
comparison. It is worth noting that French public affairs and legal departments – when 
talking about European lobbying – permanently compare themselves to ‘the British 
way’. This comparative work seems pertinent as Britain is perceived as the 
‘successful’ benchmark in France. Yet in my different interviews in Britain many of 
my respondents were keen to tell me that ‘the French were good at the political 
game’.  
 
Exerting influence in the policy-making process of the EU is quite different from 
what it is in France – more so than in Britain, where the system is more consultative – 
and French government and business officials encountered understandably, as a result, 
difficulty adapting themselves to this very different administrative culture, as 
explained in the Chapter 2 difference between France and UK merger authorities. 
Repeated reference to this difficulty can be found in ‘how to’ books on lobbying the 
EU such as: ‘the Dutch and British are virtuosos, the Irish excellent, the Germans (as 
always) efficient, and the French (as often) lightweight and late’. In particular it is felt 
that the French tend to wait until the last minute to act, and are too abstract, especially 
in contrast to the British who tend to propose ready-to-use amendments (Fourçans 
1993). Another source of difficulty for France arises from a longstanding 
underestimation within its ministries of the importance of EC/EU administration. 
(Schmidt 1996). The 2002 CCIP Report (Derieux 2002) epitomises this lack of 
interest from French officials with a telling example, 
 
 ‘On 27th November 2001, the ‘cercle des délégués permanents français’ 
(composed of French groups, firms, consultants, regional representatives, 
chamber of commerce) organised in Brussels its annual dinner inviting all 
French MEPs at the time of a Brussels plenary session. Out of the 87 French 
MEPs, only 7 came to the dinner’199
                                                 




The French permanent representation in Brussels, unlike its British counterpart, does 
not seem to be providing the French industry with support. As one French 
commentator based in Brussels indicated, ‘when I need a working paper in view of a 
Council working party’s meeting I do not attempt to go to the French permanent 
representation. I usually go to other permanent representations which are more 
helpful’200
 ‘We will note that at EU Council level, French civil servants, by contrast to 
many of their counterparts, refuse too often to cooperate with French firms’ 
representatives or to communicate information on discussed texts - an attitude 
that has no justification’
. The role of the permanent representation is crucial to get documents with 
‘limited distribution’, and intervene in decision-making processes as an insider. The 
CCIP Report (Derieux 2002) was very critical of the French governmental 
representation in general: 
 
201
 ‘During the British beef crisis, British beef producers were supported by the 
British permanent representation to the European Union in the recognition of 
the quality of their produce and obtained, via the permanent representation, 
the support of all 87 British MEPs from all political parties. The latter 
protested, in one voice, through a common action within the European 
Parliament in Strasbourg in July 2000. Simultaneously the British Chamber of 
Commerce in Brussels was organizing a dinner to celebrate the quality of 
British beef’
.   
 
The British interest representation experiences a totally different attitude, 
 
202
 These original differences impact to a certain degree the comparison between 
French and British corporate political strategies. Indeed the high-level and technical 
dichotomy is helpful. French firms tend to go to the highest level of the European 
.  
 
However French multinationals have made progress at the EU level and are involved 
in the European policy-making level. They have a much greater appreciation of the 
importance of Brussels than the ministries, given not only their obvious interest in EU 
regulation where it affects their products and operations, but also their early support 
for accelerating European integration (Green Cowles 1995).  
 
                                                 
200 Informal interview with author, on 9th January 2007 
201 Translated by the author (op.cit. , p.17) 
202 Translated by author, in op.cit., p.28 
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Commission to get their case resolved. The merger case of Schneider/Legrand is 
symptomatic in this instance203
 ‘I was late to hand in our joint response to a consultation paper on the merger 
legislation, about which I told our public affairs department. The latter 
panicked straight away and was wondering whether we should not ring the 
Head of DG Comp or even Kroes to let them know that the response was 
going to be delayed. This is their answer to everything - ring the Cabinet’
. The press was keen to relay that both the French 
President and the Prime Minister were involved at the highest level. This is further 
explained by Table 7. One in-house lawyer informed me of a similar reaction, 
 
204
Yet many Commissioners, unlike senior officials, have had virtually no training in the 
handling of the technicalities of merger decisions. They are primarily interested in 
policy directions and strategy rather than the technicality of the legal texts
.   
  
205. 
Significantly Brussels insiders can only recall one case that a Competition 
Commissioner actually lost after collegial decision206. One lobbyist explained that 
intervention at different levels depended upon what needed achieving207
However, there is a small number of academics who influence the big policy debate 
both directly and indirectly, and this may be in legal and economic terms. Indirectly, 
academics have analysed merger cases and policy developments. Firms can also 
commission studies to help them pursue certain arguments in specific merger cases. In 
merger cases, this is particularly true with economic reports.  
. 
 
Over recent years there has been a proliferation of bodies that exist purely to 
study and influence public policy (CEPS, EPC, Brueghel). A few bodies are aligned 
with particular parties or sections of parties or political philosophies. Other bodies are 
studiously non-political and seek influence through the quality of their research. 
These bodies probably enjoy having an increasing influence on the development of 
public policy.  
 
                                                 
203 Le Monde reported on 5th October 2001 that the French political class attempts to save the two 
national champions – Schneider and Legrand. Following the prohibition decision of the European 
Commission, it was reported in the French press that both Mr. Fabius, then Prime Minister, and the 
French President, Mr. Chirac, called respectively Commissioner Monti and President Prodi.  
204 Translated by author, Interview with author, 8th March 2006, Paris 
205 Interview with Head of European Public Policy, London, 13th December 2005.  
206 Commissioner Van Miert advised the College to proceed with the prohibition of the merger between 
Ilva SpA, Mannessmann AG and Vallourec SA.  
207 Interview with Head of European Public Policy, London, 13th December 2005. 
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Relying upon the case team's need of technical expertise, British firms have favoured 
adding economic reports and hire economic consultants in merger cases at the 
European level (during the investigation and judicial reviews). Unsurprisingly, major 
economic consultancies are of British or American origin. The only major French 
economic research organisation, used by consultants in merger cases, is based in 
Toulouse within the Université I208. Although French firms are now hiring economists 
to strengthen their case209
In France, ultimate decision-making in the ministries is political, and the most 
important level of decision-making is at the top - any decision on a dossier, however 
technically competent, may be reversed higher up; by the minister or even, in 
particular sensitive merger cases, by the minister, by the Prime Minister or President 
as explained in Chapter 2. Moreover the State has guaranteed pools of expertise 
, they were slow at integrating this component into their 
strategy, as this is less used at the national level. This example is symptomatic of the 
difference between French and British firms when interacting with authorities.  
 
Firms with professional lobbyists probably interact with the Commission 
making use of the whole of the spectrum. Yet, in general, French and British firms 
differ on their understanding of what to ask from different levels. French firms have a 
tendency to assume that the upper level of the spectrum is able to circumvent the 
lower level – however expert the latter might be. Interestingly more French firms than 
British firms have accommodated in their organisational structure a department closed 
to the corporate upper management, whose work solely focuses on ‘high-level’ policy 
strategy. Business assumes that the solution is to go to the top or, as one CEO 
observed, ‘the French think that a phone call to Jacques Delors [then President of the 
Commission] can solve everything. They’re wrong’ (quoted in Schmidt 1996). British 
firms display a better understanding of the political and technical mechanisms and 
how to use them efficiently in a merger case. Yet they are less competent at the 
political game.  
 
                                                 
208 Paul Seabright, Patrick Rey and Jean Tirole.  
209 ‘Upon appeal, Schneider hired NERA to provide economic evidence to bolster its case. NERA’s 
structure of distribution in the different national markets to show that the merger would not increase 
market power and provided evidence that demonstrated that the EC was wrong to exclude vertically 
integrated sales from its market analysis’, in NERA (07), Antitrust and Competition Policy Economics, 
NERA Publications.  
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within its own governmental ranks. The State’s institutionalisation of expertise 
(Saurugger 2003) is demonstrated by the establishment of Grands Corps which have 
‘established an expertise fully integrated in the decision-making processes’ (Papon 
1978). This administrative practice reflects the Weberian technocratic model within 
which technical competence is linked to legal competence. The notion of the Corps is 
one inherited from the Ancien Régime which is closely related to that of corporatism 
(Kessler 1986). ‘The members of the group are unified in an organisation thanks to 
an established position, legally protected by the State. Members are close through 
rituals, common recruiting systems, and a similar collective vision of themselves’ 
(Kessler 1986, p.9).   
 
Lobbying is still, to a certain extent, regarded as illegitimate. The key to having 
influence, however, is with personal relationships between business and leaders, and 
top ministers and their staffs. Relationships are based on old school ties, membership 
in the Grand Corps (the elite civil service corps), or common working experience in 
politics, ministries, or industries, so much so that this more than anything else is seen 
as ‘lobbying’ à la française (Lefébure 91).  It would be wrong not to mention   the 
‘pantouflage’, the concept that explains in part French public and private relationships 
(Saurugger 2004).  
 
In the United Kingdom the lobbying industry has been steadily growing in recent 
years. Hansard Society210 assessed that the industry was worth USD 1.9 billion and 
was employing 14,000 people. The report also suggested that MPs are approached 
over 100 times a week by lobbyists. The House of Commons Public Administration 
Select Committee investigated lobbying in the UK, and its 2009 report called for a 
'statutory register of lobbying activity to bring greater transparency to the dealings 
between Whitehall decision-makers and outside interests'211
                                                 
210 Parvin, P. (2007), 'Friend or Foe? Lobbying in British democracy', available at 
. The report also 
concluded that self-regulation of the professional lobbying industry was 'fragmented' 
and appeared to involve 'very little regulation of any substance'.   
 
www.hansardsociety.org.uk.  
211 Public Administration Select Committee (2009), ' PASC calls fro a register of lobbying activity' 
available at www.parliament.uk  
 173 
In the EU general directorates, 'lobbying' is regarded as a legitimate activity in policy 
formulation and even encouraged by the European Commission212
 ‘At the case team level there is no lobbying possible and it is not advisable to 
lobby. They are the experts of the case, and they look at a case from a very 
objective viewpoint – even a clinical one. No other argument, other than legal 
or economic, will prevail in their analysis, which makes it a waste of time to 
attempt to get political considerations across’
; Decision-making 
is by comparison less political for the vast majority of decisions, although for larger 
issues politics of course plays a role; the most important level is the bottom one, 
where the first level of civil servants charged with a given dossier has the most weight 
(for the complexities of the EU decision-making structure, see Donnelly 1993). This 
is reflected in the evaluation of merger cases as one Brussels-based consultant 
explained the inner dynamics of the case team, 
 
213
                                                 
212 ‘The Commission has always been an institution open to outside input. The Commission believes 
this process to be fundamental to the development of its policies. (…) Commission officials 
acknowledge the need for such outside input and welcome it’, in Commission 93, p.1 
213 Interview with Consultant, Brussels, 12th January 2006.  
.  
 
As a result personal and in particular ‘corporatist’ (based on the grand corps 
membership) contacts are rare at the level of the case teams, unlike what may occur at 
higher levels involved in more strategic or political cases (such as Phase II cases), 
where informal networks of influence operate alongside the more formal channels of 
power. 
 
 Therefore this study also shows that nationality also affects corporate political 
strategies to the extent that French firms are more likely to target generally French 
officials, whereas British firms are more likely to interact with the different European 
institutions’ officials relevant to the stage at which the case or the stage of EMCR 
development is looked at. This will be further examined in the next section 
 
Also a first qualification of the comparison between French and British firms can be 
drawn from the experience of the EMCR. French firms show a preference for using  
high-level rather than technical corporate political strategies, and have an impact on 




 3.3.2. A European level of governance in a multi-level structure – the logic of 
nationality. 
 
One of the most significant issues facing European interest representatives is the 
shifting balance of power amongst European institutions. The extension of qualified 
majority voting in the Council took the veto power from Member States in some 
economic areas; Co-decision procedure gave the European Parliament a greater role 
in decision-making processes and the ability to reject legislation that the Council may 
favour. Institutional changes helped to underpin the importance of non-state actors in 
policy-making processes. In the EU merger control regime, the shift happened in 1990 
with the establishment of a long-awaited European merger control regime, as 
discussed earlier in this thesis. With the Regulation the Commission obtained full 
powers regarding the investigation of merger decisions – for mergers above the 
discussed thresholds – and it was also established that the investigation process was 
only subject to European judicial review. Yet, the national level has still a certain 
degree of latitude in getting involved in the EU merger control. I discussed ‘legitimate 
interests’ in my second chapter, and certain provisions within the letter of the 
Regulation (see Chapter 2) which still enable Member States to interact at European 
level. Unlike neofunctionalism which focused primarily on dominance of the EU level 
of policy-making and liberal intergovernmentalism that posited Member States as 
main political actors in EU policy-making, a mid-way analysis such as the multi-level 
governance which consider both levels would be more useful in the context of 
corporate political strategies. Accordingly the EU multi-level governance structure 
presents political opportunities at each level of structure (Kitschelt 1986, Ladrech 
1994). The EU has a clear impact on options available to interest representatives in 
terms of 'vehicles' and 'arenas' of corporate political strategy. As one French 
commentator explained, 
 
‘Merger regulation allows for a possible transfer of cases back to national 
authorities [via Article 9]. Some law firms will advise to follow such a route, 
as their ties with national authorities and understanding of local rules are 
better than those at European level, and permit to expect better outcomes’214
 
.  
                                                 
214 Interview with author, translated by author, Paris, 8th March 2006 
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The mere existence of the EU as a political system offers additional and/or alternative 
political opportunities (and threats). In other words, in absence of an EU political 
system, interest representatives would be confined to a more limited range of vehicles 
and arenas to interact with.  
 
Observers such as European Commission staff, however, noted that cultural factors – 
‘the logic of nationality’ (Kohler-Koch 1994, 1996)- had an impact on  interest 
representation activities in the merger regime context from UK and French firms, 
resulting in contrasting behaviours, perhaps reflecting resilient national 
characteristics. Both British and French firms try to exploit national contacts within 
the Commission. Yet British interest representatives also contact officials of other 
nationalities. The French sees less value in contacting other nationalities from a 
comparative point of view. In merger proceedings French firms suppose that other 
nationalities’ officials may not understand as well as French officials the industrial 
consequences behind transaction projects. French-based government administrators 
are also supporting French firms215 - at Commission level and at European Courts 
level216
Previous academic research has suggested that interest groups and individual 
firms will choose to use one or more of three potential ‘routes’ to gain access to EU 
 as was discussed earlier in this Chapter. 
 
This interaction with authorities of different nationalities is reflected in my own 
experiences. Indeed both ethnographic experiences focused on the European aspect of 
financial services policy-making, and therefore my main interlocutors were in both 
instances European officials. However, significantly, during my placement in France, 
I solely interacted with European and French officials. By contrast, during my 
placement within the British Bankers’ Association, I met various European officials 
and national UK officials, but the BBA was also in touch once a month with other 
national officials (most notably the French Trésor) and 'sister' trade associations in 
other EU Member States.   
 
3.4. The direct and indirect representation – the ‘vehicles’ element 
 
                                                 
215 Interview with former French national official, Paris, 28th June 2006.  
216 For instance Schneider case, Air France case.  
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policy makers: the ‘direct’ route; the ‘national’ route, or the ‘European’ route (see 
Grant 1989; Bennett 1999). Evidence collected attests to the preference of both UK 
and French firms for direct contact with EU policy makers especially in merger 
transactions. Additionally, both UK and French firms were willing to make use of 
intermediaries such as national and European wide trade associations but this was 
regarded as a second choice compared to direct contact, tied in with specific tasks 
(response to consultation papers on competition issues, industry surveys, etc.).   
 
The European Commission may assess the importance of an issue in light of the 
number of responses received following a consultation period. This can affect the 
vehicle firms may choose. They may decide to emphasise directly the message their 
relevant association or Federation has already provided. Simultaneously firms may 
decide not to directly intervene in the consultation process but participate under the 
association’s name, such as the strength of a consensual message. Many of my 
interviewees have highlighted factors that may explain such behaviour, despite 
collective action issues; time constraints may or may not always enable firms to 
intervene directly. Importantly the merger regime context firms may want to hide 
behind the association's name to raise an issue without being perceived as the initiator 
and ‘avoid being picked on’ later by the competition authorities.  The latter reason has 
been mentioned by many of my interviewees. Greenwood et al. (2000) first referred to 
it when looking at how governable business associations were. Greenwood (2002) 
defined it as follows, 
 
 ‘At a superficial level, all members of EU associations confirm the presence of 
[the collective cloak] factor – that is, the conveyance of interests to the EU 
institutions under the weight of a collective badge or identity – as a reason for 
membership; and may cite it as the principle reason. (…) On their own 
[companies] are too exposed to articulate what they really want, but under the 
guise of an association they may be able to articulate these views’.   
 
For firms a fine balance has to be struck between formal and informal 
representation. Formal representative work, that is making submissions or ‘primary 
lobbying’ (Karpeles 05), is essential. However, policy submissions and meetings are 
more likely to be successful if essential ground work has been done first – going 
through the merger transaction with the Commission, highlighting the main points and 
arguments. The best approach is to have the meeting at an earlier stage (pre-
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notification in the case of merger cases) so that it can help laying down the grounds 
for the case later. The Commission welcomes such initiatives217
Grossman (2004) indicated that for major banks it has slowly become second 
nature to turn to the European policy level to solve domestic conflicts. Grossman 
refers in particular to the rescue of the Crédit Lyonnais in the state aid policy field.  
 as it allows them to 
plan their workload and bring experts they may need.  
 
From a comparative viewpoint, French firms are relying more on their sectoral 
associations compared to British ones. As the 2005 CCIP Report explains the French 
tend not to multiply responses to European consultation papers. Accordingly a French 
firm will only reply once through its association or federation, whereas a British firm 
makes use of more channels, responding under its own name and via other channels 
(using different trade association).  
 
The significance of the associational route for French firms is also highlighted by the 
presence of French financial services firms at the head of European institutions. 
Indeed they are represented on the Executive Committees of major European 
federations. At the time of writing up this project, Michel Pébereau – Chairman of 
BNP Paribas – is also President of the European Banking Federation (EBF); Charles 
Milhaud –Président du Directoire, Caisse Nationale des Caisses d'Epargne (CNCE) – 
has also endorsed the role of Vice-President to the European Savings Banks Group 
(ESBG); Jean-Marie Sander – Vice-Chairman of the Board of Fédération Nationale 
du Crédit Agricole – is also Vice President of the European Association of 
Cooperative Banks (EACB).   
 
 This case study therefore shows a distinct preference for the associational 
route compared to direct representation by French firms. As a result, national 
preferences have a direct effect on the 'vehicles' element of corporate political 
strategies chosen by firms.  
 
3.5. A certain adaptation of national corporate political activities? 
 
                                                 
217 Interviews with DG Comp officials, January 2006.  
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In this Chapter, I discussed major differences and similarities in French and British 
corporate political strategies' design. Despite this, recent French studies have also 
acknowledged a degree of adaptation of French corporate political activities to the 
European layer of governance. For instance the CCIP reports, which were referred to 
throughout this Chapter, written first in 2002 and then in 2005 highlight changes in 
approaches from French firms. In addition the current debate at French Assemblée 
Nationale, following the European Commission’s Transparency Initiative, prompted a 
debate as the supervision of lobbying practices in France - A significant step towards 
the acknowledgement of the practice. Moreover French corporate lobbying strategies, 
as well as UK ones, have become more and more sophisticated. So what does this 
comparison between French and British firms show as far as the impact of a shift of 
competencies to the European authorities? I can only venture conclusions on three 
aspects: the high-level/technical strategy spectrum, the type of relationship firms and 
authorities build, and finally the inclusion of a strategic design framework in 
corporate political activities.  
 
Firstly French and British firms seem to be able to use the full spectrum of 
strategies, from technical to high-level strategies. This is demonstrated by responses 
to European consultation papers and to invitations which top managers receive from 
Commissioners and their cabinets. French firms, as well as British firms, will favour 
being represented directly in high-level forums. However at a technical level, French 
firms are more likely to interact through sectoral national associations than British 
ones. This may be related to resources allocated to a European ‘public affairs’ 
department – and the attitude and appreciation of top management within firms of the 
European level of governance. In France the existence of a strong network between 
public and private spheres is seen as important and as a more formalised consultation 
process at the European level. One of my former colleagues explained to me, 
 
‘I am one of the lucky ones in European government affairs. Indeed my 
Chairman has quickly understood the importance of European authorities. 
Other [European representatives in other companies] have to fight to make 
their management understand the importance of Brussels’218
 
.    
                                                 
218 Author work placement in Paris.  
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 Secondly, in the specific context of merger regulation, French authorities have 
been more likely to intervene in merger decision proceedings in favour of French 
firms. As explained British authorities have refused to support UK firms in the filing 
of their cases. This difference in approach may have an impact on the type of 
relationship firms will have with European competition authorities. Indeed the 
concept of independence of DG Comp is pervasive throughout the European 
Directorate-General and the Competition cabinet. The intervention of French 
authorities may therefore be ill-received by the EU bodies 
 
 Finally, the literature has established that British firms have been quicker to 
incorporate a wider range of corporate political strategies aimed at the EU level of 
governance. National traditions have favoured the recognition of the importance and 
the need of establishing relations with governments of other Member States as well. 
scholarly work (Schmidt 1996, Grossman 2004) interested in French firms’ interest 
representation at the European level highlight that French firms have been slower to 
interact with Brussels’ bodies and to incorporate a department dedicated to European 
affairs. However French firms have adapted their strategies and attuned them to 
Brussels and the European corporate political strategies. More and more post-graduate 
courses in France are now dedicated to European institutions and lobbying. An 
increasing number of political consultants are present in France. As Jean-Claude 
Adler219 explained in a 2007 article published by Le Parisien220
 Competition policy ‘hurts’ French industrial policy from the outset. One of the 
facets of the French industrial policy was to favour industrial concentration in order to 
create the infamous ‘national champions’ predisposed to confront international 
, ‘the profession 
begins in France and doesn't gather more than 200 lobbyists versus 200.000 in 
Brussels, [but] the business should be promising regarding its growth for the last 
decade’. The importance of Brussels is clearly recognised. Yet French top managers, 
as explained by the high-level/technical dichotomy affecting the choice of arenas, are 




                                                 
219 President of the AFCL – L’Association Française des Conseils en Lobbying, founded in 1991.  
220 Le Parisien, September 24, 2007,’Lobbying at the heart of firms' strategy’ 
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competition. This policy has elsewhere been nicknamed the policy of the ‘meccano 
industriel’221 because the government is often involved in the construction as well as 
the dismantling of industrial groups. This aspect of French industrial policy was 
preferred after the wave of privatisation, with the creation of the ‘hard cores’222
At a second level of the analysis, I have compared the different elements of the new 
framework of analysis in light of the comparison between French and British firms. 
The comparison between French and British firms has clearly affected an element of 
the strategy design framework – that of the delivery of the message. As I explained in 
the case of the staging element, different expertise is needed. Messages to the 
European institutions should also reflect such sensitivity to what the European body 
needs. In addition, cases such as Schneider/Legrand showed that the European level 
of governance and the independence of DG Comp have to be recognised in their own 
rights throughout the interactions between firms and the European institutions. The 
staging element shows that the expertise needed from firms differs at each stage of the 
public policy life cycle. However the support for French firms from their national 
government is more visible at each stage of the cycle. The comparative case study 
 and 
the system of golden shares.  The British system – more liberal towards foreign 
ownership and competition – was therefore more prepared for the recognition of an 
independent European competition authority. Both systems have, however, been 
affected by the presence of both an added European layer of competition authority 
and other traditions in the sphere of competition policy. 
 
From my observations, semi-structured interviews, and analysis of documents 
available in the public domain, and on the basis of my original framework of analysis 
explained in Chapter 1, I have been able to complete a two-level data analysis. 
Accordingly I have further detailed the original framework by reflecting the high level 
and technical distinction in light of results generated by the case of the financial 
services sector. This was done by distinguishing between internal and external 
vehicles. Both are chosen according to this dichotomy, most notably the internal 
vehicle.  
 
                                                 
221 Hennion, B. (1992), ‘Le ‘meccano industriel’ d’Edith Cresson’, L’Etat de la France 1992 (La 
Decouverte), pp. 512-43.  
222 ‘Les noyaux durs’ was established by Prime Minister Balladur to guarantee control over the 
shareholder constituency of the newly privatised firms. 
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shows that, as regards the ‘arenas’ element of the framework, French firms are more 
likely to play a political game as opposed to a technical game. In addition French 
firms follow, to a certain degree, a logic of nationality while interacting with the 
European level of governance. They will be more willing to target a French official 
rather than the official in charge of the dossier. As far as the ‘vehicles’ element is 
concerned, British firms tend to use the full spectrum of vehicles at their disposal, 
whereas French firms have an inclination to use the associational route – both national 
and European one.  
 
This project does not reject or accept strategies, but attempts to define 
different strategies according to elements and dimensional qualifications. There are 
traditional tendencies in choosing strategies – and case-by-case the efficiency of 
strategies can be assessed. The best strategies will be technical as well as political, 
making use of the whole spectrum of strategies, and which recognise the value of a 
European level of governance, opting accordingly for the different components 





Europeanization of Corporate Political 
Strategies 
 




The European merger regime has proved to be a fruitful regulatory context to study as 
far as corporate political strategies are concerned. Firstly mergers and acquisitions 
represent such significant operations for a company that the full array of corporate 
political strategies can be put in place when firms interact with the Commission. 
Corporate political strategies may in fact include the CEO and his/her close 
involvement to the merger case review process. Upper management levels may also 
be interacting with European institutions as was explained in Chapter 4 of this project. 
Secondly, from a researcher’s perspective, the number of mergers scrutinised by DG 
Comp and, in fact, the overall development of the European merger control regime 
have provided fertile grounds for analysis, also in terms of policy-making. The 
European merger control regime also allows, to a certain extent, for cross-sectoral 
analysis in the context of a geographical case study. Other authors in fact 
acknowledged the potential of the study of merger regulation (Bulmer 1994, 
Zahariadis 2005). 
 
Chapter 4 has established differences and similarities between British and 
French financial services firms’ corporate political strategies in the context of 
European merger control regime. As mentioned throughout the thesis, this analysis 
will lead to further examination in terms of Europeanization. Indeed the conclusions 
highlighted in the previous chapter will now be explored to assess whether the 
emergence of a European mode of representation can be identified in the context of 
this study.  
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Europeanization remains a vague concept, although one heavily studied since 1973223
                                                 
223 The Social Science Citation Index identified one publication in 1973, namely the article of Fry 
(1973), ‘the Europeanisation of development aid’ which was published in African Social Research.  
. 
The number of scholarly work on this concept culminated in 2007. The Social Science 
Citation Index listed 85 pieces of work on the topic at that time. Different scholars 
have attached different meanings to the concept (Ladrech 1994, Bulmer et al. 2000, 
2004, Bache et al. 2004, Schmidt 2006, Beyers et al. 2007, Schneider et al 2008). 
However an underlying question emerges from the literature when it refers to 
Europeanization: a question about the relationship between the European level of 
governance and the studied object. This vagueness relates probably to the difficulties 
to define the various elements that may be included in the term ‘relationship’. 
Scholars have tried to qualify the type and direction the relationship may take – one of 
‘bottom-up’ or ‘top-down’ direction. Others have considered that Europeanization 
may only be part of what needs to be analysed, globalisation could equally influence 
the studied object. This aspect is pertinent in the case of large firms exposed to other 
jurisdictions and therefore other institutional systems. Chapter 1 took into 
consideration all these elements and added a horizontal element. My own definition is 
therefore based on vertical and horizontal influences.  
 
This wide range of academic conclusions will need to be analysed in a systematic 
manner, so as to identify what the concept of Europeanization could mean with 
regards to corporate political strategies. As will be explained in this chapter the main 
current debate in this field relates to questions concerning which interest 
representation modes are detaching themselves from the structuring relationship with 
the national state. The fact that European merger control regime offers a suitable 
framework of analysis in terms of the multi-layered structure of responsibilities 
between the national and European level was explained in my second chapter. The 
study of firms’ European institutions’ interactions will therefore lead to an assessment 
of the importance of the national and European institutional structures in shaping 
corporate interest intermediation patterns.   
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The literature related to the role of interest groups in the development of a 
European merger control regime failed to delve deeper. My study also attempted to 
fill in this gap. Chapter 2 explained the critical role of interest representatives in the 
development of a European merger control regime from the outset and throughout the 
development of the EU merger control regime. My framework of analysis and the 
data collected showed different strategies put in place by firms when interacting with 
the European Commission. Chapter 4 accounted for the importance of the message 
delivered to the Commission in the design of a corporate political strategy. In addition 
the enhanced framework, generated by a first-level of analysis of the data collected, 
identified core elements to corporate political strategies – namely staging, arenas, and 
internal and external vehicles. How can conclusions regarding these different 
elements now be interpreted in Europeanization terms? 
   
My research has tried so far to explain the relationship between firms and 
European authorities – mainly the Commission in the context of European merger 
control regulation. Data collection has been undertaken through two main research 
method strategies, namely the ethnographic method – and therefore participation 
observation – and a comparative geographical case study. The particular focus has 
been, from an established framework of analysis explained in Chapter 1, to test 
corporate political strategies through the lens of a comparison between French and 
British firms. The most salient differences were laid out in Chapter 4 of this project. 
Study of each element seems to show that there are clear differences between French 
and British firms’ corporate political strategies in the context of European merger 
control regulation. The next step is to look at it from the Europeanization angle.   
 
 This chapter is divided into three sections. Based on the Europeanization 
definition established in Chapter 1, the first section looks at analysis and conclusions 
of my previous chapter. The comparison between French and British corporate 
political strategies in the case of the European merger control regime has generated 
some interesting findings in this regard. The second part will suggest some 
explanations of my findings, and identify the role of national structures in the study of 
European interest intermediation. Finally a third part will be presenting this study in 
the wider context of the study of European modes of interest representation.  
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1. The Franco-British comparison, how is the picture changing?  
 
 This project, and notably the Franco-British case study, has attempted to 
contribute to the Europeanization literature and qualify the extent to which national 
interest representation traditions have been affected by the existence of a European 
level of governance – horizontally and vertically. It has highlighted some important 
national preferences regarding interest representation traditions in analysing different 
types of corporate political behaviours in the context of the European merger control 
regime. In this last section I will firstly emphasise the importance of the structure of 
the European merger control regime. I will then attempt to identify main themes of 
differences between France and Britain in terms of corporate political strategies, and 
the extent to which the concept of Europeanization is challenged. This may in turn 
help me explain factors influencing corporate political practices in these two 
countries.  
 
1.1. European merger regime developments and national merger regimes 
 
European legislation exercises an important influence on national policy even 
in areas where there is no pressure or need to incorporate it into national legislation 
directives or regulations agreed upon in Brussels (Zahariadis 2005). The study of 
Europeanization of public policy has received considerable analytical attention as 
explained in Chapter 1 and earlier in this Chapter (Ladrech 1994, Bulmer 2000, 2004, 
Green Cowles et al. 2001, Bache 2004, Featherstone et al. 2003, Graziano et al. 
2008). Of particular importance has been the effort to clarify the mechanisms linking 
European and national governing structures. The Table in Annex 5 represents the 
changes in national merger regulation. It is evident that some Member States have 
taken into account the overhaul of the European merger control regime and as a result 
adapted their own national merger control regime. Others have not. The Franco-
British comparison is interesting in this context.  
 
As explained in previous chapters, European merger policy represents an area where 
jurisdictional responsibilities are clearly split between national and European 
authorities. Yet the European merger regulation had a significant impact on national 
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merger systems. What are the mechanisms of Europe's influence? Mergers occur 
within and across countries. Hence, solutions that work at a transnational level may be 
exported to specific national contexts. Changes to national merger systems did not 
occur at the same pace across Member States and to the same extent. The last EU 
changes appeared in 2004. The changes in the French merger system appeared in 
2001 – effective in 2002. The French changes adopted, for instance, the substantive 
test of the original European merger control regulation established in 1989. As 
previously explained the modifications of national legislation were not made by 
transposition of European legislation. A top-down process can be identified in the 
context of merger control, however it is not as noticeable as some authors may have 
portrayed in other areas (Boerzel et al. 2000). Moreover the existence of a forum 
where national authorities can communicate – the Advisory Committee in the case of 
the European merger regime – have enabled them to learn from the European level 
and other Member States experiences. Since 1997, the British Office of Fair Trading 
(OFT) has been in almost daily communication with the competition authorities in 
Brussels (Zahariadis 2005). The British merger system deficiencies – the 
discretionary powers of national authorities (Office of Fair Trading and Monopolies 
and Mergers Commission) –, for instance, did not just come to the fore as a result of 
the introduction of the EU regulation. Several authors had pointed them out for a long 
time (Fairburn & Kay 1989; Doern et al. 1996). However they needed addressing by 
the emergence of a new system and its significance for domestic actors – exposed to 
other systems. In France the NRE (Nouvelles Régulations Economiques) introduced 
the mandatory ex ante notification of mergers to the French national authority. This 
was perceived as clear alignment of the French legislation to the European system 
(Condomines 2007).   
 
In addition through repeated interaction in professional forums, individuals dealing 
with similar issues, for example, merger policy, learn from one another about what is 
appropriate and what good policy is – this idea is captured by the concept ‘normative 
socialisation’. Although national competition authorities are not normally involved in 
making EU merger decisions, they regularly hold meetings with EU officials to 
discuss issues of mutual concern (Cini & McGowan, 1998). European legislation 
affects national merger practice via the mechanism of policy framing and the process 
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of institutional isomorphism (for a study of British merger policy, see Zahariadis 
2005).  
 
Yet the creation of the European Competition Network (ECN) that has simultaneously 
come into effect with the new merger regulation recognises the importance of 
cooperation and official communication channels between Member States and 
European authorities – and conceptually the bottom-up Europeanization process. The 
ECN has a crucial role to play in coordination and cooperation of European 
Competition Authorities – an element the importance of which has now increased 
with the enlargement of the European Union to new members.  
 
 Consequently the changes in European competencies have had an impact on 
national merger systems. Some authors (Zahariadis 2005) have mentioned briefly that 
this may be due to business pressures to create legal certainty and similar systems 
throughout Europe. Yet changes in national regimes need to be qualified. France, for 
instance, has introduced the so-called ‘dominance test’ – the previous European 
substantive test – in 2002, which is now at odds with the new European regime. 
Despite this, regulatory developments did occur at the national level. Have corporate 
political activities also been affected by European regulatory developments? 
 
1.2. The Europeanization of national corporate political strategies 
 
 Firms have been affected, to a certain extent, by the existence of a European 
layer of governance. Some have set up a European government relations office in 
Brussels, while others have European public affairs experts at their head offices – 
around 13% of the permanent representation bureaux in Brussels (Landmarks 2007). 
The impact and the recognition of another public policy centre is indisputable. As van 
Schendelen (2005) explained, ‘an organisation is never independent from and always 
more or less dependent on its challenging environment […] the permanently changing 
complexities of the environment make adaptive and/or influencing behaviours 
continuously necessary’. My project however attempts to qualify the interaction 
between firms and the European level of governance and identify the extent to which 
the way they interact has been affected by the existence of ‘Brussels’.   
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As previously defined, the concept of ‘Europeanization’ should be examined in the 
context of the three flows of influence. Firms will not have been affected solely by the 
fact that the European Commission, for instance, welcomes expert input in its policy-
making processes. Firms will also be affected because their national governments 
have forced them to be aware of the European level of governance as well (like Edith 
Cresson in France, or by implementing directives from Brussels). As a result 
vertically, the relationship may be bidirectional – top-down and bottom-up. More 
importantly, the horizontality of the ‘Europeanization’ concept is also a factor that 
needs to be taken into account. Accordingly, the interaction with competing firms that 
are more sophisticated in their corporate political activities may compel firms to adopt 
more sophisticated – and adapted – corporate political strategies.   
 
From my research project, and the subsequent work I have undertaken, however, I am 
inclined to agree with those authors who have recognised the importance of national 
traditions in corporate political strategies. Clearly, this conclusion cannot be applied 
to all firms or all areas of policy. However, the way corporate political strategies are 
constructed at national level – because of diverse factors such as the institutional 
setting, the public opinion on lobbying, etc – have an impact on the way firms will 
interact with European institutions. Chapter 4 highlighted some clear demarcation 
between French and British financial services firms in the context of the European 
merger control regime. These elements of variation will be reviewed.  
 
1.3. Corporate political strategies, French and British firms compared 
  
 My research strategies, laid out in Chapter 3 of this project, are based upon the 
collection of qualitative data, which in turn were analysed in Chapter 4. The research 
methods used were the ethnographic - through participation-observation - and case 
study methods – through the comparison between French and British corporate 
political studies in the financial services sector.  
 
Chapter 4 explained that a national interest representation strategy can be identified 
through the analysis of national models of governance. However the addition of a new 
layer of governance and the consequent shift of competencies to a new centre of 
governance since the Single European Act has also been recognised by interest 
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representatives. The basic framework for analysis for corporate political strategies 
design which was originally established in Chapter 1 was further enhanced in my 
first-level analysis in Chapter 4. The organisational structure has an impact upon the 
'vehicles' element of the original framework by identifying internal and external 
vehicles.  
 
The comparison between French and British firms identified five main differences in 
corporate political strategies following the analysis of the various elements of the 
framework of analysis. Firstly, the fragmented structure of the Commission and 
internal bureaucratic aspects of the institution, as well as corporate organisational 
structures, have led to furthering analysis of the relationship between firms and the 
European Commission in merger cases. It has led to the dichotomy between high-
level and technical corporate political strategies. French firms have a preference 
towards 'high-level' corporate political strategies. British firms have displayed a better 
understanding of the high-level to technical continuum of information. This element, 
as was discussed in Chapter 4, has a direct impact on the nature of the expertise 
needed by the case team. Moreover this study also highlighted the willingness of the 
French government to intervene at different stages of the cycle in comparison to the 
British government. The involvement of the French Republic as a party in European 
court cases affecting French firms is particularly telling in this analysis (see Table 7). 
Nationality also affects corporate political strategies to the extent that French firms 
are generally more likely to target French officials, whereas British firms are more 
likely to interact with officials relevant to the issue looked at. Fourthly, the case study 
has highlighted a decisive preference of French firms towards the associational route 
compared to direct representation – although there are a growing number of dedicated 
French representational bureaux in Brussels.  
 
This specific examination of data in Chapter 4 demonstrated that the style of 
interaction between firms and EU policy makers – and in turn the type of relationship 
firms have with the Commission - was another area where differences emerged. The 
framework for analysis of corporate political strategies design also shows that the 
message conveyed is important. A strategy discarding - notably in merger regulation – 
the independence of the Commission may not produce the desired outcomes. 
However it is conceivable that on the same piece of legislation a firm may decide to 
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directly interact with the Commission at a high-level, and adapt its discourse 
accordingly, while simultaneously provide expert technical knowledge to the officials 
who are ‘holding the pen’. The degree of recognition of both the European level of 
governance in its own right and the independence of the European competition policy 
affect this relationship. French firms have had a tendency to discard these two factors 
in interacting with European authorities, whereas British firms were better perceived. 
 
These five characteristics of the analysis of French and British corporate political 
strategies in the field of the financial services have highlighted differences between 
strategies. However the link to the concept of Europeanization needs to be further 
refined in light of these conclusions.  
  
1.4. Conclusions from the data analysis in terms of Europeanization 
 
 The scholarly literature interested in the Europeanization of interest 
representation has often argued that a European mode of representation would emerge 
from the existence of an added level of governance. Despite this, other academic 
authors have been reluctant to acknowledge convergence of modes of interest 
representation. This study and the analysis of data collected have shown clear 
differences in the design of corporate political strategies between French and British 
firms. In the end five main features were highlighted by the framework of analysis, 
and in fact question the degree to which corporate political behaviours are affected by 
the European level of competence in competition policy.  
 
Europeanization was discussed as a process according to three directional flows of 
influence. The concept was supposed to designate bottom-up and top-down impact of 
the added layer of governance on national corporate political strategies. In addition a 
horizontal vector of influence was added to the definition of the concept. For benefits 
of membership to the European Union to be reaped, firms have to assimilate the 
existence of the European level of governance and also devise an effective response to 
the multi-level governance structure. This model was coined by Bulmer and Burch 
(2000) as a two-stage response: reception and projection. From the data analysis, 
French and British corporate political strategies, in the financial services sector, have 
recognised the competence of the European Commission in the regulation of merger 
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and acquisition operations (within the thresholds discussed in Chapter 2) – the 
reception stage discussed by Bulmer et al (2000). The projection stage has produced 
different outcomes in terms of modes of interest intermediation of firms.  
 
From my data analysis French firms seemed to have replicated, to a certain degree, 
national interest representation patterns at the European level – in the context of the 
European merger control regime. The importance of the ‘high-level’ strategy, in 
comparison of the more ‘technical strategies’ preferred by British firms – replicates 
also the importance given in French public policy to the political level rather than 
administration. Finally the importance of the delivery of the message, recognising 
notably the European level of governance and the independence of the European 
Commission in merger controls demonstrates the significance of the second stage of 
the Bulmer et al. (2000) response – projection.  
 
How can these differences and challenges to the concept of Europeanization be 
explained? The next section will attempt to provide different avenues for 
explanations. Firstly, I will be reiterating the importance of the institutional structure 
of the European merger control regime and existence of, in fact, a two-level 
governance structure which still allows the national level to have an important role to 
play. Secondly I will be focusing on the role of firms as sources of Europeanization – 
the European merger control regulation is a direct response to this. Thirdly this 
section will present a rationale directly derived from the importance of the national 
government in the European merger cases: The importance of national governments 
in the degree of Europeanization. Finally Europeanization will be discussed as a 
learning process. This point in fact relates indirectly to the goodness of fit model 
referred to in Chapter 1.  
 
2. Possible explanations of corporate political behaviours at the European level 
 
2.1. Merger Control Regulation – the existence of two forums 
 
Arguments in favour of corporate political integration within the overall 
corporate strategy contend that participation is inevitable given the highly diverse and 
complex nature of issues public policy actors deal with. The latter require a much-
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needed expertise to successfully resolve these issues in line with market functioning. 
As was suggested in Chapter 1, corporations have a legitimate role to play in political 
activities, as they are affected as any other actors by such public policy issues and can 
provide valuable expertise. Corporate interests should thus be placed on an equal 
footing with other interests in the public policy arena. Indeed there are many public 
issues either on the current public policy agenda, or that will make their way to that 
agenda, affecting business one way or another. Effective resolution of issues needs 
business participation. Theoretical approaches to EU lobbying have as a result 
increasingly conceptualised lobbying as a political exchange (Pappi et al. 1999; 
Bouwen 2002, 2003, Michalowitz 2005).   
 
Yet, using exchange theory jargon, corporate lobbying actors do not possess a 
monopoly of the good of information (or only in exceptional cases), as they are not 
sole information providers. Moreover information therefore is not readily available; 
rather it has to be generated and adapted to the demand side. Depending on the issue, 
specific firms can thus deliver specific information regarding the impact of legislation 
upon their sector and amount of conflict or consensus that can be expected on a 
certain regulation. The information good delivered can also specify how to curb 
conflict and foster consensus. Related to specific needs of European decision-makers, 
this involves, for instance, information about pan-European effects. 
 
As a result, the European Commission’s highly visible commitment to 
enforcing European merger rules, growing familiarity – as was explained partly by the 
soft law angle of the European merger regime – of private firms and business 
associations with competition rules, and the prominence of competition policy case 
law pushed corporate actors to use EU competition rules as an opportunity to pursue 
interests. Actors increasingly identify both the Commission and, recently, the 
European Courts as potential productive venues for transcending the confines of 
interest articulation in the domestic political arena (Smith 2001).  
 
Smith explained (2001) that one consequence of a single European market 
competition policy regime has created opportunities for private sector actors to attack 
political restraints on competition. Smith referred to the 90s and competition 
developments. In contrast, the European regime has really been reshaped at the 
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beginning of 21st century. Indeed, following the latest revamp of the EMCR, the 
European Commission has become more sophisticated in its application of economic 
theory to merger cases, and the CFI and ECJ present the opportunity for private actors 
- mainly individual firms – to challenge government policies toward public sector 
activities.   
 
As explained in different parts of this thesis, the Commission – within the 
remit of its powers with regards to competition policy – has been trying to play a 
proactive role in the development of an integrated European financial services market. 
DG Comp has in fact taken decisions opposing domestic prohibitions – regardless of a 
political environment in favour of subsidiarity. Other authors have observed similar 
usage of merger control regulation in the media markets for instance (Harcourt in 
Featherstone and Radaelli 2003) the defence sector and telecommunications.   
 
Rules have to be crystal clear to avoid unnecessary frictions. Sequentially DG Comp 
is examining the case according to the criteria laid down in the Regulation (see Annex 
1) – defining the Community dimension of a transaction. Yet some mergers need to 
also be approved by the transaction target’s national authority in a specific sector, for 
instance in the banking sector.  
 
In most cases national authorities intervene in the Advisory Committee to voice 
concerns. They can also ask for the merger decision to be 'brought back' to their 
national competition authority. Some countries have been keen to keep some room of 
manoeuvre in merger decisions, notably in energy services, using the criteria to ensure 
that a merger decision rests within their authority. At this stage, firms may experience 
national political barriers to mergers. This has an impact in the way firms engage with 
competition authorities. As a result the European decision-making level is not a 
sufficient arena to convince, and furthermore, national actors are also involved and 
could endanger a transaction. The most obvious market to keep an eye on is the 
target’s Member State, but also markets where positions will significantly increase are 
of importance.  
 
Member States’ approach to merger investigations cannot be considered in 
isolation from the wider European policy perspective and national policy transposition 
 194 
work as was explained in my approach towards Europeanization. Indeed firms are 
also subject to other Member States’ rules, through their branches and subsidiaries for 
instance – according to the home/host divide. National developments should be 
known and considered by firms in order to correctly comply with requirements. 
Directives and the concept of subsidiarity acknowledge diversity of market structures 
and conditions within the European single market. A policy cannot be applied in the 
same way to different national market structures.  
 
Indeed Schmidt (1999, 2006) explained the limits to which the EU level of 
governance has an impact on the national level. Differences in implementation of 
European policies are also manifest within the competence of European competition 
policy. The existence of DG Comp – which reviews mergers of all Member states 
above some defined thresholds (as explained in Chapter 2 of this thesis) – and the 
evolution of responsibilities of national competition authorities – which are generally 
gaining independence vis-à-vis national governments (see table in Annex 5) – explain 
the sense of public policy convergence in this field. Yet differences remain in the 
powers these national authorities enjoy, types of case they scrutinise, and procedures 
used to base their decisions upon (for instance, the different substantive tests used). 
As explained in Chapter 2, in the UK competition policy is institutionally independent 
compared to France in the mergers and acquisitions area (Schmidt 1999). Indeed the 
publishing of an adverse report by the UK Competition Commission – if the relevant 
merger has resulted, or may be expected to result in a substantial lessening of 
competition within any market in the UK for goods or services – requires parties to 
act upon it immediately. The French Conseil de de la Concurrence does not issue 
binding decisions, and the Minister can decide not to follow its opinion. Indeed in 
France only Ministers can issue a definitive decision regarding merger and acquisition 
operations. Moreover a problematic operation does not necessarily have to be referred 
to the Conseil.  
 
As a result the Europeanization concept is to be qualified to recognise importance of 
the national level and limits of the implementation process of the European level 
regulation – even in the case of Regulations, as opposed to Directives. To these limits 
is to be added the horizontal flow of influence I referred to earlier in Chapter 1 related 
to the conceptualisation of Europeanization. In the case of interest intermediation this 
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implies a separation between national political activities and European ones – as they 
reflect different governmental attitudes to a particular topic and de facto different 
outcomes. Therefore, although Europe has had an impact on the political agendas of 
companies – EU government affairs department are established in the capital and/or in 
Brussels - the nature of the relationship is still dependent upon national political 
activities of the firm – even for major companies.  
 
2.2. Firms as actors of the Europeanization of the merger control regime 
 
 This project has focused on the intervention of firms in the political sphere. 
However, as Green Cowles (1997) explained, economic activities of firms also have 
an impact on political decisions. As noted by Lindblom (1977) market activities of 
firms shape and limit options opened to national politicians, as they are convinced that 
a strong and stable economy is one of the foundations of their election success. By the 
same token the economic activity of a firm at the national or global level can 
influence public policies. As Gerd Junne (1994) noted that by their choice of 
investments, private companies shape structures of the global economy - the 
framework under which political decisions are taken. Private firms influence political 
choices as these structures determine the definition of national interest and margins of 
manoeuvre of politicians in a country.  
 
Faced with the multiplication of merger and acquisition transactions, the Commission 
had to reinforce, as was explained in Chapter 2 of this thesis, its competition policy 
tools with regards to merger operations.  
 
Although governmental activity can profoundly transform market structures, which 
can in turn impact the profitability of firms within an industry (Schuler 1996), firms 
have also had a profound impact on national and European institutional arrangements 
as far as scrutiny of mergers is concerned. Following European regulatory 
developments in the financial services sector, Mario Draghi, the governor of the Bank 
of Italy, explained that huge progress has been made in ‘cleaning’ the sector. Politics, 
he said, has become much more distant from banking. According to him mergers have 
opened up banks to the scrutiny of shareholders; the system is more transparent and 
better regulated as a result (Michaels 2007). Old national monopoles have been forced 
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to face and adapt to competitive pressures, rather than be protected by the 
government. Although this influence may formally come from the European 
Commission, changes have in fact been driven by firms experiencing issues in certain 
Member States to acquire national firms.  
 
The lack of cross-border operations in banking sectors has been highlighted by 2005 
events involving ABN Amro in Italy and Unicredito in Poland. These events in fact 
brought to light the realities of cross-border banking mergers, ‘quite brutally’224. 
Following political obstacles experienced by both firms in the Italian and Polish 
markets respectively, the process of making merger and acquisition rules in the 
banking sector clearer gathered pace, and there was more impetus to challenge current 
practices. This was already established during the 2004 Scheveningen Council 
meeting – as brought to the ECOFIN attention by ABN Amro – and the ensuing 
Commission’s report on cross-border mergers in the banking sector225
                                                 
224 Interview with author, DG Markt official, Brussels, January 4, 2007.  
225 European Commission (2005), Cross-border consolidation in the EU financial sector, SEC (2005) 
1398.  
. In both cases, 
the process of merger and acquisition was nearly complete, and the EU approval was 
in fact gained. Yet the last leg of the process, the supervisor’s approval at national 
level was denied. Both firms’ experiences resulted in amendments to Article 16 of the 
banking directive which is aimed at lifting the last political obstacles for cross-border 
operations and clarify grey areas.  
 
As a result, firms have become more and more involved in the governmental arena to 
voice their concerns. As explained in previous chapters, at EU and national levels, 
firms can opt for an individual direct interaction with governmental bodies, or use 
collective action platforms. Most authors interested in interest intermediation, have 
agreed upon the fact that firms have become more and more professional in their 
political activities. Trade associations have thus stepped up their services to members 






2.3. The importance of the national governmental structure 
 
As this thesis explains, the multi-level governance approach is of particular 
importance in the study of Europeanization. It shows that the European level of 
governance has opened up more opportunities for firms to interact with authorities 
and to shape policy-making and decision-making. As a result, a Europeanization 
process does exist; firms have recognised the existence of a European level of 
governance and are using it in their strategies. In effect, this new layer affects each 
element of the framework for analysis in creating more arenas, more vehicles and 
another set of stages in the public policy life cycle of the European merger control 
regime; institutionally one cannot deny its impact. However, has this new layer of 
governance affected the traditional ways firms interact with authorities? At the 
Athenora conference referred to in Chapter 4, Europeanization of corporate political 
strategies is visible – however these signs may be limited to French firms’ Brussels 
offices. As the report states, 
 
‘Indeed, some companies’ representatives often feel badly understood by their 
Parisian 'direction'. Their information is sometimes insufficiently integrated 
into the internal circuit of the company, their files become a priority only 
when it is too late, while at the same time they had drawn the alarm bell very 
upstream. Information will thus often take precedence over the action of 
influence whose technique is badly understood, even purely and simply 
ignored. The polemic around the constitutional treaty does not reflect only the 
identity crisis which goes through in France: it also says much about the 
ignorance and the mistrust of the citizens with respect to the fifty year-old 
institutions. As long as this ignorance and this mistrust will persist, the lobbies 
will not be able to stress the European stakes and will be unable to work as 
effectively as they would wish in Brussels226
This quote is symptomatic of the attitude of French firms vis-à-vis the European level 
of governance. It is expected that the French government will intervene in favour of 
French businesses if European institutions’ decisions do not suit. The reflex to the 
national government is latent throughout my analysis of corporate political strategies 
in the context of the European merger control regime. This was further highlighted by 
the fact that the British government refused to engage on behalf of British firms at the 
’.  
 
                                                 





European level. This involvement of French firms, as well as the fact that British 
firms also attempt to get their national government involved at the European level in 
their favour – albeit unsuccessfully – show the importance of the national level of 
governance. This observation is made in spite of the fact that the competence in 
competition matters of the European Commission is quasi-autonomous. The 
implementation of the Directive and the various enforcement issues (described earlier 
in this Chapter) would further emphasise the importance of the national level of 
governance for firms when interacting at the European level.  
 
2.4. A learning process 
 
Although my conclusions have challenged the current scholarly discussion 
with regards to the degree of Europeanization of corporate political strategies, other 
analytical features need further studying. The goodness of fit model focuses on the 
level of adaptational pressure each Member States and domestic institutions face as a 
result of the existence of the European level of governance. This argument was first 
put forward by Risse, Cowles and Caporaso in 2000. Bulmer and Radaelli (2004) 
explained the main contention as follows, ‘in order to produce domestic effects, EU 
policy must be somewhat difficult to absorb at the domestic level. If the policy of 
country A fits in well with EU policy, there will no impact: things can go on as they 
were before. At the other extreme, where country A has a policy which is completely 
different from the EU policy, it would be almost impossible to adapt to Europe. They 
argued that the impact of Europeanization will be most pronounced in cases of 
moderate goodness of fit’. Accordingly national institutional structures participate 
actively in the absorbing, rejecting, or adapting to the European level of governance. 
 
As was discussed in Chapter 4, the French landscape, as far as interest representation 
is concerned, is an evolving one. In that Chapter, I discussed, for instance, the 
development of professional lobbying and the professionalisation of lobbying. Two 
independent evolutions illustrate this trend.  Firstly Grossman and Saurugger (2006) 
consider that a real market for interest representatives with a specific know-how is 
now opening. A symptom of this is the apparition of firms dedicated to public affairs 
firms and consultancies in France; these firms have been created in their vast majority 
in the 1990s, following the adoption of the Single European Act and therefore clearly 
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with the European level of governance in mind.  As a result Grossman et al. (2006) 
explained that interest representation was not limited to Anglo-Saxon firms but was 
aimed at a thriving market in France too, although a late emerging one. Indeed 
mistrust towards lobbying and its techniques in France, as explained in Chapter 4, 
have delayed the opening of such a market. Faced with the existence of such 
professional firms, the Assemblée Nationale has looked at introducing a Bill to ensure 
transparency of these activities – following the Kallas Green Paper on 
Transparency227
The institutionalist literature has shown that institutions do matter. The 
construction of the analytical framework for corporate political strategies design is 
perceived as an adaptable model for different policy processes and institutions. By 
identifying distinct elements, the comparative case study was able to qualify and 
.  
 
The emergence of a new market, recognised to a certain extent by national authorities 
shows the impact of the European level of governance on the national socio-economic 
landscape. France and the French state were more reluctant to recognise both Brussels 
as a centre for decision-making and ‘lobbying’ as a legitimate activity. The impact on 
the latter is clearly strong; the former is, to a certain extent, less evident.  
 
3. Contribution to the Europeanization literature: a research agenda 
  
Few studies have solely focused on the Europeanization of corporate political 
activities compared to studies with a more policy-making focus. Neofunctionalist 
conclusions of a shift in preferences of non-governmental actors towards EU 
institutions have failed to materialise. Intergovernmentalism has also given a biased 
picture, overemphasising the role of Member States to provide a solid framework for 
analysis. However the multi-level governance literature gives a sound platform for my 
research and how Europeanisation can be conceptualised. Other authors have already 
appreciated the value in using multi-level governance in the study of Europeanization 
and interest intermediation (Constantelos 2004, Eising 2004). My project clearly 
recognises this contribution henceforth mitigating neofunctionalist and 
integovernmentalist focuses on governmental bodies’ importance.   
 
                                                 
227 European Commission (2005), 'Green Paper: European transparency Initiative', COM (2006) 194.  
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contextualise these elements and analyse French and British firms’ corporate political 
strategies in financial services. My research methods were a mix of theoretical 
considerations, practical issues and opportunities and my research experience. In 
addition to the use of in-depth case studies, I have tried to complement my case study 
with a third experience set in another country. In my third year I was working part-
time for the government affairs department of one of the major Dutch banks liaising 
between their European office and their national one. Because at the time of my work 
experience this particular firm was the target of two bidders, this experience provided 
further exposure to the topic of my thesis.  
 
As I did not actively participate in political work surrounding mergers, I was able to 
observe and cross-check my analysis, and this from two different points of view. 
Firstly, this permitted a better understanding of the different roles which a European 
office and a nationally-based one undertake. In addition this third experience enabled 
me to overcome the purely Franco-British comparative framework and highlighted the 
main components my research could focus on. The institutionalisation of interest 
representation at the European level has initially been established in order to enable 
the development of corporatist structures, via, for instance, the establishment of 
institutionalised committees and favouring of interest representation through 
European associations. In terms of the Europeanization literature it allows me to 
widen my conclusions with regards to the interest intermediation literature. However, 
it is probably true to acknowledge the limitations of this study towards new Member 
States – as their experiences of interacting with the European competition authority is 
recent and less advanced than that of Western Europe. 
 
As a result of my work experiences I have also interacted with many more 
participants and stakeholders than the number of interviewees accounts for. Although 
I have worked solely in the financial services sector, many public affairs forums rally 
practitioners from other industries working in similar positions and engaged in 
different policies. I have seized as many opportunities as possible to interact with the 
community in my studied context – going to launch parties, participating in 
conferences and making contacts while working. Therefore I was able to cross-check 
the different ‘stories’ interviewees were telling me in confidentiality, which in turn 
enabled me to identify one story to be at odds with another respondent’s explanation. 
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Moreover it enabled me to check my own hypothesis and conclusions with 
practitioners. The setting for these meetings was more informal, and I could also in 
fact engage in some of these general political activities issues. This extra measure was 
in place and helped me validate my data. Finally, as I explained throughout my 
research method chapter I have been wary of interacting in merger settings during my 
work experience and kept my position of observer rather than becoming an active 
participant. My tasks were focused on diverse policy projects and developments 
unrelated to competition policies. The horizontal dimension of Europeanization, for 
instance, is one that came to the forefront through my own work and different 
meetings with European and national officials – rather than my interviews.  
 
 This study challenges scholars who have predicted the development of a 
European mode of representation that would accompany the shift of competences 
from the national to the European level of governance. The European merger control 
regime is a very strong case. Indeed the European Commission holds powers in this 
area which are not equalled in any other areas. Five differences in corporate political 
behaviours have been highlighted in Chapter 4, and summarised earlier in this 
chapter. Although firms have recognised the level of European governance – the 
reception stage of their response – the projection stage differs in the case of French 
and British firms.  
 
I put forward four rationales to explain this conclusion. Firstly the European merger 
control regime is in fact a two-level institutional regime – where the national levels 
coexist and constantly interact with the European level. As a result the national level 
has a role to play in this regime. Secondly my research, notably in the financial 
services sector, has highlighted the importance of firms as sources of 
Europeanization. Thirdly the importance of national governmental and institutional 
structures is apparent. These shape the type of relationship firms may be enjoying 
with the European competent authority as they affect the delivery of messages to 
European institutions, notably the European Commission. Finally I analysed my 
conclusions in light of a learning process. France – as the model of goodness of fit 
would suspect – has changed the most, notably in the market for public affairs and its 
professionalisation. Accordingly these observations demonstrate that the strength of 
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the pressure on France is greater than those on Britain. This may explain why France 
is more likely to keep national reflexes.   
 
 The case of European merger control regulation is clearly distinct from other 
competences held by the European Commission – and as a result it may be difficult to 
argue for a general application of these findings to other competences of the 
Commission. Competition policy is however not confined to the European merger 
control regime, and further research in the development of Articles 81 and 82, in 
which the European Parliament and the Council are active, may shed new light in the 
design of corporate political strategies.  
 
Moreover the use of management tools in public policy and political science may also 
mean that further studies will be able to assess thoroughly the impact of corporate 
political strategies on public policy outcomes. Throughout my thesis, and notably 
with the analysis of the message element of my framework for analysis, I have 
highlighted merger cases that failed at the European level. This failure may be partly 
explained by corporate political behaviours, although further investigation would be 




This research project has focused on European corporate political strategies. 
The context of my thesis – the European merger control regime – has provided 
numerous fruitful opportunities for the analysis of strategies. My data collection, 
through different channels, has been instrumental in bringing fresh conclusions to the 
fore. I was able to establish a framework for the analysis of the design of corporate 
political strategies. Based on this framework, the analysis of my data collection 
allowed me to systematically review each element of the framework and make 
conclusive remarks in the comparison between French and British corporate political 
strategies. Finally, my data contributed to furthering the Europeanization conceptual 
view – as far as interest intermediation is concerned.  
 
Indeed, unlike the current conclusions in Europeanization literature this research 
project acknowledges five main themes of differences between French and British 
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corporate political strategies design, and thus the extent to which Europeanization 
affects interest intermediation needs to be qualified. Both horizontal and vertical 
flows have an impact on corporate political activity because of economic activities of 
firms. However, this impact should not be over stated. National constructs and 
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ANNEX 1: Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation) (Text with EEA relevance)  
 
Official Journal L 024 , 29/01/2004 P. 0001 - 0022 
 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular Articles 83 
and 308 thereof, 
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission(1), 
Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament(2), 
Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee(3), 
Whereas: 
(1) Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations 
between undertakings (4) has been substantially amended. Since further amendments are to be 
made, it should be recast in the interest of clarity. 
(2) For the achievement of the aims of the Treaty, Article 3(1)(g) gives the Community the 
objective of instituting a system ensuring that competition in the internal market is not distorted. 
Article 4(1) of the Treaty provides that the activities of the Member States and the Community 
are to be conducted in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free 
competition. These principles are essential for the further development of the internal market. 
(3) The completion of the internal market and of economic and monetary union, the enlargement 
of the European Union and the lowering of international barriers to trade and investment will 
continue to result in major corporate reorganisations, particularly in the form of concentrations. 
(4) Such reorganisations are to be welcomed to the extent that they are in line with the 
requirements of dynamic competition and capable of increasing the competitiveness of European 
industry, improving the conditions of growth and raising the standard of living in the Community. 
(5) However, it should be ensured that the process of reorganisation does not result in lasting 
damage to competition; Community law must therefore include provisions governing those 
concentrations which may significantly impede effective competition in the common market or in 
a substantial part of it. 
(6) A specific legal instrument is therefore necessary to permit effective control of all 
concentrations in terms of their effect on the structure of competition in the Community and to be 
the only instrument applicable to such concentrations. Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 has allowed 
a Community policy to develop in this field. In the light of experience, however, that Regulation 
should now be recast into legislation designed to meet the challenges of a more integrated market 
and the future enlargement of the European Union. In accordance with the principles of 
subsidiarity and of proportionality as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty, this Regulation does not 
go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve the objective of ensuring that competition in the 
common market is not distorted, in accordance with the principle of an open market economy 
with free competition. 
(7) Articles 81 and 82, while applicable, according to the case-law of the Court of Justice, to 
certain concentrations, are not sufficient to control all operations which may prove to be 
incompatible with the system of undistorted competition envisaged in the Treaty. This Regulation 
should therefore be based not only on Article 83 but, principally, on Article 308 of the Treaty, 
under which the Community may give itself the additional powers of action necessary for the 
attainment of its objectives, and also powers of action with regard to concentrations on the 
markets for agricultural products listed in Annex I to the Treaty. 
(8) The provisions to be adopted in this Regulation should apply to significant structural changes, 
the impact of which on the market goes beyond the national borders of any one Member State. 
Such concentrations should, as a general rule, be reviewed exclusively at Community level, in 
application of a "one-stop shop" system and in compliance with the principle of subsidiarity. 
Concentrations not covered by this Regulation come, in principle, within the jurisdiction of the 
Member States. 
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(9) The scope of application of this Regulation should be defined according to the geographical 
area of activity of the undertakings concerned and be limited by quantitative thresholds in order 
to cover those concentrations which have a Community dimension. The Commission should 
report to the Council on the implementation of the applicable thresholds and criteria so that the 
Council, acting in accordance with Article 202 of the Treaty, is in a position to review them 
regularly, as well as the rules regarding pre-notification referral, in the light of the experience 
gained; this requires statistical data to be provided by the Member States to the Commission to 
enable it to prepare such reports and possible proposals for amendments. The Commission's 
reports and proposals should be based on relevant information regularly provided by the Member 
States. 
(10) A concentration with a Community dimension should be deemed to exist where the 
aggregate turnover of the undertakings concerned exceeds given thresholds; that is the case 
irrespective of whether or not the undertakings effecting the concentration have their seat or their 
principal fields of activity in the Community, provided they have substantial operations there. 
(11) The rules governing the referral of concentrations from the Commission to Member States 
and from Member States to the Commission should operate as an effective corrective mechanism 
in the light of the principle of subsidiarity; these rules protect the competition interests of the 
Member States in an adequate manner and take due account of legal certainty and the "one-stop 
shop" principle. 
(12) Concentrations may qualify for examination under a number of national merger control 
systems if they fall below the turnover thresholds referred to in this Regulation. Multiple 
notification of the same transaction increases legal uncertainty, effort and cost for undertakings 
and may lead to conflicting assessments. The system whereby concentrations may be referred to 
the Commission by the Member States concerned should therefore be further developed. 
(13) The Commission should act in close and constant liaison with the competent authorities of 
the Member States from which it obtains comments and information. 
(14) The Commission and the competent authorities of the Member States should together form a 
network of public authorities, applying their respective competences in close cooperation, using 
efficient arrangements for information-sharing and consultation, with a view to ensuring that a 
case is dealt with by the most appropriate authority, in the light of the principle of subsidiarity 
and with a view to ensuring that multiple notifications of a given concentration are avoided to the 
greatest extent possible. Referrals of concentrations from the Commission to Member States and 
from Member States to the Commission should be made in an efficient manner avoiding, to the 
greatest extent possible, situations where a concentration is subject to a referral both before and 
after its notification. 
(15) The Commission should be able to refer to a Member State notified concentrations with a 
Community dimension which threaten significantly to affect competition in a market within that 
Member State presenting all the characteristics of a distinct market. Where the concentration 
affects competition on such a market, which does not constitute a substantial part of the common 
market, the Commission should be obliged, upon request, to refer the whole or part of the case to 
the Member State concerned. A Member State should be able to refer to the Commission a 
concentration which does not have a Community dimension but which affects trade between 
Member States and threatens to significantly affect competition within its territory. Other 
Member States which are also competent to review the concentration should be able to join the 
request. In such a situation, in order to ensure the efficiency and predictability of the system, 
national time limits should be suspended until a decision has been reached as to the referral of the 
case. The Commission should have the power to examine and deal with a concentration on behalf 
of a requesting Member State or requesting Member States. 
(16) The undertakings concerned should be granted the possibility of requesting referrals to or 
from the Commission before a concentration is notified so as to further improve the efficiency of 
the system for the control of concentrations within the Community. In such situations, the 
Commission and national competition authorities should decide within short, clearly defined time 
limits whether a referral to or from the Commission ought to be made, thereby ensuring the 
efficiency of the system. Upon request by the undertakings concerned, the Commission should be 
able to refer to a Member State a concentration with a Community dimension which may 
significantly affect competition in a market within that Member State presenting all the 
characteristics of a distinct market; the undertakings concerned should not, however, be required 
to demonstrate that the effects of the concentration would be detrimental to competition. A 
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concentration should not be referred from the Commission to a Member State which has 
expressed its disagreement to such a referral. Before notification to national authorities, the 
undertakings concerned should also be able to request that a concentration without a Community 
dimension which is capable of being reviewed under the national competition laws of at least 
three Member States be referred to the Commission. Such requests for pre-notification referrals to 
the Commission would be particularly pertinent in situations where the concentration would 
affect competition beyond the territory of one Member State. Where a concentration capable of 
being reviewed under the competition laws of three or more Member States is referred to the 
Commission prior to any national notification, and no Member State competent to review the case 
expresses its disagreement, the Commission should acquire exclusive competence to review the 
concentration and such a concentration should be deemed to have a Community dimension. Such 
pre-notification referrals from Member States to the Commission should not, however, be made 
where at least one Member State competent to review the case has expressed its disagreement 
with such a referral. 
(17) The Commission should be given exclusive competence to apply this Regulation, subject to 
review by the Court of Justice. 
(18) The Member States should not be permitted to apply their national legislation on competition 
to concentrations with a Community dimension, unless this Regulation makes provision therefor. 
The relevant powers of national authorities should be limited to cases where, failing intervention 
by the Commission, effective competition is likely to be significantly impeded within the territory 
of a Member State and where the competition interests of that Member State cannot be 
sufficiently protected otherwise by this Regulation. The Member States concerned must act 
promptly in such cases; this Regulation cannot, because of the diversity of national law, fix a 
single time limit for the adoption of final decisions under national law. 
(19) Furthermore, the exclusive application of this Regulation to concentrations with a 
Community dimension is without prejudice to Article 296 of the Treaty, and does not prevent the 
Member States from taking appropriate measures to protect legitimate interests other than those 
pursued by this Regulation, provided that such measures are compatible with the general 
principles and other provisions of Community law. 
(20) It is expedient to define the concept of concentration in such a manner as to cover operations 
bringing about a lasting change in the control of the undertakings concerned and therefore in the 
structure of the market. It is therefore appropriate to include, within the scope of this Regulation, 
all joint ventures performing on a lasting basis all the functions of an autonomous economic 
entity. It is moreover appropriate to treat as a single concentration transactions that are closely 
connected in that they are linked by condition or take the form of a series of transactions in 
securities taking place within a reasonably short period of time. 
(21) This Regulation should also apply where the undertakings concerned accept restrictions 
directly related to, and necessary for, the implementation of the concentration. Commission 
decisions declaring concentrations compatible with the common market in application of this 
Regulation should automatically cover such restrictions, without the Commission having to assess 
such restrictions in individual cases. At the request of the undertakings concerned, however, the 
Commission should, in cases presenting novel or unresolved questions giving rise to genuine 
uncertainty, expressly assess whether or not any restriction is directly related to, and necessary 
for, the implementation of the concentration. A case presents a novel or unresolved question 
giving rise to genuine uncertainty if the question is not covered by the relevant Commission 
notice in force or a published Commission decision. 
(22) The arrangements to be introduced for the control of concentrations should, without 
prejudice to Article 86(2) of the Treaty, respect the principle of non-discrimination between the 
public and the private sectors. In the public sector, calculation of the turnover of an undertaking 
concerned in a concentration needs, therefore, to take account of undertakings making up an 
economic unit with an independent power of decision, irrespective of the way in which their 
capital is held or of the rules of administrative supervision applicable to them. 
(23) It is necessary to establish whether or not concentrations with a Community dimension are 
compatible with the common market in terms of the need to maintain and develop effective 
competition in the common market. In so doing, the Commission must place its appraisal within 
the general framework of the achievement of the fundamental objectives referred to in Article 2 
of the Treaty establishing the European Community and Article 2 of the Treaty on European 
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Union. 
(24) In order to ensure a system of undistorted competition in the common market, in furtherance 
of a policy conducted in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free 
competition, this Regulation must permit effective control of all concentrations from the point of 
view of their effect on competition in the Community. Accordingly, Regulation (EEC) No 
4064/89 established the principle that a concentration with a Community dimension which creates 
or strengthens a dominant position as a result of which effective competition in the common 
market or in a substantial part of it would be significantly impeded should be declared 
incompatible with the common market. 
(25) In view of the consequences that concentrations in oligopolistic market structures may have, 
it is all the more necessary to maintain effective competition in such markets. Many oligopolistic 
markets exhibit a healthy degree of competition. However, under certain circumstances, 
concentrations involving the elimination of important competitive constraints that the merging 
parties had exerted upon each other, as well as a reduction of competitive pressure on the 
remaining competitors, may, even in the absence of a likelihood of coordination between the 
members of the oligopoly, result in a significant impediment to effective competition. The 
Community courts have, however, not to date expressly interpreted Regulation (EEC) No 
4064/89 as requiring concentrations giving rise to such non-coordinated effects to be declared 
incompatible with the common market. Therefore, in the interests of legal certainty, it should be 
made clear that this Regulation permits effective control of all such concentrations by providing 
that any concentration which would significantly impede effective competition, in the common 
market or in a substantial part of it, should be declared incompatible with the common market. 
The notion of "significant impediment to effective competition" in Article 2(2) and (3) should be 
interpreted as extending, beyond the concept of dominance, only to the anti-competitive effects of 
a concentration resulting from the non-coordinated behaviour of undertakings which would not 
have a dominant position on the market concerned. 
(26) A significant impediment to effective competition generally results from the creation or 
strengthening of a dominant position. With a view to preserving the guidance that may be drawn 
from past judgments of the European courts and Commission decisions pursuant to Regulation 
(EEC) No 4064/89, while at the same time maintaining consistency with the standards of 
competitive harm which have been applied by the Commission and the Community courts 
regarding the compatibility of a concentration with the common market, this Regulation should 
accordingly establish the principle that a concentration with a Community dimension which 
would significantly impede effective competition, in the common market or in a substantial part 
thereof, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position, is to be 
declared incompatible with the common market. 
(27) In addition, the criteria of Article 81(1) and (3) of the Treaty should be applied to joint 
ventures performing, on a lasting basis, all the functions of autonomous economic entities, to the 
extent that their creation has as its consequence an appreciable restriction of competition between 
undertakings that remain independent. 
(28) In order to clarify and explain the Commission's appraisal of concentrations under this 
Regulation, it is appropriate for the Commission to publish guidance which should provide a 
sound economic framework for the assessment of concentrations with a view to determining 
whether or not they may be declared compatible with the common market. 
(29) In order to determine the impact of a concentration on competition in the common market, it 
is appropriate to take account of any substantiated and likely efficiencies put forward by the 
undertakings concerned. It is possible that the efficiencies brought about by the concentration 
counteract the effects on competition, and in particular the potential harm to consumers, that it 
might otherwise have and that, as a consequence, the concentration would not significantly 
impede effective competition, in the common market or in a substantial part of it, in particular as 
a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position. The Commission should publish 
guidance on the conditions under which it may take efficiencies into account in the assessment of 
a concentration. 
(30) Where the undertakings concerned modify a notified concentration, in particular by offering 
commitments with a view to rendering the concentration compatible with the common market, 
the Commission should be able to declare the concentration, as modified, compatible with the 
common market. Such commitments should be proportionate to the competition problem and 
entirely eliminate it. It is also appropriate to accept commitments before the initiation of 
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proceedings where the competition problem is readily identifiable and can easily be remedied. It 
should be expressly provided that the Commission may attach to its decision conditions and 
obligations in order to ensure that the undertakings concerned comply with their commitments in 
a timely and effective manner so as to render the concentration compatible with the common 
market. Transparency and effective consultation of Member States as well as of interested third 
parties should be ensured throughout the procedure. 
(31) The Commission should have at its disposal appropriate instruments to ensure the 
enforcement of commitments and to deal with situations where they are not fulfilled. In cases of 
failure to fulfil a condition attached to the decision declaring a concentration compatible with the 
common market, the situation rendering the concentration compatible with the common market 
does not materialise and the concentration, as implemented, is therefore not authorised by the 
Commission. As a consequence, if the concentration is implemented, it should be treated in the 
same way as a non-notified concentration implemented without authorisation. Furthermore, 
where the Commission has already found that, in the absence of the condition, the concentration 
would be incompatible with the common market, it should have the power to directly order the 
dissolution of the concentration, so as to restore the situation prevailing prior to the 
implementation of the concentration. Where an obligation attached to a decision declaring the 
concentration compatible with the common market is not fulfilled, the Commission should be 
able to revoke its decision. Moreover, the Commission should be able to impose appropriate 
financial sanctions where conditions or obligations are not fulfilled. 
(32) Concentrations which, by reason of the limited market share of the undertakings concerned, 
are not liable to impede effective competition may be presumed to be compatible with the 
common market. Without prejudice to Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, an indication to this effect 
exists, in particular, where the market share of the undertakings concerned does not exceed 25 % 
either in the common market or in a substantial part of it. 
(33) The Commission should have the task of taking all the decisions necessary to establish 
whether or not concentrations with a Community dimension are compatible with the common 
market, as well as decisions designed to restore the situation prevailing prior to the 
implementation of a concentration which has been declared incompatible with the common 
market. 
(34) To ensure effective control, undertakings should be obliged to give prior notification of 
concentrations with a Community dimension following the conclusion of the agreement, the 
announcement of the public bid or the acquisition of a controlling interest. Notification should 
also be possible where the undertakings concerned satisfy the Commission of their intention to 
enter into an agreement for a proposed concentration and demonstrate to the Commission that 
their plan for that proposed concentration is sufficiently concrete, for example on the basis of an 
agreement in principle, a memorandum of understanding, or a letter of intent signed by all 
undertakings concerned, or, in the case of a public bid, where they have publicly announced an 
intention to make such a bid, provided that the intended agreement or bid would result in a 
concentration with a Community dimension. The implementation of concentrations should be 
suspended until a final decision of the Commission has been taken. However, it should be 
possible to derogate from this suspension at the request of the undertakings concerned, where 
appropriate. In deciding whether or not to grant a derogation, the Commission should take 
account of all pertinent factors, such as the nature and gravity of damage to the undertakings 
concerned or to third parties, and the threat to competition posed by the concentration. In the 
interest of legal certainty, the validity of transactions must nevertheless be protected as much as 
necessary. 
(35) A period within which the Commission must initiate proceedings in respect of a notified 
concentration and a period within which it must take a final decision on the compatibility or 
incompatibility with the common market of that concentration should be laid down. These 
periods should be extended whenever the undertakings concerned offer commitments with a view 
to rendering the concentration compatible with the common market, in order to allow for 
sufficient time for the analysis and market testing of such commitment offers and for the 
consultation of Member States as well as interested third parties. A limited extension of the 
period within which the Commission must take a final decision should also be possible in order to 
allow sufficient time for the investigation of the case and the verification of the facts and 
arguments submitted to the Commission. 
(36) The Community respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in 
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particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (5). Accordingly, this 
Regulation should be interpreted and applied with respect to those rights and principles. 
(37) The undertakings concerned must be afforded the right to be heard by the Commission when 
proceedings have been initiated; the members of the management and supervisory bodies and the 
recognised representatives of the employees of the undertakings concerned, and interested third 
parties, must also be given the opportunity to be heard. 
(38) In order properly to appraise concentrations, the Commission should have the right to 
request all necessary information and to conduct all necessary inspections throughout the 
Community. To that end, and with a view to protecting competition effectively, the Commission's 
powers of investigation need to be expanded. The Commission should, in particular, have the 
right to interview any persons who may be in possession of useful information and to record the 
statements made. 
(39) In the course of an inspection, officials authorised by the Commission should have the right 
to ask for any information relevant to the subject matter and purpose of the inspection; they 
should also have the right to affix seals during inspections, particularly in circumstances where 
there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a concentration has been implemented without being 
notified; that incorrect, incomplete or misleading information has been supplied to the 
Commission; or that the undertakings or persons concerned have failed to comply with a 
condition or obligation imposed by decision of the Commission. In any event, seals should only 
be used in exceptional circumstances, for the period of time strictly necessary for the inspection, 
normally not for more than 48 hours. 
(40) Without prejudice to the case-law of the Court of Justice, it is also useful to set out the scope 
of the control that the national judicial authority may exercise when it authorises, as provided by 
national law and as a precautionary measure, assistance from law enforcement authorities in order 
to overcome possible opposition on the part of the undertaking against an inspection, including 
the affixing of seals, ordered by Commission decision. It results from the case-law that the 
national judicial authority may in particular ask of the Commission further information which it 
needs to carry out its control and in the absence of which it could refuse the authorisation. The 
case-law also confirms the competence of the national courts to control the application of national 
rules governing the implementation of coercive measures. The competent authorities of the 
Member States should cooperate actively in the exercise of the Commission's investigative 
powers. 
(41) When complying with decisions of the Commission, the undertakings and persons concerned 
cannot be forced to admit that they have committed infringements, but they are in any event 
obliged to answer factual questions and to provide documents, even if this information may be 
used to establish against themselves or against others the existence of such infringements. 
(42) For the sake of transparency, all decisions of the Commission which are not of a merely 
procedural nature should be widely publicised. While ensuring preservation of the rights of 
defence of the undertakings concerned, in particular the right of access to the file, it is essential 
that business secrets be protected. The confidentiality of information exchanged in the network 
and with the competent authorities of third countries should likewise be safeguarded. 
(43) Compliance with this Regulation should be enforceable, as appropriate, by means of fines 
and periodic penalty payments. The Court of Justice should be given unlimited jurisdiction in that 
regard pursuant to Article 229 of the Treaty. 
(44) The conditions in which concentrations, involving undertakings having their seat or their 
principal fields of activity in the Community, are carried out in third countries should be 
observed, and provision should be made for the possibility of the Council giving the Commission 
an appropriate mandate for negotiation with a view to obtaining non-discriminatory treatment for 
such undertakings. 
(45) This Regulation in no way detracts from the collective rights of employees, as recognised in 
the undertakings concerned, notably with regard to any obligation to inform or consult their 
recognised representatives under Community and national law. 
(46) The Commission should be able to lay down detailed rules concerning the implementation of 
this Regulation in accordance with the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers 
conferred on the Commission. For the adoption of such implementing provisions, the 
Commission should be assisted by an Advisory Committee composed of the representatives of 
the Member States as specified in Article 23, 
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HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: 
Article 1 
Scope 
1. Without prejudice to Article 4(5) and Article 22, this Regulation shall apply to all 
concentrations with a Community dimension as defined in this Article. 
2. A concentration has a Community dimension where: 
(a) the combined aggregate worldwide turnover of all the undertakings concerned is more than 
EUR 5000 million; and 
(b) the aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings concerned 
is more than EUR 250 million, 
unless each of the undertakings concerned achieves more than two-thirds of its aggregate 
Community-wide turnover within one and the same Member State. 
3. A concentration that does not meet the thresholds laid down in paragraph 2 has a Community 
dimension where: 
(a) the combined aggregate worldwide turnover of all the undertakings concerned is more than 
EUR 2500 million; 
(b) in each of at least three Member States, the combined aggregate turnover of all the 
undertakings concerned is more than EUR 100 million; 
(c) in each of at least three Member States included for the purpose of point (b), the aggregate 
turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings concerned is more than EUR 25 million; and 
(d) the aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings concerned 
is more than EUR 100 million, 
unless each of the undertakings concerned achieves more than two-thirds of its aggregate 
Community-wide turnover within one and the same Member State. 
4. On the basis of statistical data that may be regularly provided by the Member States, the 
Commission shall report to the Council on the operation of the thresholds and criteria set out in 
paragraphs 2 and 3 by 1 July 2009 and may present proposals pursuant to paragraph 5. 
5. Following the report referred to in paragraph 4 and on a proposal from the Commission, the 




Appraisal of concentrations 
1. Concentrations within the scope of this Regulation shall be appraised in accordance with the 
objectives of this Regulation and the following provisions with a view to establishing whether or 
not they are compatible with the common market. 
In making this appraisal, the Commission shall take into account: 
(a) the need to maintain and develop effective competition within the common market in view of, 
among other things, the structure of all the markets concerned and the actual or potential 
competition from undertakings located either within or outwith the Community; 
(b) the market position of the undertakings concerned and their economic and financial power, 
the alternatives available to suppliers and users, their access to supplies or markets, any legal or 
other barriers to entry, supply and demand trends for the relevant goods and services, the interests 
of the intermediate and ultimate consumers, and the development of technical and economic 
progress provided that it is to consumers' advantage and does not form an obstacle to competition. 
2. A concentration which would not significantly impede effective competition in the common 
market or in a substantial part of it, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a 
dominant position, shall be declared compatible with the common market. 
3. A concentration which would significantly impede effective competition, in the common 
market or in a substantial part of it, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a 
dominant position, shall be declared incompatible with the common market. 
4. To the extent that the creation of a joint venture constituting a concentration pursuant to Article 
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3 has as its object or effect the coordination of the competitive behaviour of undertakings that 
remain independent, such coordination shall be appraised in accordance with the criteria of 
Article 81(1) and (3) of the Treaty, with a view to establishing whether or not the operation is 
compatible with the common market. 
5. In making this appraisal, the Commission shall take into account in particular: 
- whether two or more parent companies retain, to a significant extent, activities in the same 
market as the joint venture or in a market which is downstream or upstream from that of the joint 
venture or in a neighbouring market closely related to this market, 
- whether the coordination which is the direct consequence of the creation of the joint venture 
affords the undertakings concerned the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a 
substantial part of the products or services in question. 
 
Article 3 
Definition of concentration 
1. A concentration shall be deemed to arise where a change of control on a lasting basis results 
from: 
(a) the merger of two or more previously independent undertakings or parts of undertakings, or 
(b) the acquisition, by one or more persons already controlling at least one undertaking, or by one 
or more undertakings, whether by purchase of securities or assets, by contract or by any other 
means, of direct or indirect control of the whole or parts of one or more other undertakings. 
2. Control shall be constituted by rights, contracts or any other means which, either separately or 
in combination and having regard to the considerations of fact or law involved, confer the 
possibility of exercising decisive influence on an undertaking, in particular by: 
(a) ownership or the right to use all or part of the assets of an undertaking; 
(b) rights or contracts which confer decisive influence on the composition, voting or decisions of 
the organs of an undertaking. 
3. Control is acquired by persons or undertakings which: 
(a) are holders of the rights or entitled to rights under the contracts concerned; or 
(b) while not being holders of such rights or entitled to rights under such contracts, have the 
power to exercise the rights deriving therefrom. 
4. The creation of a joint venture performing on a lasting basis all the functions of an autonomous 
economic entity shall constitute a concentration within the meaning of paragraph 1(b). 
5. A concentration shall not be deemed to arise where: 
(a) credit institutions or other financial institutions or insurance companies, the normal activities 
of which include transactions and dealing in securities for their own account or for the account of 
others, hold on a temporary basis securities which they have acquired in an undertaking with a 
view to reselling them, provided that they do not exercise voting rights in respect of those 
securities with a view to determining the competitive behaviour of that undertaking or provided 
that they exercise such voting rights only with a view to preparing the disposal of all or part of 
that undertaking or of its assets or the disposal of those securities and that any such disposal takes 
place within one year of the date of acquisition; that period may be extended by the Commission 
on request where such institutions or companies can show that the disposal was not reasonably 
possible within the period set; 
(b) control is acquired by an office-holder according to the law of a Member State relating to 
liquidation, winding up, insolvency, cessation of payments, compositions or analogous 
proceedings; 
(c) the operations referred to in paragraph 1(b) are carried out by the financial holding companies 
referred to in Article 5(3) of Fourth Council Directive 78/660/EEC of 25 July 1978 based on 
Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty on the annual accounts of certain types of companies(6) provided 
however that the voting rights in respect of the holding are exercised, in particular in relation to 
the appointment of members of the management and supervisory bodies of the undertakings in 
which they have holdings, only to maintain the full value of those investments and not to 




Prior notification of concentrations and pre-notification referral at the request of the notifying 
parties 
1. Concentrations with a Community dimension defined in this Regulation shall be notified to the 
Commission prior to their implementation and following the conclusion of the agreement, the 
announcement of the public bid, or the acquisition of a controlling interest. 
Notification may also be made where the undertakings concerned demonstrate to the Commission 
a good faith intention to conclude an agreement or, in the case of a public bid, where they have 
publicly announced an intention to make such a bid, provided that the intended agreement or bid 
would result in a concentration with a Community dimension. 
For the purposes of this Regulation, the term "notified concentration" shall also cover intended 
concentrations notified pursuant to the second subparagraph. For the purposes of paragraphs 4 
and 5 of this Article, the term "concentration" includes intended concentrations within the 
meaning of the second subparagraph. 
2. A concentration which consists of a merger within the meaning of Article 3(1)(a) or in the 
acquisition of joint control within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) shall be notified jointly by the 
parties to the merger or by those acquiring joint control as the case may be. In all other cases, the 
notification shall be effected by the person or undertaking acquiring control of the whole or parts 
of one or more undertakings. 
3. Where the Commission finds that a notified concentration falls within the scope of this 
Regulation, it shall publish the fact of the notification, at the same time indicating the names of 
the undertakings concerned, their country of origin, the nature of the concentration and the 
economic sectors involved. The Commission shall take account of the legitimate interest of 
undertakings in the protection of their business secrets. 
4. Prior to the notification of a concentration within the meaning of paragraph 1, the persons or 
undertakings referred to in paragraph 2 may inform the Commission, by means of a reasoned 
submission, that the concentration may significantly affect competition in a market within a 
Member State which presents all the characteristics of a distinct market and should therefore be 
examined, in whole or in part, by that Member State. 
The Commission shall transmit this submission to all Member States without delay. The Member 
State referred to in the reasoned submission shall, within 15 working days of receiving the 
submission, express its agreement or disagreement as regards the request to refer the case. Where 
that Member State takes no such decision within this period, it shall be deemed to have agreed. 
Unless that Member State disagrees, the Commission, where it considers that such a distinct 
market exists, and that competition in that market may be significantly affected by the 
concentration, may decide to refer the whole or part of the case to the competent authorities of 
that Member State with a view to the application of that State's national competition law. 
The decision whether or not to refer the case in accordance with the third subparagraph shall be 
taken within 25 working days starting from the receipt of the reasoned submission by the 
Commission. The Commission shall inform the other Member States and the persons or 
undertakings concerned of its decision. If the Commission does not take a decision within this 
period, it shall be deemed to have adopted a decision to refer the case in accordance with the 
submission made by the persons or undertakings concerned. 
If the Commission decides, or is deemed to have decided, pursuant to the third and fourth 
subparagraphs, to refer the whole of the case, no notification shall be made pursuant to paragraph 
1 and national competition law shall apply. Article 9(6) to (9) shall apply mutatis mutandis. 
5. With regard to a concentration as defined in Article 3 which does not have a Community 
dimension within the meaning of Article 1 and which is capable of being reviewed under the 
national competition laws of at least three Member States, the persons or undertakings referred to 
in paragraph 2 may, before any notification to the competent authorities, inform the Commission 
by means of a reasoned submission that the concentration should be examined by the 
Commission. 
The Commission shall transmit this submission to all Member States without delay. 
Any Member State competent to examine the concentration under its national competition law 
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may, within 15 working days of receiving the reasoned submission, express its disagreement as 
regards the request to refer the case. 
Where at least one such Member State has expressed its disagreement in accordance with the 
third subparagraph within the period of 15 working days, the case shall not be referred. The 
Commission shall, without delay, inform all Member States and the persons or undertakings 
concerned of any such expression of disagreement. 
Where no Member State has expressed its disagreement in accordance with the third 
subparagraph within the period of 15 working days, the concentration shall be deemed to have a 
Community dimension and shall be notified to the Commission in accordance with paragraphs 1 
and 2. In such situations, no Member State shall apply its national competition law to the 
concentration. 
6. The Commission shall report to the Council on the operation of paragraphs 4 and 5 by 1 July 
2009. Following this report and on a proposal from the Commission, the Council, acting by a 
qualified majority, may revise paragraphs 4 and 5. 
 
Article 5 
Calculation of turnover 
1. Aggregate turnover within the meaning of this Regulation shall comprise the amounts derived 
by the undertakings concerned in the preceding financial year from the sale of products and the 
provision of services falling within the undertakings' ordinary activities after deduction of sales 
rebates and of value added tax and other taxes directly related to turnover. The aggregate turnover 
of an undertaking concerned shall not include the sale of products or the provision of services 
between any of the undertakings referred to in paragraph 4. 
Turnover, in the Community or in a Member State, shall comprise products sold and services 
provided to undertakings or consumers, in the Community or in that Member State as the case 
may be. 
2. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, where the concentration consists of the acquisition of 
parts, whether or not constituted as legal entities, of one or more undertakings, only the turnover 
relating to the parts which are the subject of the concentration shall be taken into account with 
regard to the seller or sellers. 
However, two or more transactions within the meaning of the first subparagraph which take place 
within a two-year period between the same persons or undertakings shall be treated as one and the 
same concentration arising on the date of the last transaction. 
3. In place of turnover the following shall be used: 
(a) for credit institutions and other financial institutions, the sum of the following income items as 
defined in Council Directive 86/635/EEC(7), after deduction of value added tax and other taxes 
directly related to those items, where appropriate: 
(i) interest income and similar income; 
(ii) income from securities: 
- income from shares and other variable yield securities, 
- income from participating interests, 
- income from shares in affiliated undertakings; 
(iii) commissions receivable; 
(iv) net profit on financial operations; 
(v) other operating income. 
The turnover of a credit or financial institution in the Community or in a Member State shall 
comprise the income items, as defined above, which are received by the branch or division of that 
institution established in the Community or in the Member State in question, as the case may be; 
(b) for insurance undertakings, the value of gross premiums written which shall comprise all 
amounts received and receivable in respect of insurance contracts issued by or on behalf of the 
insurance undertakings, including also outgoing reinsurance premiums, and after deduction of 
taxes and parafiscal contributions or levies charged by reference to the amounts of individual 
premiums or the total volume of premiums; as regards Article 1(2)(b) and (3)(b), (c) and (d) and 
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the final part of Article 1(2) and (3), gross premiums received from Community residents and 
from residents of one Member State respectively shall be taken into account. 
4. Without prejudice to paragraph 2, the aggregate turnover of an undertaking concerned within 
the meaning of this Regulation shall be calculated by adding together the respective turnovers of 
the following: 
(a) the undertaking concerned; 
(b) those undertakings in which the undertaking concerned, directly or indirectly: 
(i) owns more than half the capital or business assets, or 
(ii) has the power to exercise more than half the voting rights, or 
(iii) has the power to appoint more than half the members of the supervisory board, the 
administrative board or bodies legally representing the undertakings, or 
(iv) has the right to manage the undertakings' affairs; 
(c) those undertakings which have in the undertaking concerned the rights or powers listed in (b); 
(d) those undertakings in which an undertaking as referred to in (c) has the rights or powers listed 
in (b); 
(e) those undertakings in which two or more undertakings as referred to in (a) to (d) jointly have 
the rights or powers listed in (b). 
5. Where undertakings concerned by the concentration jointly have the rights or powers listed in 
paragraph 4(b), in calculating the aggregate turnover of the undertakings concerned for the 
purposes of this Regulation: 
(a) no account shall be taken of the turnover resulting from the sale of products or the provision 
of services between the joint undertaking and each of the undertakings concerned or any other 
undertaking connected with any one of them, as set out in paragraph 4(b) to (e); 
(b) account shall be taken of the turnover resulting from the sale of products and the provision of 
services between the joint undertaking and any third undertakings. This turnover shall be 
apportioned equally amongst the undertakings concerned. 
 
Article 6 
Examination of the notification and initiation of proceedings 
1. The Commission shall examine the notification as soon as it is received. 
(a) Where it concludes that the concentration notified does not fall within the scope of this 
Regulation, it shall record that finding by means of a decision. 
(b) Where it finds that the concentration notified, although falling within the scope of this 
Regulation, does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the common market, it shall 
decide not to oppose it and shall declare that it is compatible with the common market. 
A decision declaring a concentration compatible shall be deemed to cover restrictions directly 
related and necessary to the implementation of the concentration. 
(c) Without prejudice to paragraph 2, where the Commission finds that the concentration notified 
falls within the scope of this Regulation and raises serious doubts as to its compatibility with the 
common market, it shall decide to initiate proceedings. Without prejudice to Article 9, such 
proceedings shall be closed by means of a decision as provided for in Article 8(1) to (4), unless 
the undertakings concerned have demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Commission that they 
have abandoned the concentration. 
2. Where the Commission finds that, following modification by the undertakings concerned, a 
notified concentration no longer raises serious doubts within the meaning of paragraph 1(c), it 
shall declare the concentration compatible with the common market pursuant to paragraph 1(b). 
The Commission may attach to its decision under paragraph 1(b) conditions and obligations 
intended to ensure that the undertakings concerned comply with the commitments they have 
entered into vis-à-vis the Commission with a view to rendering the concentration compatible with 
the common market. 
3. The Commission may revoke the decision it took pursuant to paragraph 1(a) or (b) where: 
(a) the decision is based on incorrect information for which one of the undertakings is responsible 
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or where it has been obtained by deceit, 
or 
(b) the undertakings concerned commit a breach of an obligation attached to the decision. 
4. In the cases referred to in paragraph 3, the Commission may take a decision under paragraph 1, 
without being bound by the time limits referred to in Article 10(1). 
5. The Commission shall notify its decision to the undertakings concerned and the competent 
authorities of the Member States without delay. 
 
Article 7 
Suspension of concentrations 
1. A concentration with a Community dimension as defined in Article 1, or which is to be 
examined by the Commission pursuant to Article 4(5), shall not be implemented either before its 
notification or until it has been declared compatible with the common market pursuant to a 
decision under Articles 6(1)(b), 8(1) or 8(2), or on the basis of a presumption according to Article 
10(6). 
2. Paragraph 1 shall not prevent the implementation of a public bid or of a series of transactions 
in securities including those convertible into other securities admitted to trading on a market such 
as a stock exchange, by which control within the meaning of Article 3 is acquired from various 
sellers, provided that: 
(a) the concentration is notified to the Commission pursuant to Article 4 without delay; and 
(b) the acquirer does not exercise the voting rights attached to the securities in question or does so 
only to maintain the full value of its investments based on a derogation granted by the 
Commission under paragraph 3. 
3. The Commission may, on request, grant a derogation from the obligations imposed in 
paragraphs 1 or 2. The request to grant a derogation must be reasoned. In deciding on the request, 
the Commission shall take into account inter alia the effects of the suspension on one or more 
undertakings concerned by the concentration or on a third party and the threat to competition 
posed by the concentration. Such a derogation may be made subject to conditions and obligations 
in order to ensure conditions of effective competition. A derogation may be applied for and 
granted at any time, be it before notification or after the transaction. 
4. The validity of any transaction carried out in contravention of paragraph 1 shall be dependent 
on a decision pursuant to Article 6(1)(b) or Article 8(1), (2) or (3) or on a presumption pursuant 
to Article 10(6). 
This Article shall, however, have no effect on the validity of transactions in securities including 
those convertible into other securities admitted to trading on a market such as a stock exchange, 
unless the buyer and seller knew or ought to have known that the transaction was carried out in 
contravention of paragraph 1. 
Article 8 
Powers of decision of the Commission 
1. Where the Commission finds that a notified concentration fulfils the criterion laid down in 
Article 2(2) and, in the cases referred to in Article 2(4), the criteria laid down in Article 81(3) of 
the Treaty, it shall issue a decision declaring the concentration compatible with the common 
market. 
A decision declaring a concentration compatible shall be deemed to cover restrictions directly 
related and necessary to the implementation of the concentration. 
2. Where the Commission finds that, following modification by the undertakings concerned, a 
notified concentration fulfils the criterion laid down in Article 2(2) and, in the cases referred to in 
Article 2(4), the criteria laid down in Article 81(3) of the Treaty, it shall issue a decision 
declaring the concentration compatible with the common market. 
The Commission may attach to its decision conditions and obligations intended to ensure that the 
undertakings concerned comply with the commitments they have entered into vis-à-vis the 
Commission with a view to rendering the concentration compatible with the common market. 
A decision declaring a concentration compatible shall be deemed to cover restrictions directly 
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related and necessary to the implementation of the concentration. 
3. Where the Commission finds that a concentration fulfils the criterion defined in Article 2(3) or, 
in the cases referred to in Article 2(4), does not fulfil the criteria laid down in Article 81(3) of the 
Treaty, it shall issue a decision declaring that the concentration is incompatible with the common 
market. 
4. Where the Commission finds that a concentration: 
(a) has already been implemented and that concentration has been declared incompatible with the 
common market, or 
(b) has been implemented in contravention of a condition attached to a decision taken under 
paragraph 2, which has found that, in the absence of the condition, the concentration would fulfil 
the criterion laid down in Article 2(3) or, in the cases referred to in Article 2(4), would not fulfil 
the criteria laid down in Article 81(3) of the Treaty, 
the Commission may: 
- require the undertakings concerned to dissolve the concentration, in particular through the 
dissolution of the merger or the disposal of all the shares or assets acquired, so as to restore the 
situation prevailing prior to the implementation of the concentration; in circumstances where 
restoration of the situation prevailing before the implementation of the concentration is not 
possible through dissolution of the concentration, the Commission may take any other measure 
appropriate to achieve such restoration as far as possible, 
- order any other appropriate measure to ensure that the undertakings concerned dissolve the 
concentration or take other restorative measures as required in its decision. 
In cases falling within point (a) of the first subparagraph, the measures referred to in that 
subparagraph may be imposed either in a decision pursuant to paragraph 3 or by separate 
decision. 
5. The Commission may take interim measures appropriate to restore or maintain conditions of 
effective competition where a concentration: 
(a) has been implemented in contravention of Article 7, and a decision as to the compatibility of 
the concentration with the common market has not yet been taken; 
(b) has been implemented in contravention of a condition attached to a decision under Article 
6(1)(b) or paragraph 2 of this Article; 
(c) has already been implemented and is declared incompatible with the common market. 
6. The Commission may revoke the decision it has taken pursuant to paragraphs 1 or 2 where: 
(a) the declaration of compatibility is based on incorrect information for which one of the 
undertakings is responsible or where it has been obtained by deceit; or 
(b) the undertakings concerned commit a breach of an obligation attached to the decision. 
7. The Commission may take a decision pursuant to paragraphs 1 to 3 without being bound by the 
time limits referred to in Article 10(3), in cases where: 
(a) it finds that a concentration has been implemented 
(i) in contravention of a condition attached to a decision under Article 6(1)(b), or 
(ii) in contravention of a condition attached to a decision taken under paragraph 2 and in 
accordance with Article 10(2), which has found that, in the absence of the condition, the 
concentration would raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the common market; or 
(b) a decision has been revoked pursuant to paragraph 6. 
8. The Commission shall notify its decision to the undertakings concerned and the competent 
authorities of the Member States without delay. 
 
Article 9 
Referral to the competent authorities of the Member States 
1. The Commission may, by means of a decision notified without delay to the undertakings 
concerned and the competent authorities of the other Member States, refer a notified 
concentration to the competent authorities of the Member State concerned in the following 
circumstances. 
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2. Within 15 working days of the date of receipt of the copy of the notification, a Member State, 
on its own initiative or upon the invitation of the Commission, may inform the Commission, 
which shall inform the undertakings concerned, that: 
(a) a concentration threatens to affect significantly competition in a market within that Member 
State, which presents all the characteristics of a distinct market, or 
(b) a concentration affects competition in a market within that Member State, which presents all 
the characteristics of a distinct market and which does not constitute a substantial part of the 
common market. 
3. If the Commission considers that, having regard to the market for the products or services in 
question and the geographical reference market within the meaning of paragraph 7, there is such a 
distinct market and that such a threat exists, either: 
(a) it shall itself deal with the case in accordance with this Regulation; or 
(b) it shall refer the whole or part of the case to the competent authorities of the Member State 
concerned with a view to the application of that State's national competition law. 
If, however, the Commission considers that such a distinct market or threat does not exist, it shall 
adopt a decision to that effect which it shall address to the Member State concerned, and shall 
itself deal with the case in accordance with this Regulation. 
In cases where a Member State informs the Commission pursuant to paragraph 2(b) that a 
concentration affects competition in a distinct market within its territory that does not form a 
substantial part of the common market, the Commission shall refer the whole or part of the case 
relating to the distinct market concerned, if it considers that such a distinct market is affected. 
4. A decision to refer or not to refer pursuant to paragraph 3 shall be taken: 
(a) as a general rule within the period provided for in Article 10(1), second subparagraph, where 
the Commission, pursuant to Article 6(1)(b), has not initiated proceedings; or 
(b) within 65 working days at most of the notification of the concentration concerned where the 
Commission has initiated proceedings under Article 6(1)(c), without taking the preparatory steps 
in order to adopt the necessary measures under Article 8(2), (3) or (4) to maintain or restore 
effective competition on the market concerned. 
5. If within the 65 working days referred to in paragraph 4(b) the Commission, despite a reminder 
from the Member State concerned, has not taken a decision on referral in accordance with 
paragraph 3 nor has taken the preparatory steps referred to in paragraph 4(b), it shall be deemed 
to have taken a decision to refer the case to the Member State concerned in accordance with 
paragraph 3(b). 
6. The competent authority of the Member State concerned shall decide upon the case without 
undue delay. 
Within 45 working days after the Commission's referral, the competent authority of the Member 
State concerned shall inform the undertakings concerned of the result of the preliminary 
competition assessment and what further action, if any, it proposes to take. The Member State 
concerned may exceptionally suspend this time limit where necessary information has not been 
provided to it by the undertakings concerned as provided for by its national competition law. 
Where a notification is requested under national law, the period of 45 working days shall begin 
on the working day following that of the receipt of a complete notification by the competent 
authority of that Member State. 
7. The geographical reference market shall consist of the area in which the undertakings 
concerned are involved in the supply and demand of products or services, in which the conditions 
of competition are sufficiently homogeneous and which can be distinguished from neighbouring 
areas because, in particular, conditions of competition are appreciably different in those areas. 
This assessment should take account in particular of the nature and characteristics of the products 
or services concerned, of the existence of entry barriers or of consumer preferences, of 
appreciable differences of the undertakings' market shares between the area concerned and 
neighbouring areas or of substantial price differences. 
8. In applying the provisions of this Article, the Member State concerned may take only the 
measures strictly necessary to safeguard or restore effective competition on the market concerned. 
9. In accordance with the relevant provisions of the Treaty, any Member State may appeal to the 
Court of Justice, and in particular request the application of Article 243 of the Treaty, for the 
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purpose of applying its national competition law. 
 
Article 10 
Time limits for initiating proceedings and for decisions 
1. Without prejudice to Article 6(4), the decisions referred to in Article 6(1) shall be taken within 
25 working days at most. That period shall begin on the working day following that of the receipt 
of a notification or, if the information to be supplied with the notification is incomplete, on the 
working day following that of the receipt of the complete information. 
That period shall be increased to 35 working days where the Commission receives a request from 
a Member State in accordance with Article 9(2)or where, the undertakings concerned offer 
commitments pursuant to Article 6(2) with a view to rendering the concentration compatible with 
the common market. 
2. Decisions pursuant to Article 8(1) or (2) concerning notified concentrations shall be taken as 
soon as it appears that the serious doubts referred to in Article 6(1)(c) have been removed, 
particularly as a result of modifications made by the undertakings concerned, and at the latest by 
the time limit laid down in paragraph 3. 
3. Without prejudice to Article 8(7), decisions pursuant to Article 8(1) to (3) concerning notified 
concentrations shall be taken within not more than 90 working days of the date on which the 
proceedings are initiated. That period shall be increased to 105 working days where the 
undertakings concerned offer commitments pursuant to Article 8(2), second subparagraph, with a 
view to rendering the concentration compatible with the common market, unless these 
commitments have been offered less than 55 working days after the initiation of proceedings. 
The periods set by the first subparagraph shall likewise be extended if the notifying parties make 
a request to that effect not later than 15 working days after the initiation of proceedings pursuant 
to Article 6(1)(c). The notifying parties may make only one such request. Likewise, at any time 
following the initiation of proceedings, the periods set by the first subparagraph may be extended 
by the Commission with the agreement of the notifying parties. The total duration of any 
extension or extensions effected pursuant to this subparagraph shall not exceed 20 working days. 
4. The periods set by paragraphs 1 and 3 shall exceptionally be suspended where, owing to 
circumstances for which one of the undertakings involved in the concentration is responsible, the 
Commission has had to request information by decision pursuant to Article 11 or to order an 
inspection by decision pursuant to Article 13. 
The first subparagraph shall also apply to the period referred to in Article 9(4)(b). 
5. Where the Court of Justice gives a judgment which annuls the whole or part of a Commission 
decision which is subject to a time limit set by this Article, the concentration shall be re-examined 
by the Commission with a view to adopting a decision pursuant to Article 6(1). 
The concentration shall be re-examined in the light of current market conditions. 
The notifying parties shall submit a new notification or supplement the original notification, 
without delay, where the original notification becomes incomplete by reason of intervening 
changes in market conditions or in the information provided. Where there are no such changes, 
the parties shall certify this fact without delay. 
The periods laid down in paragraph 1 shall start on the working day following that of the receipt 
of complete information in a new notification, a supplemented notification, or a certification 
within the meaning of the third subparagraph. 
The second and third subparagraphs shall also apply in the cases referred to in Article 6(4) and 
Article 8(7). 
6. Where the Commission has not taken a decision in accordance with Article 6(1)(b), (c), 8(1), 
(2) or (3) within the time limits set in paragraphs 1 and 3 respectively, the concentration shall be 




Requests for information 
1. In order to carry out the duties assigned to it by this Regulation, the Commission may, by 
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simple request or by decision, require the persons referred to in Article 3(1)(b), as well as 
undertakings and associations of undertakings, to provide all necessary information. 
2. When sending a simple request for information to a person, an undertaking or an association of 
undertakings, the Commission shall state the legal basis and the purpose of the request, specify 
what information is required and fix the time limit within which the information is to be provided, 
as well as the penalties provided for in Article 14 for supplying incorrect or misleading 
information. 
3. Where the Commission requires a person, an undertaking or an association of undertakings to 
supply information by decision, it shall state the legal basis and the purpose of the request, 
specify what information is required and fix the time limit within which it is to be provided. It 
shall also indicate the penalties provided for in Article 14 and indicate or impose the penalties 
provided for in Article 15. It shall further indicate the right to have the decision reviewed by the 
Court of Justice. 
4. The owners of the undertakings or their representatives and, in the case of legal persons, 
companies or firms, or associations having no legal personality, the persons authorised to 
represent them by law or by their constitution, shall supply the information requested on behalf of 
the undertaking concerned. Persons duly authorised to act may supply the information on behalf 
of their clients. The latter shall remain fully responsible if the information supplied is incomplete, 
incorrect or misleading. 
5. The Commission shall without delay forward a copy of any decision taken pursuant to 
paragraph 3 to the competent authorities of the Member State in whose territory the residence of 
the person or the seat of the undertaking or association of undertakings is situated, and to the 
competent authority of the Member State whose territory is affected. At the specific request of the 
competent authority of a Member State, the Commission shall also forward to that authority 
copies of simple requests for information relating to a notified concentration. 
6. At the request of the Commission, the governments and competent authorities of the Member 
States shall provide the Commission with all necessary information to carry out the duties 
assigned to it by this Regulation. 
7. In order to carry out the duties assigned to it by this Regulation, the Commission may 
interview any natural or legal person who consents to be interviewed for the purpose of collecting 
information relating to the subject matter of an investigation. At the beginning of the interview, 
which may be conducted by telephone or other electronic means, the Commission shall state the 
legal basis and the purpose of the interview. 
Where an interview is not conducted on the premises of the Commission or by telephone or other 
electronic means, the Commission shall inform in advance the competent authority of the 
Member State in whose territory the interview takes place. If the competent authority of that 
Member State so requests, officials of that authority may assist the officials and other persons 
authorised by the Commission to conduct the interview. 
 
Article 12 
Inspections by the authorities of the Member States 
1. At the request of the Commission, the competent authorities of the Member States shall 
undertake the inspections which the Commission considers to be necessary under Article 13(1), 
or which it has ordered by decision pursuant to Article 13(4). The officials of the competent 
authorities of the Member States who are responsible for conducting these inspections as well as 
those authorised or appointed by them shall exercise their powers in accordance with their 
national law. 
2. If so requested by the Commission or by the competent authority of the Member State within 
whose territory the inspection is to be conducted, officials and other accompanying persons 
authorised by the Commission may assist the officials of the authority concerned. 
Article 13 
The Commission's powers of inspection 
1. In order to carry out the duties assigned to it by this Regulation, the Commission may conduct 
all necessary inspections of undertakings and associations of undertakings. 
2. The officials and other accompanying persons authorised by the Commission to conduct an 
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inspection shall have the power: 
(a) to enter any premises, land and means of transport of undertakings and associations of 
undertakings; 
(b) to examine the books and other records related to the business, irrespective of the medium on 
which they are stored; 
(c) to take or obtain in any form copies of or extracts from such books or records; 
(d) to seal any business premises and books or records for the period and to the extent necessary 
for the inspection; 
(e) to ask any representative or member of staff of the undertaking or association of undertakings 
for explanations on facts or documents relating to the subject matter and purpose of the inspection 
and to record the answers. 
3. Officials and other accompanying persons authorised by the Commission to conduct an 
inspection shall exercise their powers upon production of a written authorisation specifying the 
subject matter and purpose of the inspection and the penalties provided for in Article 14, in the 
production of the required books or other records related to the business which is incomplete or 
where answers to questions asked under paragraph 2 of this Article are incorrect or misleading. In 
good time before the inspection, the Commission shall give notice of the inspection to the 
competent authority of the Member State in whose territory the inspection is to be conducted. 
4. Undertakings and associations of undertakings are required to submit to inspections ordered by 
decision of the Commission. The decision shall specify the subject matter and purpose of the 
inspection, appoint the date on which it is to begin and indicate the penalties provided for in 
Articles 14 and 15 and the right to have the decision reviewed by the Court of Justice. The 
Commission shall take such decisions after consulting the competent authority of the Member 
State in whose territory the inspection is to be conducted. 
5. Officials of, and those authorised or appointed by, the competent authority of the Member State 
in whose territory the inspection is to be conducted shall, at the request of that authority or of the 
Commission, actively assist the officials and other accompanying persons authorised by the 
Commission. To this end, they shall enjoy the powers specified in paragraph 2. 
6. Where the officials and other accompanying persons authorised by the Commission find that 
an undertaking opposes an inspection, including the sealing of business premises, books or 
records, ordered pursuant to this Article, the Member State concerned shall afford them the 
necessary assistance, requesting where appropriate the assistance of the police or of an equivalent 
enforcement authority, so as to enable them to conduct their inspection. 
7. If the assistance provided for in paragraph 6 requires authorisation from a judicial authority 
according to national rules, such authorisation shall be applied for. Such authorisation may also 
be applied for as a precautionary measure. 
8. Where authorisation as referred to in paragraph 7 is applied for, the national judicial authority 
shall ensure that the Commission decision is authentic and that the coercive measures envisaged 
are neither arbitrary nor excessive having regard to the subject matter of the inspection. In its 
control of proportionality of the coercive measures, the national judicial authority may ask the 
Commission, directly or through the competent authority of that Member State, for detailed 
explanations relating to the subject matter of the inspection. However, the national judicial 
authority may not call into question the necessity for the inspection nor demand that it be 
provided with the information in the Commission's file. The lawfulness of the Commission's 




1. The Commission may by decision impose on the persons referred to in Article 3(1)b, 
undertakings or associations of undertakings, fines not exceeding 1 % of the aggregate turnover 
of the undertaking or association of undertakings concerned within the meaning of Article 5 
where, intentionally or negligently: 
(a) they supply incorrect or misleading information in a submission, certification, notification or 
supplement thereto, pursuant to Article 4, Article 10(5) or Article 22(3); 
(b) they supply incorrect or misleading information in response to a request made pursuant to 
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Article 11(2); 
(c) in response to a request made by decision adopted pursuant to Article 11(3), they supply 
incorrect, incomplete or misleading information or do not supply information within the required 
time limit; 
(d) they produce the required books or other records related to the business in incomplete form 
during inspections under Article 13, or refuse to submit to an inspection ordered by decision 
taken pursuant to Article 13(4); 
(e) in response to a question asked in accordance with Article 13(2)(e), 
- they give an incorrect or misleading answer, 
- they fail to rectify within a time limit set by the Commission an incorrect, incomplete or 
misleading answer given by a member of staff, or 
- they fail or refuse to provide a complete answer on facts relating to the subject matter and 
purpose of an inspection ordered by a decision adopted pursuant to Article 13(4); 
(f) seals affixed by officials or other accompanying persons authorised by the Commission in 
accordance with Article 13(2)(d) have been broken. 
2. The Commission may by decision impose fines not exceeding 10 % of the aggregate turnover 
of the undertaking concerned within the meaning of Article 5 on the persons referred to in Article 
3(1)b or the undertakings concerned where, either intentionally or negligently, they: 
(a) fail to notify a concentration in accordance with Articles 4 or 22(3) prior to its 
implementation, unless they are expressly authorised to do so by Article 7(2) or by a decision 
taken pursuant to Article 7(3); 
(b) implement a concentration in breach of Article 7; 
(c) implement a concentration declared incompatible with the common market by decision 
pursuant to Article 8(3) or do not comply with any measure ordered by decision pursuant to 
Article 8(4) or (5); 
(d) fail to comply with a condition or an obligation imposed by decision pursuant to Articles 
6(1)(b), Article 7(3) or Article 8(2), second subparagraph. 
3. In fixing the amount of the fine, regard shall be had to the nature, gravity and duration of the 
infringement. 
4. Decisions taken pursuant to paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 shall not be of a criminal law nature. 
 
Article 15 
Periodic penalty payments 
1. The Commission may by decision impose on the persons referred to in Article 3(1)b, 
undertakings or associations of undertakings, periodic penalty payments not exceeding 5 % of the 
average daily aggregate turnover of the undertaking or association of undertakings concerned 
within the meaning of Article 5 for each working day of delay, calculated from the date set in the 
decision, in order to compel them: 
(a) to supply complete and correct information which it has requested by decision taken pursuant 
to Article 11(3); 
(b) to submit to an inspection which it has ordered by decision taken pursuant to Article 13(4); 
(c) to comply with an obligation imposed by decision pursuant to Article 6(1)(b), Article 7(3) or 
Article 8(2), second subparagraph; or; 
(d) to comply with any measures ordered by decision pursuant to Article 8(4) or (5). 
2. Where the persons referred to in Article 3(1)(b), undertakings or associations of undertakings 
have satisfied the obligation which the periodic penalty payment was intended to enforce, the 
Commission may fix the definitive amount of the periodic penalty payments at a figure lower 
than that which would arise under the original decision. 
 
Article 16 
Review by the Court of Justice 
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The Court of Justice shall have unlimited jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 229 of the 
Treaty to review decisions whereby the Commission has fixed a fine or periodic penalty 




1. Information acquired as a result of the application of this Regulation shall be used only for the 
purposes of the relevant request, investigation or hearing. 
2. Without prejudice to Article 4(3), Articles 18 and 20, the Commission and the competent 
authorities of the Member States, their officials and other servants and other persons working 
under the supervision of these authorities as well as officials and civil servants of other authorities 
of the Member States shall not disclose information they have acquired through the application of 
this Regulation of the kind covered by the obligation of professional secrecy. 
3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not prevent publication of general information or of surveys which do 
not contain information relating to particular undertakings or associations of undertakings. 
 
Article 18 
Hearing of the parties and of third persons 
1. Before taking any decision provided for in Article 6(3), Article 7(3), Article 8(2) to (6), and 
Articles 14 and 15, the Commission shall give the persons, undertakings and associations of 
undertakings concerned the opportunity, at every stage of the procedure up to the consultation of 
the Advisory Committee, of making known their views on the objections against them. 
2. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, a decision pursuant to Articles 7(3) and 8(5) may be 
taken provisionally, without the persons, undertakings or associations of undertakings concerned 
being given the opportunity to make known their views beforehand, provided that the 
Commission gives them that opportunity as soon as possible after having taken its decision. 
3. The Commission shall base its decision only on objections on which the parties have been able 
to submit their observations. The rights of the defence shall be fully respected in the proceedings. 
Access to the file shall be open at least to the parties directly involved, subject to the legitimate 
interest of undertakings in the protection of their business secrets. 
4. In so far as the Commission or the competent authorities of the Member States deem it 
necessary, they may also hear other natural or legal persons. Natural or legal persons showing a 
sufficient interest and especially members of the administrative or management bodies of the 
undertakings concerned or the recognised representatives of their employees shall be entitled, 
upon application, to be heard. 
 
Article 19 
Liaison with the authorities of the Member States 
1. The Commission shall transmit to the competent authorities of the Member States copies of 
notifications within three working days and, as soon as possible, copies of the most important 
documents lodged with or issued by the Commission pursuant to this Regulation. Such 
documents shall include commitments offered by the undertakings concerned vis-à-vis the 
Commission with a view to rendering the concentration compatible with the common market 
pursuant to Article 6(2) or Article 8(2), second subparagraph. 
2. The Commission shall carry out the procedures set out in this Regulation in close and constant 
liaison with the competent authorities of the Member States, which may express their views upon 
those procedures. For the purposes of Article 9 it shall obtain information from the competent 
authority of the Member State as referred to in paragraph 2 of that Article and give it the 
opportunity to make known its views at every stage of the procedure up to the adoption of a 
decision pursuant to paragraph 3 of that Article; to that end it shall give it access to the file. 
3. An Advisory Committee on concentrations shall be consulted before any decision is taken 
pursuant to Article 8(1) to (6), Articles 14 or 15 with the exception of provisional decisions taken 
in accordance with Article 18(2). 
4. The Advisory Committee shall consist of representatives of the competent authorities of the 
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Member States. Each Member State shall appoint one or two representatives; if unable to attend, 
they may be replaced by other representatives. At least one of the representatives of a Member 
State shall be competent in matters of restrictive practices and dominant positions. 
5. Consultation shall take place at a joint meeting convened at the invitation of and chaired by the 
Commission. A summary of the case, together with an indication of the most important 
documents and a preliminary draft of the decision to be taken for each case considered, shall be 
sent with the invitation. The meeting shall take place not less than 10 working days after the 
invitation has been sent. The Commission may in exceptional cases shorten that period as 
appropriate in order to avoid serious harm to one or more of the undertakings concerned by a 
concentration. 
6. The Advisory Committee shall deliver an opinion on the Commission's draft decision, if 
necessary by taking a vote. The Advisory Committee may deliver an opinion even if some 
members are absent and unrepresented. The opinion shall be delivered in writing and appended to 
the draft decision. The Commission shall take the utmost account of the opinion delivered by the 
Committee. It shall inform the Committee of the manner in which its opinion has been taken into 
account. 
7. The Commission shall communicate the opinion of the Advisory Committee, together with the 
decision, to the addressees of the decision. It shall make the opinion public together with the 




Publication of decisions 
1. The Commission shall publish the decisions which it takes pursuant to Article 8(1) to (6), 
Articles 14 and 15 with the exception of provisional decisions taken in accordance with Article 
18(2) together with the opinion of the Advisory Committee in the Official Journal of the 
European Union. 
2. The publication shall state the names of the parties and the main content of the decision; it shall 
have regard to the legitimate interest of undertakings in the protection of their business secrets. 
 
Article 21 
Application of the Regulation and jurisdiction 
1. This Regulation alone shall apply to concentrations as defined in Article 3, and Council 
Regulations (EC) No 1/2003(8), (EEC) No 1017/68(9), (EEC) No 4056/86(10) and (EEC) No 
3975/87(11) shall not apply, except in relation to joint ventures that do not have a Community 
dimension and which have as their object or effect the coordination of the competitive behaviour 
of undertakings that remain independent. 
2. Subject to review by the Court of Justice, the Commission shall have sole jurisdiction to take 
the decisions provided for in this Regulation. 
3. No Member State shall apply its national legislation on competition to any concentration that 
has a Community dimension. 
The first subparagraph shall be without prejudice to any Member State's power to carry out any 
enquiries necessary for the application of Articles 4(4), 9(2) or after referral, pursuant to Article 
9(3), first subparagraph, indent (b), or Article 9(5), to take the measures strictly necessary for the 
application of Article 9(8). 
4. Notwithstanding paragraphs 2 and 3, Member States may take appropriate measures to protect 
legitimate interests other than those taken into consideration by this Regulation and compatible 
with the general principles and other provisions of Community law. 
Public security, plurality of the media and prudential rules shall be regarded as legitimate 
interests within the meaning of the first subparagraph. 
Any other public interest must be communicated to the Commission by the Member State 
concerned and shall be recognised by the Commission after an assessment of its compatibility 
with the general principles and other provisions of Community law before the measures referred 
to above may be taken. The Commission shall inform the Member State concerned of its decision 
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within 25 working days of that communication. 
 
Article 22 
Referral to the Commission 
1. One or more Member States may request the Commission to examine any concentration as 
defined in Article 3 that does not have a Community dimension within the meaning of Article 1 
but affects trade between Member States and threatens to significantly affect competition within 
the territory of the Member State or States making the request. 
Such a request shall be made at most within 15 working days of the date on which the 
concentration was notified, or if no notification is required, otherwise made known to the 
Member State concerned. 
2. The Commission shall inform the competent authorities of the Member States and the 
undertakings concerned of any request received pursuant to paragraph 1 without delay. 
Any other Member State shall have the right to join the initial request within a period of 15 
working days of being informed by the Commission of the initial request. 
All national time limits relating to the concentration shall be suspended until, in accordance with 
the procedure set out in this Article, it has been decided where the concentration shall be 
examined. As soon as a Member State has informed the Commission and the undertakings 
concerned that it does not wish to join the request, the suspension of its national time limits shall 
end. 
3. The Commission may, at the latest 10 working days after the expiry of the period set in 
paragraph 2, decide to examine, the concentration where it considers that it affects trade between 
Member States and threatens to significantly affect competition within the territory of the 
Member State or States making the request. If the Commission does not take a decision within 
this period, it shall be deemed to have adopted a decision to examine the concentration in 
accordance with the request. 
The Commission shall inform all Member States and the undertakings concerned of its decision. 
It may request the submission of a notification pursuant to Article 4. 
The Member State or States having made the request shall no longer apply their national 
legislation on competition to the concentration. 
4. Article 2, Article 4(2) to (3), Articles 5, 6, and 8 to 21 shall apply where the Commission 
examines a concentration pursuant to paragraph 3. Article 7 shall apply to the extent that the 
concentration has not been implemented on the date on which the Commission informs the 
undertakings concerned that a request has been made. 
Where a notification pursuant to Article 4 is not required, the period set in Article 10(1) within 
which proceedings may be initiated shall begin on the working day following that on which the 
Commission informs the undertakings concerned that it has decided to examine the concentration 
pursuant to paragraph 3. 
5. The Commission may inform one or several Member States that it considers a concentration 
fulfils the criteria in paragraph 1. In such cases, the Commission may invite that Member State or 




1. The Commission shall have the power to lay down in accordance with the procedure referred 
to in paragraph 2: 
(a) implementing provisions concerning the form, content and other details of notifications and 
submissions pursuant to Article 4; 
(b) implementing provisions concerning time limits pursuant to Article 4(4), (5) Articles 7, 9, 10 
and 22; 
(c) the procedure and time limits for the submission and implementation of commitments 
pursuant to Article 6(2) and Article 8(2); 
(d) implementing provisions concerning hearings pursuant to Article 18. 
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2. The Commission shall be assisted by an Advisory Committee, composed of representatives of 
the Member States. 
(a) Before publishing draft implementing provisions and before adopting such provisions, the 
Commission shall consult the Advisory Committee. 
(b) Consultation shall take place at a meeting convened at the invitation of and chaired by the 
Commission. A draft of the implementing provisions to be taken shall be sent with the invitation. 
The meeting shall take place not less than 10 working days after the invitation has been sent. 
(c) The Advisory Committee shall deliver an opinion on the draft implementing provisions, if 
necessary by taking a vote. The Commission shall take the utmost account of the opinion 
delivered by the Committee. 
 
Article 24 
Relations with third countries 
1. The Member States shall inform the Commission of any general difficulties encountered by 
their undertakings with concentrations as defined in Article 3 in a third country. 
2. Initially not more than one year after the entry into force of this Regulation and, thereafter 
periodically, the Commission shall draw up a report examining the treatment accorded to 
undertakings having their seat or their principal fields of activity in the Community, in the terms 
referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4, as regards concentrations in third countries. The Commission 
shall submit those reports to the Council, together with any recommendations. 
3. Whenever it appears to the Commission, either on the basis of the reports referred to in 
paragraph 2 or on the basis of other information, that a third country does not grant undertakings 
having their seat or their principal fields of activity in the Community, treatment comparable to 
that granted by the Community to undertakings from that country, the Commission may submit 
proposals to the Council for an appropriate mandate for negotiation with a view to obtaining 
comparable treatment for undertakings having their seat or their principal fields of activity in the 
Community. 
4. Measures taken under this Article shall comply with the obligations of the Community or of 
the Member States, without prejudice to Article 307 of the Treaty, under international 




1. Without prejudice to Article 26(2), Regulations (EEC) No 4064/89 and (EC) No 1310/97 shall 
be repealed with effect from 1 May 2004. 
2. References to the repealed Regulations shall be construed as references to this Regulation and 
shall be read in accordance with the correlation table in the Annex. 
 
Article 26 
Entry into force and transitional provisions 
1. This Regulation shall enter into force on the 20th day following that of its publication in the 
Official Journal of the European Union. 
It shall apply from 1 May 2004. 
2. Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 shall continue to apply to any concentration which was the 
subject of an agreement or announcement or where control was acquired within the meaning of 
Article 4(1) of that Regulation before the date of application of this Regulation, subject, in 
particular, to the provisions governing applicability set out in Article 25(2) and (3) of Regulation 
(EEC) No 4064/89 and Article 2 of Regulation (EEC) No 1310/97. 
3. As regards concentrations to which this Regulation applies by virtue of accession, the date of 
accession shall be substituted for the date of application of this Regulation. 
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. 
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Done at Brussels, 20 January 2004. 
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ANNEX 2:     Key Dates to the European Merger Control Regulation  
Date Event Institution Substance 
1951 Treaty of Paris European Coal and Steel Community Articles 65 & 66 
June 1956 Spaak Report Basis for the Treaty of Rome It is 'necessary to seek to establish a single industrial base for the Community as a 
whole. This involves the formulation of measures that ensure that mergers 
affecting firms established in the Community (…)' 
1957 Treaty of Rome Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
France, Germany, Italy 
Articles 85 & 86, and Article 3(f) 
1966 Memorandum on the problems of 
concentrations in the Common 
market 
Commission Application possible of Article 86 to the control of mergers. 
Article 85 is considered not applicable. 
June 1971 Berkhouwer Report European Parliament There should be prior notification of merger resulting in firms exceeding a certain 
size or holding more than a stated share in the market 
December 1971 Continental Can decision Commission Application of Article 86 to mergers 
October 1972 Paris Summit Heads of State or of Government Called for the formulation of measures to ensure that mergers involving firms 
established in the Community are in harmony with the economic and social aims 
of the Community and the maintenance of fair competition 
October 1972 Political Announcement Commission The Commission will submit, independently of the application of Article 86 to 
specific cases, proposals designed to introduce a more systematic control of 
merger operations of a given scale.  
February 1973 Continental Can Case European Court of Justice Clarification of the question of the application of Article 86 to combinations 
effected within the common market by firms in a dominant position 
June 1973 Proposal for Regulation Commission Proposal for a Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings 
based on Articles 87 and 235.  
July 1973 24th Conference of Government 
Experts of Member States on 
Restrictive Agreements and 
Dominant Position (Brussels) 
Commission Preliminary discussion with relevant national authorities on draft regulation 
establishing more systematic control over business concentrations 
July 1975 Communication to Council Commission Asked the Council to give priority to the proposal 
March 1976 Interim Report to the Permanent 
Representatives Committee 
Council Working Party on Economic 
Questions 
Areas of difficulties: 
- Principle of pre-merger control and legal basis for regulation 
- Field of application 
- Possibility of derogation from any prohibition 
- Notification of planned mergers 
- Decision-making procedures  
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1981 Amended Proposal for a 
Regulation 
Commission Two political problems addressed: 
- Conditions for applying Community rules 
- Association of Member States in Decision-making process 
February 1984 Amendments to the proposed 
regulation on control of 
concentrations 
Commission Although the majority of Member States have expressed their approval of the 
principles of merger control, views on details and certain essential points remain 
quite divergent.  
1986 Amendments to the proposed 





Philip Morris Case European Court of Justice Application of Article 85 possible to mergers 
30 November 
1987 
Meeting Council Positive attitude on Commission’s approach and prepared to give priority to the 
proposal 
April 1988 Amended proposal for regulation Commission  
18 November 
1988 
Meeting Council Basic problems are: 
- exclusive competence of Commission 
- compatibility and incompatibility requirements 
25 November 
1988 
Amended proposal  Commission - Definition of concentration having a Community dimension 
- Compatibility requirements 
- Commission and sole competence 
- Suspension period 
December 1988 Meeting  Council No definitive decision 
1988 Decisions under Article 86 Commission - Irish Distillers Group 
- British Airways/British Caledonian 
December 1989 Meeting  Council Adoption of Commission’s proposal for the control of concentrations between 
undertakings 
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ANNEX 4 : Different types of mergers and effects 
Types of merger Definition Potential effects of merger type Examples 
HORIZONTAL  Occur when a merger takes place 
between competitors in the same 
product and geographic markets 
and at the same level of 
production or distribution cycle.  
As a general proposition, horizontal mergers 
present a greater danger to competition than 
vertical ones – ‘unilateral effects’ or 
‘coordinated effects’. 
Carnival/P&O Princess (M.2706) 
 
Airtours/First Choice (M.1524) 
 
SEB/Foereningssparbanken (aborted) 
VERTICAL  May be experienced when a 
merger occurs between firms 
that operate at different levels of 
the market: a firm may acquire 
control of another firm further 
up or further down the 
distribution chain (backward or 
forward integration) 
Vertical integration may have a harmful effect 
on competition, in particular if it gives rise to a 
risk of the market becoming foreclosed to third 
parties (e.g. a firm downstream in the market 
acquires a, upstream undertaking that has 
monopoly power in relation to an important raw 
material and input: concerns that competitors in 
the downstream market will be unable to obtain 
supplies of the raw material or input, or they 








Nordic Satellite Distribution (M.490) 
CONGLOMERATE 
 
A merger that brings together 
firms which do not compete with 
each other in any product market 
and which does not entail 
vertical integration. There are 
three types: 
- product line extension 
- market extension 
- pure conglomerates 
Whether conglomerate mergers should be 
controlled at all is a matter for controversy. US 
law long ago abandoned any interest in the 
conglomerate effects of mergers.  
However in recent years the European 
Commission has expressed concern about ‘the 
portfolio’ or ‘range effect’.  




Tetra Laval v Commission – the CFI 
recognised that the effects of 
conglomerate mergers are generally 
neutral, or even beneficial to 
competition.   
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Annex 5 : Different European national merger regimes 
Jurisdiction Entering 
in force of 
merger 
regime  
Authority in charge of national merger 
regulation 
Substantive Test applied Notification procedure 
Austria 1993 The Federal Competition Authority 
(Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde) 
Dominant position test Compulsory and Ex ante 
Belgium 1991 Commission Bancaire et Financiere create or strengthen a 
“dominant position”  
that significantly hinders 
effective competition 
within the  
relevant market  
Compulsory and Ex ante 
Bulgaria 1998 the Commission on the Protection of 
Competition (independent body) 
Concerned with the 
establishment or 
strengthening of a dominant 
position, where such a 
dominant position would 
materially limit or impede 
competition in the relevant 
market. 
Compulsory and Ex ante 
Cyprus 1999 Cyprus Commission for the Protection of 
Competition 
EC’s former dominance test Compulsory and ex post 
Czech 
Republic 
2001 Office for the Protection of Economic 
Competition 
Result in substantial 
distortion of economic 
competition especially due 
to fact that it would lead to 
the strengthening of a 
dominant position of either 
of the merging 
undertakings 
Compulsory, no defined deadline 
Denmark 2000 The Competition Council (“Konkurrencerådet”) 
and the Competition Authority 
(“Konkurrencestyrelsen”) 
EC’s current significant 
impediment to effective 
competition test 
Compulsory and ex post 
Estonia 2001 The Competition Board (“Konkurentsiamet”) significantly damages 
competition in particular 
Compulsory and ex ante and ex post 
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through the creating or 
strengthening of a dominant 
position 
Finland 1998 Finnish Competition Authority SIC – significantly impede 
competition 
Compulsory and ex ante (thresholds) 
France 1986 • The Ministry for Economy, Finance and 
Industry (DGCCRF ) 
• Conseil de la Concurrence (advisory 
role) 
significantly lessens 
competition, especially by 
creating or strengthening an 
individual or dominant 
position. 
Compulsory  and Ex ante (thresholds) 
Germany 1958 The Federal Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt) former ECMR’s dominance 
test 
Notification is compulsory. There is no 
deadline for filing but the transaction may not 
be implemented unless and until it has been 
approved 
Hungary 1996 Hungarian Competition Office 
(independent) 
EC’s former dominance test Compulsory and ex post  
Greece 1977 the Hellenic Competition Commission SIC – significantly impede 
competition 
Compulsory, ex ante and ex post 
Ireland 1991 The Irish Competition Authority 
independent statutory body 
SLC test Compulsory and ex post 
Italy 1990 Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del 
Mercato  
Independent body from the government  
EC’s former dominance test Compulsory and ex ante 
Latvia 2002 The Competition Council (Konkurences 
padome) 
appointed by the Latvian government (Cabinet 
of Ministers) and it is subordinate to the 
Ministry of Economics 
EC’s former “dominance” 
test 
Compulsory and ex ante 
Lithuania 1999 Competition Council of the Republic of 
Lithuania 
independent 
The Law on Competition 
prohibits any 
concentrations that (a) 
create or strengthen a 
dominant position; or (b) 
result in significant 
impediment of competition 
in the relevant market. 
Compulsory and ex ante 
Luxemburg  The Conseil de la Concurrence (independent 
body) and the Inspection de la Concurrence (a 
 the undertakings concerned cannot even file a 
voluntary notification with the competition 
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department within the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs that receives competition law-related 
complaints) 
authorities. Ex post 
Malta 2002 Director of the Office for Fair Competition and 
the Commission for Fair Trading  
the “substantial lessening of 
competition test” (“SLC 
Test”) 
Compulsory and ex post 
Netherlands 1998 The Dutch Competition Authority, the 
Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit (“NMa”)  
an independent administrative body 
the EC’s former dominance 
test 
Compulsory and ex ante 
Poland 2000 President of the Office for Competition and 
Consumer Protection ( “Prezes Urzêdu Ochrony 
Konkurencji i Konsumentów”) 
the UOKiK President will no longer be an 
independent authority 
whether competition on the 
market will not be 
substantially restricted, in 
particular by creating or 
strengthening the 
controlling market position 
Compulsory and ex ante 
Portugal 2003 Autoridade da Concorrência (“Competition 
Authority”) 
the EC’s former dominance 
test 
Compulsory and ex post 
Romania 1997 Romanian Competition Council whether the transaction 
leads (or could lead) to the 
creation or the 
consolidation of a dominant 
position on the relevant 
market on which the 
transaction takes place. 
Compulsory and ex post 
Slovakia 2001 The Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak 
Republic Office is headed by a Chairperson 
appointed and recalled by the President of the 
Slovak Republic based on a proposal of the 
Slovak Government. 
the EC’s former dominance 
test 
Compulsory and ex post 
Slovenia 1999 The Slovenian Competition Protection Office Corresponds broadly to the 
European Commission’s 
“substantial impediment to 
effective competition test”. 
Compulsory and ex post 
Spain 1989 The “Servicio de Defensa de la Competencia” 
(SDC), a Directorate General within the 
Ministry of Economy which conducts the 
investigation in the first phase of the procedure. 
Equivalent to the 
“substantial lessening of 
competition” test used 
under the EC Merger 
Regulation 
notification of a concentration to the Spanish 
competition authority is compulsory.  
Under the Spanish merger control regime, 
notification must be filed before the execution 
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The Minister of Economy, who has the power, 
upon the proposal of the SDC, to authorise 
mergers after the first phase of the procedure or 
to refer the case to the TDC for a second-phase 
investigation. 
The “Tribunal de Defensa de la Competencia” 
(TDC), an autonomous body independent from 
the Ministry of Economy.  After a second-phase 
analysis in the merger procedure it issues a non-
binding report that is referred to the 
Government. 
The Government (Council of Ministers), which 
is entitled, under Law 16/1989, to forbid or 
approve (with or without conditions) a proposed 
transaction at the end of the second-phase 
investigation upon the proposal of the TDC 
of the transaction 
 
Sweden 1993 Swedish Competition Authority (the 
Competition Authority) and the Stockholm 
District Court 
corresponds to the former 
dominance test as applied 
under EC law 
an obligation to notify the transaction to the 
Competition Authority when the jurisdictional 




1973 the Office of Fair Trading (“OFT”) and the 
Competition Commission (“CC”).   
Substantial lessening of 
competition. 
not compulsory in the UK; accordingly there 
is no deadline for notification but the OFT has 
the power to review mergers whether or not 
they are notified 
 
 
